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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 The Lost Decades 
The 1980s and 1990s have been labelled the “lost decades” of Africa. Following the 
initially promising economic growth of the post-independence years, most African 
countries were hit hard by the oil crisis in 1973 and the subsequent stagnation of the world 
economy. In many parts of the continent, the result was a deep debt crisis, which 
paralysed economies for many years to come. The consequences of the mounting debt 
were devastating both economically and socially. From 1981 to 1996 nearly half of all 
African nations “experienced significant episodes of violent conflict between government 
and opposition groups”1. Although ethnic atrocities sparked many of these conflicts, one 
can hardly downplay the significance of poverty and economic woes in generating social 
unrest. While economic growth has picked up again in the new millennia, Africa remains 
the poorest continent in the world.  
The history of independent Zambia illustrates vividly the general trajectory of African 
economic development. Formerly known as Northern Rhodesia, the British protectorate 
gained independence in 1964. The republic’s first president, Kenneth Kaunda, established 
a semi-authoritarian socialist one-party state and reigned for over 25 years. Rich in natural 
resources, Zambia rapidly emerged as one of the most prosperous states in Africa. 
However, the Zambian economy was too heavily reliant on its mining industry and 
economic troubles commenced when copper prices plummeted in 1975. As revenues from 
the mining sector dropped, the state was unable to sustain growth and a severe economic 
downturn followed. The Zambian government turned to the international financial 
institutions (IFIs)2 and other creditors for aid in the form of debt. Despite receiving 
substantial loans, Zambia was unable to recover and a large part of the population was 
                                                             
1 Goldsmith 2001, 128. 
2 This abbreviation refers to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. When referring to just 
one of these institutions I will employ the commonly used terms: The Fund and the Bank. 
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dragged into poverty. By the 1990s, the real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita had 
nearly halved since independence3. 
The turbulent 1970s brought an end to the Bretton Woods system4 that had set the rules 
for the global economy since World War II. The upheavals of the decade also transformed 
the role of the IFIs, created in Bretton Woods. Originally, the International Monetary 
Fund’s purpose was to oversee fixed currency exchange rates between countries and to 
provide short-term capital to aid balance of payments5 problems. The World Bank was 
operating with a mandate of granting loans to poor countries in order to bolster 
development. These loans were often tied to projects for building infrastructure in the 
developing states.  
In the 1980s the Fund and the Bank started issuing loans which were characterised by 
heavy conditionality. From the 1950s onwards, conditions had been attached to loans but 
they were mostly in the form of macroeconomic policy guidelines. Three decades later, 
very specific economic conditions and benchmarks accompanied the loans. In 1979, the 
conditional loan programs, catered to serve the needs of developing countries in financial 
distress, were named structural adjustment programs (SAPs). There were several reasons 
behind the transformation of the financial institutions. One can argue that the economists 
working in the IFIs – most of whom had studied in Western universities –  were simply 
doing their best to help poor countries in debt problems and thus decided to develop their 
lending strategies. To some extent this is certainly true, but the picture becomes more 
complex if one considers that the underlying goal of the IFIs is to ensure their return of 
capital. After all, their aid was in the form of loans.    
                                                             
3 World Bank Open Data, 13 March 2019. GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$): Zambia. The economic 
hardships were aggravated in Zambia by rapid population growth. 
4 The Bretton Woods system was a pioneering experiment because for the first time in history independent 
states created a regulatory order for international monetary relations. The Fund had an essential role within 
the system as an interventionist organ. The Bretton Woods system can broadly be described as a 
combination of Keynesian economic control and a liberal attitude towards trade. The latter was endorsed 
because high tariffs and other protective measures were seen as significant reasons in making the Great 
Depression so devastating in the 1930s. However, state control was also encouraged since Keynesian 
economics relied on the state’s ability to stimulate domestic demand and manage unemployment.     
5 Balance of payments refers to the sum of transactions of a particular state with the rest of the world. The 
revenues of a state consist for example of exports, foreign investment and foreign debt, whereas imports 
and the payments of debt can be counted as state expenses. Under the fixed exchange rate system of the 
Bretton Woods era. this meant that a deficit in the balance of payments would deplete the central bank’s 
reserves of foreign currency. This in turn was followed by downward pressure on the value of the domestic 
currency and thus a heightened risk of an inflationary spiral. (Ylönen 2012, 22.) 
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One can also view the birth of the SAPs as a manifestation of a paradigmatic shift in the 
field of economics. The 1970s witnessed, not only the crumbling of the world economy, 
but also the downfall of Keynesian economics, dominant since World War II. The assault 
on Keynesian economics was led by Milton Friedman and his associates from the so-
called Chicago school of economics. They rekindled the classical idea that a simple set 
of abstract laws governed economics. State control was to be minimised and free markets 
along with unrestricted movement of capital promoted. By the 1980s, these neoliberal 
ideals dictated economic policies in most parts of the Western world with Ronald 
Reagan’s administration (1981–1989) in the United States (US), as well as Margaret 
Thatcher’s government (1979–1990) in the United Kingdom (UK), endorsing them. The 
proliferation of neoliberal economic policies was epitomised in the birth of the 
Washington Consensus6, a 10-point list of economic policies targeted to the developing 
countries and designed together by the IFIs and the US Treasury Department. Thus, the 
imprint of neoliberalism was clearly visible in the SAPs. In order to receive loans, strict 
austerity and balanced budgets were required. In addition, conditions often included 
privatisation of state-owned companies, cutting corporate taxes, letting in foreign capital 
and liberalising trade.    
 
1.2 Research Questions and Methods  
The debt crisis and IFI’s policies in Africa have been researched at length. In my opinion, 
however, too many of the studies follow a rather distinct dogmatic perspective in doing 
so. Quite commonly, the debt crisis and consequent painful adjustment processes are 
portrayed as either caused by corrupt African regimes or as by-products of the meddling 
perpetrated by the imperialist US government. The one-sided accounts can at least 
partially be explained by the sheer complexity of the question. The economic relations 
that connect a Zambian subsistence farmer to the corridors of power in Washington are 
indeed complicated. In order to make sense of this multifaceted research question it was 
paramount for me, from the very beginning, to divide the question into smaller fragments. 
                                                             
6 The term was coined by the English economist John Williamson. Later it took on a broader meaning 
describing the neoliberal agenda in the developing countries more generally.    
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Thus, the central goal of this research can be summarized in two chronologically tied 
questions: 
1. How did conditionality develop in the IFIs and what was the role of US influence and 
neoliberalism in this process?   
2. How was this reflected in the case of Zambia? 
In this study I will examine relationships shaped by power and authority. For this reason, 
I feel that it is important to point out my own position, which could be roughly located in 
a postcolonial terrain. My theoretical framework follows a line of thought, which its 
creator, Julian Go, has tentatively named “postcolonial relationalism”. Go argues that 
postcolonial theory and the social sciences are incompatible because of the “analytical 
bifurcation” inherent in the latter, meaning the pervasive practise to make a distinction 
between “us” and “them”. 7  
Go proposes a relational approach as a solution to the dilemma.  Relationalism is an age-
old sociological method, which emphasises the role of interactions and relations as the 
constitutive elements of social reality, in opposition to treating essences and substances 
as the static agents of existence, as is the case in relationalism’s theoretical antonym, 
“substantialism”.8 A somewhat similar reasoning can be identified behind “connected 
histories”, a concept elucidated finely in the work of Gurminder K. Bhambra.9 The idea 
of connected histories acknowledges the existence of different histories and highlights 
the importance of their interplay in constructing narratives that are more complete.10  
However, I want to highlight the fact that my intention is not to apply this theory 
extensively in the study. I have chosen to include it in the introduction, because I feel that 
it captures my own approach in such a satisfactory way. After all, the aim of this study is 
not to build a comprehensive postcolonial critique of the IFI’s policies in Africa, while 
that in itself certainly would be a task worth considering. My goal is simply to offer a 
nuanced analysis by using Zambia as a case study. As a result of the relational approach, 
the disposition of this study may seem contrived at times, but the clear-cut separation of 
                                                             
7 Go 2016, 104–105. 
8 Go 2016, 118. 
9 Bhambra, 2007. The economic historian Sanjay Subrahmanyam originally formulated the idea of 
“Connected histories”.  
10 Bhambra, 2007, 33. 
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the questions into two distinct chapters has been essential for me in the attempt to grasp 
the complex subject.  
In the second chapter I will delve into the evolution of the IFIs. First, I will investigate 
the emergence of conditional loans and track their development to becoming valid and 
trusted policy options in the institutions. Later, the focus will switch into tracing the 
influence of US authority and neoliberalism in the SAPs of the 1980s. In order to obtain 
comprehensive answers to these questions, an understanding of the organisational 
structure and voting mechanism of the IFIs is required. I will also scrutinise the 
similarities and differences between the Bank’s and the Fund’s lending policies. The 
second part of the chapter will focus on the years of Reagan’s presidency because that era 
marked the expansion of SAPs in terms of both sheer number and degree of 
conditionality.  
The IFIs are both highly complex international organisations. In studying them, I have 
borrowed the theoretical approach of Sarah Babb. In her own words it is best described 
as “broadly inspired by the institutionalist tradition within the sociology of 
organisations”11. This perspective highlights that, like private corporations, the IFIs are 
principally organisations which are dependent on their shareholders in securing their 
resources.12 In this case, the US is by far the most important shareholder and considerable 
power is also wielded by other big industrial nations, namely the UK, France, Germany 
and Japan. Whilst this survivalist explanation describes the internal logic of the 
institutions, external influence is exerted in a different way. Babb argues that the 
organisations policies are shaped by two social systems that she identifies as national 
politics and expert knowledge. The end result is “policy programs”13 that combine 
political interests and academic ideas about economics.  
In the third chapter I will present the case of Zambia as a chronological account. The 
Zambian experience demonstrates how a relatively small and open economy, affected by 
global price fluctuations of a single raw material, can struggle economically and lose its 
economic autonomy to some degree. Given that the economic impacts of the SAPs in 
Zambia have been quite extensively studied, my intention is not to focus on the outcomes 
                                                             
11 Babb 2009, 33. 
12 Babb 2009, 33. 
13 The term was originally coined by the political sociologist John Campbell. 
 6 
 
of the policies per se. The key question asked in the third chapter is: how did the evolution 
of conditionality in the IFIs and the American influence – recorded in the previous chapter 
– reflect itself in the case of Zambia? 
In the third chapter I will mainly apply standard economic theory. In the beginning of the 
chapter some useful economic concepts, namely the “Dutch disease” and the so called 
“resource curse”, will be introduced. Despite their shortcomings, I believe the concepts 
to be good tools in understanding the distinct characteristics of the Zambian economy. 
The Zambian case dictates the temporal reach of the study as the investigation begins 
with Northern Rhodesia gaining independence in 1964 and ends in Kaunda losing the free 
elections of October 1991. 
My motivation for this study stems from a couple of convictions. First, I believe that the 
larger public is generally unaware of the true power of the IFIs. In Finland, political 
interest towards the IFIs has been marginal and the relationship between the state and the 
institutions has been mostly sustained by civil servants.14 Furthermore, the operations of 
the IFIs should be scrutinised thoroughly, because, more often than not, countries 
encountering financial crises have very little room for choice in terms of options. Most 
importantly, the policies formulated by the IFIs have had an effect on the lives of 
hundreds of millions of people.  
 
1.3 Sources and Literature 
The best part in conducting a study that treats recent history is the large number of sources 
available. My main set of sources consists of documents of the Fund and the Bank. These 
papers are openly accessible in the online archives of the institutions. There is, however, 
a substantial difference in the openness of these organisations. While the Bank provides 
open access to all its documents, the Fund has historically been a lot more secretive and 
only opened its executive board documents for the public in 2007. In addition to historical 
archives, both institutions have impressive online data banks, which are open to the 
public. The IMF Data Mapper and World Bank Open Data centres have been extremely 
useful in providing some essential figures of the Zambian economy.  
                                                             
14 Ylönen, 2012, 8.  
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The Bank celebrated its first 50 years by collecting an impressive database of oral history 
from its former and current employees. These documents have been transcribed and they 
are located in the Bank’s online archives. Due to the utility of the interviews I have 
deployed them more in the second chapter, and consequently my sources are somewhat 
biased toward the Bank. This partiality can be justified for two reasons. Firstly, the Bank 
and the Fund are in many ways very similar institutions. Their organisational structures 
are alike and they are both based in Washington. Secondly, most scholars would agree 
that the Fund has historically been more vulnerable to American influence. Thus, 
analogous examples of US meddling in the Bank most likely hold true with the Fund as 
well. The bias disappears in the third chapter as I actually utilise Fund documents more, 
mainly because the organisation had a slightly more decisive role in the Zambian debt 
crisis.    
Finding secondary sources has proven rather problematic. This is not due to a lack of 
literature, quite the opposite. The sheer number of studies was at first somewhat 
overwhelming, but I have managed to find relevant books and articles amongst them. 
Sarah Babb presents a thorough account of the birth of the Washington Consensus in her 
book Behind the Development Banks: Washington Politics, World Poverty, and the 
Wealth of Nations. Likewise, Matti Ylönen’s research on the history of the IFIs has 
provided me with some excellent insights.15 The critical collection of articles edited by 
Jan-Bart Gewald, Marja Hinfelaar and Giacomo Macola has offered me an astute 
overview of the rather contested interpretations of Zambia’s postcolonial history.16 
Another extremely useful volume in the Zambian context has been Zambia, Mining, and 
Neoliberalism: Boom and Bust on the Globalized Copperbelt, edited by Alistair Fraser 
and Miles Larmer.17 
                                                             
15 Ylönen 2012. 
16 Gewald, Hinfelaar & Macola 2008. 
17 Fraser 2010. 
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2. US Influence and the Transformation of the IFIs 
 
2.1 The Early Years  
In this chapter I will depict the evolution of the international financial institutions and 
their lending policies. I will devote a significant proportion of this chapter to the 
development of conditionality that led to the birth of structural adjustment programs 
(SAPs). Another key aspect is studying the relationship between the United States (US) 
administration and the international financial institutions (IFIs). My aim is to elucidate 
the channels of formal and informal influence between the US government and the 
institutions. I will also examine the somewhat turbulent relationship between the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. A portion of the chapter will be 
dedicated to the battle and spread of different economic ideas and their contribution in 
the evolution of the IFIs. Finally, the chapter will assess the co-operation between the 
IFIs and Ronald Reagan’s administration, which culminated in the birth of the 
Washington Consensus.  
The IFIs were conceived in Bretton Woods as the decisive battles of the Second World 
War were still being waged. The leaders of the West considered the economic hardships 
of the inter-war years as instrumental in lifting totalitarian governments to power in 
Europe. Thus, international economic stability was to be a top priority after the war. The 
negotiations were not easy as the British and US delegations had major disagreements on 
central issues. To the dismay of John Maynard Keynes, the renowned economist and 
leader of the British delegation, the Americans were able to push their positions better. 
Dollars tied to gold became the customary currency in international exchanges and 
Washington was eventually chosen as the headquarters for both institutions.18 
The Fund was designed to maintain financial equilibrium in the short time frame. Besides 
managing currency exchange rates, its purpose was to offer short-term capital in the form 
of emergency loans to nations facing severe balance of payments problems. The Bank’s 
focus was initially on a longer time horizon. It was designed to facilitate the 
reconstruction of Europe after the devastating war. From the 1950s onwards, the Bank 
                                                             
18 Ylönen 2012, 17–21. 
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shifted its focus to developing countries, many of which were in the process of 
decolonisation. In these years the Bank was involved in project lending, mostly financing 
the building of infrastructure.19 Almost all sovereign states of the world are members of 
the IFIs.20 
The financing of the Fund is organised in a relatively straightforward way. Corresponding 
to the amount of funds that they distribute to the institution, each member state is in turn 
entitled to a certain quota of capital, which can be drawn in case of need. If necessary, the 
Fund can muster additional resources by borrowing from its members.21 One of the US 
successes at Bretton Woods was the rejection of “automaticity”. Many other nations –
including the United Kingdom (UK) – were advocating for an automatic access by 
members wanting to draw capital from their quotas. Instead, the US stance of 
“conditional” rights was written into the Articles of Agreement.22 The most powerful 
member nation wanted to be certain that the use of Fund resources was “consistent with 
the purposes of the Fund”23. Although these provisions were written in a rather vague 
manner, Erica R. Gould maintains that they enabled the later evolution of conditional 
loans.24  
Conditionality emerged very early as a tool in the Fund. The first conditional loans were 
issued in 1952 and the initiative was made by the US.25 In the early years the Fund was 
relatively inactive as the Americans were reluctant to grant Fund loans to the European 
nations already benefitting from the Marshall Plan.26 The original idea of the Fund had 
                                                             
19 Ylönen 2012, 21–24. The Bank was often involved in the technical design of projects. It usually provided 
about a half of the credit for the project, with the rest coming from other international donors, private lenders 
and local governments.  
20 The Fund and the Bank were officially established on 27 December 1945 and 29 nations had ratified the 
Articles of Agreement of the institutions by the end of the year. Under the Bank’s Articles of Agreement a 
country has to join the Fund first in order to secure membership in the Bank. The notable absentee from the 
original member nations was the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation joined both institutions in 1992. 
Poland withdrew from the institutions in 1950 and Czechoslovakia was expelled four years later. The 
countries were readmitted in 1986 and 1990 respectively. Cuba left in 1964 and has not joined since. Today 
the Bank and the Fund both have 189 member nations. In addition to Cuba there are four countries in the 
United Nations (UN) that are not members: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco and North Korea. Zambia 
joined the Fund and the Bank in 1965 shortly after gaining independence. (IMF website, 6 March 2018. 
List of Members; World Bank website, 6 March 2018. Member countries.)    
21 IMF website, 6 March 2018. Where the IMF Gets Its Money.   
22 Gould 2006, 41. 
23 Gould 2006, 41. Quoted from the Bretton Woods agreement. 
24 Gould 2006, 42. 
25 Gould 2006, 40. 
26 The Journal of Commerce, 6 March 1952. The Marshall Plan was an American scheme that was designed 
to assist in the reconstruction of Western European states. The total amount of aid reached 13 billion US 
dollars, equating approximately 140 billion dollars today.   
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been to assist the more developed countries in urgent need of help, but soon it was 
granting loans mainly to developing nations.27 It is evident that the Americans wanted 
stronger conditionality partly because of this shift in attention. Compared to later 
meticulous standards, the early conditions were more moderate and tied to “broad 
macroeconomic targets”28. Their aim was to stabilise balance of payments in order to 
combat devaluation of currencies and inflation. In my opinion, the adoption of these loan 
policies is a clear sign of the early US hegemony in the Fund. This US dominance is 
implied in a piece from The Journal of Commerce treating the changes in lending policy 
back in March 1952:   
”It reflects some easing of the stringent U.S. position and is designed to encourage 
members to seek modest assistance from the Fund. At the same time, it has been 
written in such a way as to make it crystal clear that there is to be no “automatic 
access” and that the Fund will continue to apply rigorous standards to every 
request.”29       
The first conditional loans were named Stand-by Arrangements (SBAs). The SBA was 
designed not to be a “loan per se but rather an assurance of automaticity: that the Fund 
will loan within a certain period of time under certain conditions”30. In the following 
decades the conditional loans changed radically: the number of binding conditions grew 
and the nature of the conditions altered considerably “reflecting a shift toward 
‘microconditionality’”31.    
The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)32, as the Bank was 
known in its early years, was also struggling to find its feet in the post-war years. In 1949, 
when the remarkable reconstruction of Europe was well under away, an American banker, 
Eugene Black, was chosen as the president of the Bank (1949-1961). Under his guidance 
the Bank hired a vast number of economists and concentrated its efforts on project lending 
                                                             
27 Ylönen 2012, 21. 
28 Gould 2006, 40. 
29 The Journal of Commerce, 6 March 1952.  
30 Gould 2006, 48. 
31 Gould 2006, 59, 67. 
32 IBRD is still one of the organisations that comprise the World Bank Group. The other main agencies are 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC, founded in 1956), the International Development Association 
(IDA, 1960), the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID, 1965) and the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, 1988). In addition, it is also important to note that the 
World Bank is not the only big multilateral development bank in the world. It has four main regional 
competitors: The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, 1959), the Asian Development Bank (AsDB, 
1965), the African Development Bank (AfDB, 1964) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD, 1991).  
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in developing countries.33 Single conditions were sometimes attached to loans, but 
describing the policies as conditional lending would be an overstatement. For example, 
in order to receive a loan for a power plant, the Bank could demand the borrowing state 
to push up its tariffs on electricity so that the plant would be profitable.34  
The Bank’s three main sources for obtaining its operating resources are member 
contributions, the interest from bonds that the Bank issues on global financial markets 
and loan reflows, which means repayments of principle with interest added on.35 
Although the Bank’s budget increased in the 1950s and the early 1960s, the lending 
amounts at that time were considered by a later employee as “comparatively small”36. 
Furthermore, the Bank was not enjoying a very high status in the international financial 
market. Before his tenure in the Bank, the same employee was working for the US 
administration and according to him “everybody in the US government regarded the 
World Bank and the International Financial Corporation (IFC), which it had established 
in the late ‘50s, really as a joke, long on public relations, but short on performance”37. 
This contemptuous attitude would change in later years. 
A turning point in the Bank’s lending policies was seen in 1960 when the International 
Development Association (IDA) was established. Four years earlier the Bank had created 
the International Financial Corporation (IFC). The IFC was designed to encourage private 
business by channelling loans straight to firms. By contrast, the IDA is catered to serve 
the needs of low-income countries. The IDA’s “soft loans” are repayable in 50 years and, 
most importantly, they bear no interest. Unlike most of the Bank’s other lending facilities, 
the IDA is heavily dependent on contributions from its member states. This gives 
considerable power to the wealthier nations. The US share of the first “replenishment38” 
was 42 percent.39      
                                                             
33 Ylönen 2012, 27. 
34 Ylönen 2012, 56. 
35 Babb 2009, 24. 
36 Interview with Bernard R. Bell, 13 November 1985 and 28 January 1988: First session, 19. World Bank 
Group, Oral History Program. 
37 Interview with Bernard R. Bell, 13 November 1985 and 28 January 1988: First session, 19. World Bank 
Group, Oral History Program. 
38 The IDA raises its funds every three years. The 18th successive replenishment was finalised in December 
2016. (World Bank website, 7 March 2018. IDA: Replenishments.)   
39 Ascher 1990, 117–118. 
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The American role in the launching of the IDA was crucial. By the end of the 1950s, the 
number of sovereign states in the world was rising at a significant pace. The newly 
independent countries were able to acquire considerable power in the United Nations due 
to the general assembly’s one-country one-vote system.40 Development in the so-called 
“Third World” thus became a hot topic in the UN, and in 1953 its Economic and Social 
Council came up with a detailed plan for a new agency, SUNFED (the Special United 
Nations Fund for Economic Development). Similarly to the later IDA, the purpose of 
SUNFED was to offer concessional loans and grants to developing countries.41 Not 
surprisingly, the US government took a critical stance towards SUNFED. The Bank’s 
former Vice-President J. Burke Knapp recalls the strong US input in establishing the IDA: 
”The issue, therefore, between SUNFED and IDA became rather acute at one time, 
and it was the United States government primarily that decided to go for an agency 
under the management of the World Bank rather than one under the management of 
the United Nations. The considerations were twofold: one, that an agency 
administered under the United Nations would presumably be dominated by the 
underdeveloped countries if the voting was on a unit basis, complicated by the fact 
that in the United Nations the Soviet Union and the rest of the iron curtain countries 
would be members and participate in the management. And for those rather obvious 
political reasons, the United States felt that it would rather contribute its money to 
something under sounder professional and technical management than could be 
expected under the United Nations administration.”42 
Notwithstanding the rather smug attitude that Knapp holds for the Bank’s management, 
compared to corresponding management by the UN, his conclusions about US reasoning 
in this case are probably correct. Noting the strong antagonism toward communism, Babb 
agrees that the US opposition to SUNDFED “seems to have resulted from a combination 
of ideological and geopolitical factors”43. For the purpose of this study, however, the 
bottom line that can be drawn from this and earlier observations is the following 
deduction: in the early years of their existence the IFIs were quite firmly in US control. 
American persistence led to the adoption of conditionality in the Fund and the birth of the 
IDA testifies that the Americans were also able to guide the Bank toward a path of their 
preference.  
                                                             
40 Babb 2009, 22. 
41 Ylönen 2012, 24. 
42 Interview with J. Bruce Knapp, July 1961, 36. World Bank Group, Oral History Program. 
43 Babb 2009, 22. 
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2.2 Channels of Influence  
Tracing US influence in the early years is not difficult since the IFIs (especially the Fund) 
were generally regarded as institutions led by the interests of the American government.44 
However, it is important to analyse how this authority was precisely exerted, because the 
channels of influence remained essentially the same later when the IFIs gained more 
autonomy. Ngaire Woods provides us with a useful four-point division of different 
channels of influence. The four channels of influence include: formal structures of voting 
and power; financial structure; use of resources; staffing and management.45 Because of 
its clarity, I will implement the same categorisation here.  
The first channel is the most official one as it embodies the formal decision making of the 
IFIs. The organisational structures of the Bank and the Fund are very similar. Both 
institutions have a board of governors which meets once a year to discuss overall strategy, 
while formal decisions are made in the executive board.46 Directors in the executive board 
represent all member states, but rich countries are favoured because voting quotas are 
divided in a complex procedure that emphasises the size of the economy. Thus, for 
example, Bangladesh, with a population roughly half the size of the US, has 12 131 votes 
in the Fund, while the American director wields 831 407 votes equalling a total of 16.5 
percent.47 In the Fund, all major decisions and changes in the voting structure require an 
85 per cent majority meaning that the US has an effective veto.48 In the Bank, the US 
holds a similar veto and it has proven determined to hold on to it. In a telling example 
from 1988, the US Congress discussed granting new funds to the Bank in conjunction 
with a reshuffle of the voting shares which would see the US portion drop to 18.75 
percent. Under pressure from Congress, the Bank complied to alter the constitutional 
majority from 80 to 85 percent consequently securing the US veto.49   
The second channel of influence is tied to the financing of the IFIs. As can be expected, 
in addition to holding most votes, the US is also the most important financial donor. 
However, a substantial part of US power does not derive directly from its large 
contributions. The extra authority originates from the unique political system in the US. 
                                                             
44 Woods 2003, 92; Kahler 1990, 92.  
45 Woods 2003, 96–97. 
46 Woods 2003, 110. 
47 IMF website, 6 March 2018. IMF Members’ Quotas and Voting Power, and IMF Board of Governors.  
48 Ylönen 2012, 200. 
49 Babb 2009, 137.  
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Because executive and legislative powers are so clearly separated, Congress can have 
substantial disagreements with the president’s cabinet. Consequently, congressional 
opposition has made the formulation of consistent foreign aid policies hard for the 
government. 50 The regular increases to Fund quotas and replenishments of the IDA 
require the approval of Congress. While leading to internal disputes between Congress 
and the administration, it can be argued that the power of the former can work as a handy 
tool for the latter as well. With the continuous threat of diminishing funds, the US 
government has been able to push its policies in the IFIs.51 
Babb labels this US activist shareholder position as having “donor leverage”. According 
to her, it is probably the “most important mechanism” of US influence and regularly used 
when donor governments meet to discuss funding: “in these negotiations, the United 
States is notorious for being the squeaky wheel – the shareholder with the most demands 
and complaints and the one least willing to compromise”52. The US treasury has a 
monopoly in formulating policies directed at the Fund, but its authority is boosted 
markedly by the fact that additional contributions to the institution must be approved by 
Congress.53 Relations to the Bank are upheld mostly by the State Department.  Although 
the Bank is more independent in its funding, donor leverage becomes visible every time 
a new IDA replenishment is discussed, and this has provided an additional channel of 
influence for the US government.    
Because the US is the most important shareholder, its congressional battles are often 
followed closely by other industrial countries. Thus, the US holds a key position because 
other donors tend to follow its lead.  Ernest Stern, whose career at the Bank spanned 27 
years, describes how important it was to first secure US commitment: 
“But the US, as the single largest contributor, defined the range of possible 
conclusions. No other donor was prepared to compensate for a further decline in the 
US share. And the problem was compounded by the fact that the US had by far the 
most extensive policy demands. So they generally managed to set everybody’s teeth 
on the edge early in all the discussions.”54  
                                                             
50 Babb 2009, 14. 
51 Woods 2003, 99–100. 
52 Babb 2009, 13. 
53 Woods, 2003, 99. 
54 Interview with Ernest Stern, 16 and 29 December 1994, and 5 January 1995: Fourth session, 41–42. 
World Bank Group, Oral History Program. 
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This extract reveals in an unequivocal way the strength of US influence and, furthermore, 
the willingness of the Americans to promote their own aspirations in the institutions. 
According to Stern “there was always, particularly on the U.S. side, a strong drive for 
imposing policy conditions”55. The strong push for US objectives can be seen when the 
capital of the Bank was increased in 1988, as discussed earlier. In addition to the change 
of the constitutional majority – which secured the US veto – the Americans were able to 
ensure that the Bank was committed to “increased efforts to help design and implement 
adjustment programs and to assemble debt restructuring packages”56. There is no reason 
to believe that the Americans operated any differently with the Fund.   
The third outlet of influence involves the use of the IFI’s resources. US interference 
becomes visible in the cases where the Americans have opposed loans for political 
reasons. A commonly cited example is the US led interruption of the Bank’s lending 
operations in Chile during the reign of Salvador Allende’s left-wing government (1970–
1973).57 However, cases giving rise to public objection are relatively rare, since the US 
is able to pressure the IFIs before the loans are talked over in the executive boards of the 
institutions. Burke Knapp sums this mechanism up in a neat way: 
“However, at the same time there are occasions in which it’s useful to take a reading 
on what is current United States policy in some countries in which we’re operating. 
We are very sensitive about this. We strongly maintain our autonomy and 
independence, to the point where many State Department officials and many 
American ambassadors abroad are rather resentful of our stiff-necked attitude. But 
we do feel that it would be very damaging to us to be regarded as a political 
instrument of the United States. On the other hand, United States is our principal 
shareholder. They provide a large part of the money required by the Bank and its 
operations, and de facto the United States government could always mobilize a 
majority of the board against any project on which they wanted to impose a political 
veto. I should emphasize that this happens on only very rare occasions. But if there 
is any doubt as to whether the United States government will support an operation 
by the Bank, it’s just as well for us to know that at an early state of the game, and 
the way we usually find that out is through contacts with the State Department.”58     
Understandably, Knapp fervently defends the autonomy of the Bank. Nonetheless, the 
lengthy quotation uncovers the extensive reach of US influence. While Knapp underlines 
the sporadic nature of US interventions, it is important to note that his interview dates 
                                                             
55 Interview with Ernest Stern, 16 and 29 December 1994, and 5 January 1995: Fourth session, 39. World 
Bank Group, Oral History Program. 
56 Babb 2009, 137. Quoted from the US Congress House Appropriations Subcommittee, Appropriations for 
1989, 1043.   
57 Ascher 1990, 124; Babb 2009, 40.  
58 Interview with J. Bruce Knapp, July 1961, 40. World Bank Group, Oral History Program. 
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back to 1961. Although the Cold War was “freezing” at the time, the struggle between 
the Western and Eastern blocs over the political alignment of the developing countries 
would only intensify in the following years. Thus, by the 1970s, US relationship with the 
IFIs had become more strained and interventions more common.59 A former legal expert 
in the Bank, Aron Broches, is more straightforward in admitting that the US did get 
“special treatment”.60 According to Broches it was an accepted custom that “loan 
proposals, or the documents before they went to the Board, were shown to the U.S.”61. 
Lastly, one cannot stress enough the fact that the IFIs are based in the US capital. This 
physical proximity in Washington has surely facilitated the special relationship between 
the US government and the IFIs.  
The fourth channel of influence is very indirect and, for that reason, the hardest one to 
detect. Historically, Americans have been overrepresented in the staffs of the IFIs. The 
Americans lobbied successfully against national quotas for personnel (which for example 
the UN has) and promoted English as the working language.62 In the early years of the 
institutions one could almost speak of US hegemony, although the proportion of 
Americans has declined significantly since. In the Bank, 64 percent of the professional 
staff were Americans in 1950, but by 1968 their share had dropped to 31 percent and in 
1987 to 24 percent.63 A similar trajectory, an early American dominance followed by a 
decline, holds true for the Fund as well.64 The American presence is especially true in the 
higher levels of management. The managing director65 of the Fund is traditionally of 
European origin. However, the Americans have considerable power in choosing the 
person for the position.66 In addition, the deputy managing director, with close ties to the 
US treasury, has always been American.67 In the Bank, the Americans have the power to 
                                                             
59 Babb 2009, 61–62. 
60 Interview with Aron Broches, 18 April and 23 May 1984: First session, 14. World Bank Group, Oral 
History Program.  
61 Interview with Aron Broches, 18 April and 23 May 1984: First session, 14. World Bank Group, Oral 
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62 Woods 2003, 108. 
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64 Kahler 1990, 97. 
65 The managing director of the Fund is the leader of staff and chairman of the executive board. The 
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66 Kahler 1990, 94. 
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appoint the president who has always been a citizen of the US.68 This brings a sense of 
ambiguity to this position, which can be read in the comments of former President Black: 
 ”The President of the Bank is an international character, and his liaison with the US 
government is through the American Director. As a matter of fact, the President of 
the Bank, if he stays in Washington very long, gets to know the officials, and quite 
frequently has meetings with them, but that’s not the normal procedure. Of course, 
in my case I happened to be an American. I knew all these people personally, and 
quite frequently had talks with them.”69     
Black emphasises that relations between the president of the Bank and the US government 
should be conducted through the official way (the American director). Nevertheless, 
direct meetings between the US government officials and the president of the Bank are 
common. This implies that there is a possible channel of US influence embedded in the 
informal networks linking the IFIs to the White House and Capitol Hill. However, in my 
opinion, it is impossible to draw conclusive evidence of US influence by using the number 
of Americans in the technical staff and management of the IFIs as a yardstick. After all, 
the institutions are multilateral and committed to work for the common good. Strong 
American presence in the IFIs does enable a channel for US influence but by no means 
does it necessitate the use of it. The picture becomes more complex in later years. While 
the ethnic diversity in the IFIs expanded, an overwhelming majority of the staff’s 
economists have graduated from Anglo-Saxon universities.70 There is a strong case in 
assuming that this facilitated the spread of certain economic ideas. I will turn to this 
question later.   
The formal structure of voting was seen as an important channel of US influence in the 
early years of the institutions.71 It is safe to assume that this channel lost its early 
prominence as time passed and more unofficial links were forged between the IFIs and 
the US administration. In fact, I agree with Babb in her assessment that the formal 
structure of voting is not the most important channel of influence.72 Most likely the fourth 
channel is also not that central, and I would argue that, while this channel is important in 
spreading economic ideas, its significance as a direct channel of US influence should be 
doubted.      
                                                             
68 Babb 2009, 40. 
69 Interview with Eugene R. Black, 6 August 1961, 25. World Bank Group, Oral History Program.   
70 Woods 2003, 109. 
71 Kahler 1990, 96. 
72 Babb 2009, 66. 
 18 
 
It is the second and third channels of influence that we must turn to. In my opinion both 
are vital because they are used to achieve slightly different goals. The US government is 
able to pressure the allocation of IFI resources by using the informal networks linking the 
headquarters of the institutions to Capitol Hill and to the White House in Washington. 
Only rarely is the US government publicly forced to confront the IFIs when it disagrees 
about the use of resources. In comparison, donor leverage – derived through  
congressional opposition – is not used to achieve quick political outcomes. The purpose 
of this channel of influence is to guide the institutions toward a favoured course in the 
longer time frame. 
 
2.3 Crises Fuel Conditionality  
From their very conception the IFIs have been adapting to changes in their operational 
environment. By the 1970s the international monetary regime was under increasing 
pressure. The liquidity of the Bretton Woods system was strained as the Vietnam War 
accelerated the outflow of dollars from the US and resulted in the overvaluation of the 
currency. Simultaneously, Japan and the European block emerged as serious economic 
rivals to the Americans and the US role of “international treasury keeper” was questioned. 
The governmental control over the financial milieu became more challenging as the free 
movement of private capital was gradually relaxed. 73 In 1971, President Richard Nixon 
(1969–1974) announced that the US would end the dollar’s convertibility to gold and let 
the currency float. The effects of the “Nixon shock” were further compounded by the first 
oil crisis74 in 1973 and other commodity price jolts. 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system came at an especially critical moment for the 
Fund. The institution was customised for the needs of the system. The Fund had been 
created to oversee fixed currency exchange rates which were now allowed to float freely. 
Ylönen notes how the end of the Bretton Woods system practically destroyed the 
                                                             
73 Blyth 2002, 128–129. 
74 The oil crisis erupted in October 1973 when the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OAPEC) declared an embargo. The oil producing nations were experiencing declining earnings because 
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operating mandate of the Fund and forced it to alter the rationale of its operations. The 
Fund took on new responsibilities by expanding its lending in struggling developing 
countries and this paved the way for SAPs.75 Combating inflation had been one of the 
core aims of the Fund from the very beginning and from this perspective the 1970s 
brought increasing challenges. 76 From the end of the 1960s the stagnation of the world 
economy was accompanied with increased inflationary pressures.77 Conditionality 
developed to a useful instrument for the Fund in this battle.  
The Fund’s conditional loans had developed considerably in twenty years. The number 
of binding conditions grew steadily and new forms of conditional loans were 
introduced.78 The Fund created the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) in 1963. This 
was followed by the Oil Facility (1974), Extended Fund Facility (EFF, 1974) and the 
Trust Fund (1976).79  For the purpose of this study it is not necessary to delve too deeply 
into various technical aspects of the different loan facilities. However, it is important to 
note that the establishment of the last three loan windows was surely motivated by the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system. In a sense, the Fund had to recreate itself and the 
new innovations were designed to assist it in this metamorphosis.  
Thus, it was no surprise that increased conditionality became a topic of passionate debate. 
In June 1978 the issue was discussed extensively in the executive board meeting of the 
Fund. Conditionality had already developed so far that abandoning it altogether was not 
                                                             
75 Ylönen 2012, 23. 
76 The Fund’s economic policies are grounded on the assumption that low inflation fosters economic 
growth. The recipe for tackling high inflation is based on a couple of principles and these are typically seen 
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seen as an option. According to one of the executive directors at the time, Muhammad 
Al-Atrash, “the issue at present is not whether there should or should not be 
conditionality. There is no disagreement that conditionality is necessary. But the issue is 
how much conditionality”80. Al-Atrash propagated for less conditionality claiming that 
“many countries feel that if they have to seek Fund assistance in the higher credit tranches, 
they have practically to nearly surrender their sovereignty in the economic field”81. Others 
shared his view as more “clear-cut and limited objectives for conditionality”82 were 
demanded. These appeals were not heard as the executive board’s guidelines for 
conditionality, approved in March 1979, testify. The fourth paragraph of the guidelines 
states:  
“In helping the members to devise adjustment programs, The Fund will pay due 
regard to the domestic social and political objectives, the economic priorities, and 
the circumstances of members, including the causes of their balance of payments 
problems.”83    
In addition to this vague passage the ninth paragraph affirms that “performance criteria 
will normally be confined to (i) macroeconomic variables (ii) those necessary to 
implement specific provisions of the Articles or policies adopted under them”84.  
Performance criteria refers here to specific conditions. Although these can be viewed as 
relatively precise guidelines, one cannot but wonder how to interpret the wording 
“normally” in this case. In this light, the guidelines are reminiscent of the indefinite 
provisions which the Americans were able to include in the Articles of Agreement at 
Bretton Woods.      
Some conclusions can be drawn here. Firstly, it is evident that – quite understandably – 
the directors who opposed strong conditionality represented developing countries. Their 
calls for regulated conditions did not materialise in the final edition of the guidelines and 
this reflects the power imbalance toward developed countries and especially the US. 
While several directors were heard in earlier meetings, the American director, Sam Y. 
Cross, wrote his statement conveniently a day before the executive board meeting in 
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which the guidelines were ratified in March 1979. Cross endorsed the proposed guidelines 
and viewed the two provisions – discussed above – as “important safeguards”85. In my 
opinion, the timing of Cross’s statement indicates implicitly the decisive role of the US 
in formulating the Fund’s policies. The second deduction stems from the theoretical 
framework of studying organisations from a sociological perspective. From this point of 
view it would have made no sense for the Fund to draw strict guidelines that would tie 
the organisation down. The internally led transformation of Fund policies had largely 
been enabled by the vague formulations in the original Articles of Agreement. 
After defeating the internal opposition the Fund had to justify its new approach to the 
outside world. That is exactly what the Fund’s Director of Western Hemisphere 
Department, E. Walter Robichek, set out to do in his speech delivered at the Center for 
Latin American Monetary Studies (CEMLA), Mexico City, in July 1979. Robichek 
acknowledged the criticisms levered against conditionality but proceeded to defend the 
Fund’s approach: 
”Adjustment programs supported financially by the Fund do not lend themselves to 
standardization. Each program needs to be compatible with the structure of a 
country’s economy and with its institutional framework. Adjustment programs will, 
therefore, vary from country to country. Each program also needs to address the 
causes and the severity of a country’s payments problem, and hence even programs 
negotiated with the same country may well differ over time.”86  
This extract presents the central argument in rejecting uniform rules for conditionality. 
Because each specific case is different, the Fund needs room to manoeuvre in designing 
correct adjustment policies. Robichek dismissed the issue of losing national sovereignty 
on the grounds that “giving an international institution important regulatory powers over 
policies and behaviour of member countries, as the Fund was given, obviously involves 
a sharing of national sovereignty”87. Furthermore, he blamed the press and other media 
of portraying the negotiations of loan programs as “confrontations between the national 
authorities and the Fund”88. Although Robichek was expressing his private opinions about 
conditionality, it is clear that he was representing the official line of the Fund, approved 
earlier that year.       
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As noted before, the number of binding conditions had grown over the years but, most 
importantly, the nature of the conditions had changed along the way as well. Instead of 
addressing acute fiscal problems, the conditions were increasingly designed to confront 
structural problems in the economy and low rates of growth.89 From the 1980s onwards 
Fund loans were usually accompanied with SAPs “that address chronic balance of 
payments shortfalls and low growth, and often entail long-term, supply-side policies, such 
as deregulating domestic goods, eliminating price controls, deregulating financial 
markets, eliminating interest rate ceilings, liberalising trade”90. The Fund reviewed its 
policies on conditionality in an executive board meeting in April 1988. According to the 
chairman’s survey the directors felt that the 1979 guidelines “had served us well” but 
added that the Fund “needs to place more emphasis on structural reforms and growth-
oriented adjustment”91. Thus, after the revision of key functions in the 1970s, structural 
adjustment had taken the centre stage in the Fund’s policies by the next decade.  
In the 1970s the Bank was going through a significant transformation of its own. A new 
era began in 1968 when Robert S. McNamara was appointed as the president of the Bank 
(1968–1981). The Bank had been regarded as a conservative institution but under 
McNamara and Vice-President Hollis Chenery development economics became the new 
focal point.92 The Bank had taken steps into this direction under the previous president, 
George D. Woods (1963–1968), but his staff had consisted overwhelmingly of engineers 
and economists. Emphasising the change brought by McNamara, a former employee of 
the Bank commented on the situation before the new president was appointed, “I don’t 
believe we even had a sociologist at the Bank”93.  
The institution moved its attention to longer-term goals and took on new initiatives like 
rural development, provision of social services and upgrading of urban slum areas.94 
Ernest Stern claims that “it wasn’t until McNamara came along that population, 
education, human resources, agriculture, rural development and income distribution 
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emerged as development policy foci”95. The Bank started publishing its renowned World 
Development Report in 1978. The new agenda was epitomised in the enthusiastic and 
vigorous character of the president. In 1973, in a famous speech in Nairobi, McNamara 
declared that alleviating poverty from the world was the central aim of the Bank.96 In 
order to pursue these ambitious objectives, the Bank had to increase its budget 
substantially. During McNamara’s tenure the Bank’s lending increased fivefold in real 
terms.97 In addition, the Bank started to issue loans for state-owned industrial projects. 
Before the 1970s the Bank had been reluctant to extend its lending beyond the private 
sector.98  
After an exciting start the mood had shifted in the Bank by the end of the 1970s. Despite 
vast investments, the long-awaited “take-off” in the developing countries had never 
occurred. On the contrary, in many cases their situation had deteriorated because of the 
energy crisis and escalating indebtedness. This realisation prompted a change in policies 
as project lending was increasingly supplemented or replaced with policy-oriented 
program loans.99 Program loans differed from project loans in that they were not issued 
to finance certain development projects. Their aim was to help finance imports and they 
“were loosely connected to market-liberalising policy reforms”100. Although project loans 
had dominated Bank lending, it had also undertaken some program lending before the 
1970s.101 
By the end of the decade McNamara had singled out program lending as an avenue for 
promoting longer-term development in the poor parts of the world. In 1979, McNamara 
introduced his version of structural adjustment in an address to the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Manila. In the address McNamara 
identified trade imbalances as a key factor in preventing economic progress and urged 
“that the international community consider sympathetically the possibility of additional 
assistance to developing countries that undertake the needed structural adjustments for 
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export promotion”102. Stern, a senior vice-president at the Bank who was in charge of the 
lending operations from 1980 to 1987, explains the rationale behind the Bank’s adoption 
of structural adjustment loans (SALs): 
”It did arise out of the oil crisis, and its impact on the developing countries. It was 
the beginning of defining concerns with the structural aspects of balance of payments 
adjustments rather than focusing solely on the macroeconomic aspects. The concept 
that structural problems were at the core of the balance of payments difficulties 
facing many developing countries was not common then. The solution to balance of 
payments problems was generally believed to be macroeconomic adjustments. Our 
original concept was to help countries take action in advance of a deterioration in the 
balance of payments.”103  
Stern is placing his words with care here. One of the clearest arguments in objecting to 
structural adjustment by the Bank is that, by doing so, one is stepping on the toes of the 
Fund. Stern maintains that, instead of dealing with an acute balance of payments 
predicament, the Bank’s structural lending is aimed at fixing the underlying problems that 
cause the crisis, preferably before it starts. Stern proposed his version of structural lending 
to the executive board in February 1980. Babb argues that Stern had deviated from 
McNamara’s original vision and “placed greater emphasis on policy conditionality”104. 
Compared to the traditional project loans, the SALs usually involve larger sums, have to 
be paid back sooner (three to five years usually) and “rely on macroeconomic expertise 
and assessments of general economic policy”105. While the Bank’s SALs differed from 
the Fund’s counterparts in that they were targeted at longer-term adjustments and directed 
to the more fundamental structural problems in an economy, the loans did have a lot in 
common. In Babb’s words they both “began with a quasi-contractual agreement between 
staff and borrowing governments concerning policy changes, including statements of 
measures, or “benchmarks” for gauging government compliance”106. 
Stanley Please worked under Stern as the senior adviser on SALs from 1980 to 1983. 
According to him the initial opposition to the new loan form was severe in the executive 
board, and, unlike many other issues, it did not follow the usual North-South divide: 
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”The developed countries felt that the Bank was moving from its mandate in 
supporting development into quick-disbursing non-project lending, and developing 
countries took the view that one IMF was enough on policy matters”.107 
Despite of the hostility in the board the Bank pushed on with the SALs. The board was 
able to secure concessions, such as the guarantee to restrict program lending to ten per 
cent of the Bank’s total operations. Please notes, however, that probably the most crucial 
reason for adopting structural adjustment was external, as the debt crisis hit Latin America 
and Africa hard in the early 1980s. 108  
The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and turmoil in the global economy had a 
profound effect on the US relationship with the IFIs. When the Fund was practically 
struggling for its existence, the US government turned its attention to other international 
bodies. Woods explains how the US government marginalised the Fund on purpose and 
promoted economic collaboration through the novel Group of Seven (G7)109 and the older 
Group of Ten (G10). According to her, the rejection was a striking piece of evidence of 
the US power to determine the fate of the Fund.110 Thus, when the Fund took a leading 
role in tackling the debt crisis in the next decade, it should be viewed both as a testimony 
of US approval but equally, as Woods highlights, as an attempt of a side-lined 
organisation to get back into action.111 Even though the US government turned to other 
options in its efforts to fix the global monetary system, its influence on the Fund remained 
relatively strong, albeit not as dominating as before. Miles Kahler notes how the US was 
forced to use special majorities (70 and 85 percent in important matters) due to decreases 
in its voting quota. While this meant more extensive bargaining with other members, the 
special majorities functioned also as safeguard to US interests.112    
Although conditionality evolved in the Fund through the 1970s, the environment was not 
yet favourable for full implementation. The main reason for this was the abundant supply 
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of cheap private credit which made the Fund’s conditional loans unappealing.113 The 
removal of barriers restricting the free movement of capital began from London in the 
1960s. The vast accumulation of dollars there was facilitated by the creation of the 
Euromarkets which did not fall under the regulations of the US or the UK.114 From the 
deregulated London markets these so-called “Eurodollars” were often lent forward to the 
developing countries. Due to a lack of control, the Eurodollars were frequently used to 
finance bad investments or robbed by corrupted dictators, thus planting the first seeds of 
the debt crisis.115  
While the alterations in the operational environment explain a part of the change in the 
US relationship with the IFIs, domestic politics had surely a part to play as well. As the 
1970s progressed, a strong faction supporting more nationalist foreign policy emerged in 
US politics. Overall, the confidence in a global rules-based system and in the power of 
multilateral organisations had waned.116 Babb divides the protests of Congress into three 
groups “broadly corresponding to three major justifications for foreign aid: strategic, 
economic and humanitarian”117.  
The first group was represented by those who had become disillusioned about the 
usefulness of development in the bipolar layout of the Cold War political environment. 
This argument was fuelled by countries like India, which were receiving substantial 
amount of aid but still regarded the US government with disdain. The second argument 
was drawn on populist rhetoric. According to it, US taxpayer’s dollars were being spent 
lavishly on default and corrupted regimes in the developing countries. The third line 
questioned the humanitarian benefit of aid, maintaining that the money was not 
channelled effectively to the poor people, but rather, supported despots who did not 
respect the human rights of their citizens.118  
Due to a resistant Congress, the second half of the 1970s witnessed an increase in the use 
of the “donor leverage” tactic. Withholding appropriations became a common strategy 
for the US Congress.119 After the first IDA replenishment, every single one has stirred 
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opposition in Congress. However, it was not until the Reagan administration came to 
power that the US government started to use the defiant Congress more openly in order 
to push for policy demands.120  
Irrespective of the congressional opposition the Bank was able to increase its autonomy 
in the 1970s. McNamara had worked as the Secretary of Defence under John F. Kennedy 
(1961–1963) and Lyndon B. Johnson (1963–1969) and he had good connections to 
Congress, especially to the Democratic side of the aisle. Stern confirms that “Bob could 
and did influence congressional support”121. Moreover, the president of the Bank was 
respected in the larger US establishment as a visionary in development issues.122 This 
newfound sense of respect undoubtedly enhanced the independence of the Bank. US 
bilateral aid was formulated according to the same lines as the Bank’s with poverty 
alleviation and rural development in the centre of attention.123  
In my opinion, the US position regarding the Bank in this transitional period seems 
somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, a growing opposition in Congress regarded the 
Bank and other multilateral organisations as an unending drain on money. On the other 
hand, the Bank’s new reorientation in tackling poverty was accepted in the US 
administration. The Bank was no longer viewed as a dysfunctional commercial Bank but 
as a credible forerunner in the field of development economics. 
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2.4 The Neoliberal Breakthrough  
By the 1970s Keynesian economics was under attack on several fronts. After years of 
booming global economic growth, a slowdown coincided with high rates of inflation and 
swelling unemployment. Keynesian economic policy, based on the principle of 
controlling inflation and the unemployment rate by stimulating domestic demand, was 
unable to tackle the new state of affairs. The loudest criticisms arose from a group of 
economists centred in the University of Chicago124, and led by the charismatic apostle of 
free markets, Milton Friedman. The adherents of the Chicago school viewed monetary 
policy as the appropriate tool for fighting stagflation. According to monetarist principles, 
central banks are able to control inflation simply by contracting and increasing the supply 
of money125.  
The neoliberal program extends beyond the instrumental role it ascribes to monetarism. 
A second pillar of this rather heterogeneous ideological current is an unwavering belief 
in the freedom of individuals and markets. This conviction is based on rational choice 
theory at the individual level, and on the might of the price mechanism in organising 
markets. As a consequence, neoliberalist ideals attribute a minimal role to governments. 
The policy prescriptions of neoliberals can be crudely summarised by deregulation, 
privatisation and liberalisation.126 As the name, neoliberalism, suggests, the origins of 
economic liberalism lie further back in history, namely in the classical liberal tradition of 
the 18th and 19th centuries, formulated in the writings of Adam Smith and other 
philosophers. Today, the term, neoliberalism, carries various connotations in different 
times and places. It was not commonly in use before the 1990s, and in the US, it often 
refers to a progressive liberal worldview.127  
Jamie Peck captures wonderfully the quintessential nature of neoliberalism in the first 
pages of his book Constructions of Neoliberal Reason. According to him, neoliberalism 
can never exist in a truly pure form. Moreover, it is this inbuilt contradiction that actually 
defines it:  
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“Its utopian vision of a free society and free economy is ultimately unrealizable. Yet 
the pristine clarity of its ideological apparition, the free market, coupled with the 
endless frustrations borne of the inevitable failure to arrive at this elusive destination, 
nevertheless confer a significant degree of forward momentum on the neoliberal 
project. Ironically, neoliberalism possesses a progressive, forward‐leaning dynamic 
by virtue of the very unattainability of its idealized destination.” 128   
Encapsulating the true essence of neoliberalism is not the goal of this investigation. In 
fact, Peck prefers to use the term neoliberalization, which refers to the process where the 
ideals of neoliberalism shape economic policies. In his own words:  
“In the most abstract of terms, one can say that neoliberalization refers to a 
contradictory process of market‐like rule, principally negotiated at the boundaries of 
the state, and occupying the ideological space defined by a (broadly) sympathetic 
critique of nineteenth‐century laissez‐faire and deep antipathies to collectivist, 
planned, and socialized modes of government, especially those associated with 
Keynesianism and developmentalism.”129   
Peck argues that neoliberalization is not really concerned about diminishing the role the 
state: “notwithstanding its trademark antistatist rhetoric, neoliberalism was always 
concerned – at its philosophical, political and practical core – with the challenge of first 
seizing and then retasking the state”130 In the process state resources are diverted from 
soft areas, like social care for example, to the likes of military spending. In fact, 
neoliberalism has forged intimate relationships with authoritarian regimes, most notably 
in Chile.131  
The rise of neoliberalism is often portrayed as a revolutionary moment in time. Stedman 
Jones calls attention to two common narratives that are widespread in accounts on the 
spread of the economic ideology. The first one presents the emergence of neoliberalism 
as inevitable. In this narrative Keynesian economics is swept away suddenly and 
decisively by the mighty forces of neoliberalism. The reality is more nuanced. The 
neoliberal collective had carefully formulated their ideas during at least four decades of 
intense debate on both sides and across the Atlantic. Jones highlights the importance of 
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the transatlantic networks in formulating neoliberal thinking.132 While Friedman is 
rightfully credited as the popularising star of the movement, the true founding father of 
neoliberalism is thought to be Friedrich Hayek. The Austrian economist and philosopher 
founded the Mont Pelerin Society133 in 1947 to counter the forces of “collectivism”.134 
The second narrative is popular among the critics of neoliberalism. In these accounts the 
spread of neoliberalism is reduced to US imperialism and the Washington Consensus 
becomes a synonym to it.135 Jones acknowledges that often “such analyses contain 
valuable insights”136. However, he argues that while neoliberalism has forged strong links 
with conservative politics and corporate power especially, it has been far more adaptive. 
The design of neoliberal policies has not been an exclusive right of conservatives. For 
example, the Democratic administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) started 
deregulating different sectors of the economy and appointed the monetarist Paul Volcker 
(1979–1987) as the chairman of the Federal Reserve (Fed).137 
Friedman believed in the power of ideas and this is what made him such a formidable 
propagator of neoliberalism. He did not shy away from taking part in public debate. Thus, 
he took on two roles: “issuing audacious and uncompromising policy advice on the one 
hand, while fiercely protecting his reputation as an empirically oriented economist on the 
other”138. While Friedman established his place as the loudest advocate of neoliberalism, 
he was greatly assisted in this task by a new institutional innovation, the think tank. On 
both sides of the Atlantic, newly founded think tanks formed a network that disseminated 
the ideas that had started to take shape in Mont Pelerin.139 In addition to academics, think 
tanks included businessmen, fundraisers, journalists and politicians.140 Think tanks had a 
pivotal role in helping “turn neoliberal thought into a neoliberal political program”141. In 
the US, the most prominent neoliberal think tanks, the Heritage Foundation and the Cato 
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Institute were founded in 1973 and 1977 respectively.142 These two had a profound 
influence on Republican politics during the next decade.143  
On both sides of the Atlantic, it was an alliance with conservatives that lifted neoliberal 
policies into the limelight. In addition to the economic aspects of conservative neoliberal 
politics, Jones notes two other features that were interwoven in the alliance: a hostility 
towards Soviet communism and a reaction against the “so-called permissive society that 
was epitomized by the upheavals of 1968”144. While the conservative US and UK 
administrations did forge close links (Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher got along 
famously well), the neoliberalizing process had different aspects in the two countries. In 
the UK, government policies attacked trade unions especially hard, while, in the US, 
neoliberalization facilitated the merge of government policies with the interests of big 
corporate business.145 The rapid process of neoliberalization brought an end to the 
marginalisation of its proponents. In a sense, neoliberalism lost its sharpest ideological 
edge when it became “mainstreamed” and institutionalised in the conservative politics of 
the 1980s.146  
The partnership with conservative political powers uncovers a few fundamental aspects 
of neoliberalism. The first is the fact that neoliberalism feeds out of crises. By and large, 
it was the crises of the international monetary regime and subsequent economic hardships 
that brought it into ascendancy. Moreover, Peck, Nik Theodore and Neil Brenner argue 
that neoliberalism has the ability to create crises for itself to exploit.147 This observation 
provides an interesting perspective when analysing the most recent financial crash of 
2008. The second central characteristic is the parasitic nature of neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalization gathers momentum by tangling with state power: “neoliberalism 
invariably exists in an essentially parasitical relationship with those extant social 
formations with which it has an antagonistic relationship, such as state socialism, social 
democracy, or neoconservative authoritarianism.148” 
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I am inclined to believe that neoliberalism derives at least a portion of its power from its 
ideological impetus. While Keynesian economics did forge strong unions with political 
movements, social democratic forces in particular, one could argue that it still lacked the 
ideologically charged utopian features of neoliberalism. In hindsight, one must also note 
that Friedman’s political activity has left a mark on the field of economics in a more 
comprehensive way. Today, economists are notoriously careful in formulating specific 
policy advices. It is the tendency of both economists and politicians to treat economics 
and politics as two distinct subject matters. Instead of promoting a healthy debate in the 
public sphere, economic policy is more often than not presented as if there were no 
alternatives to it. The reasons for this change are undoubtedly complex and plentiful, but, 
instinctively thinking, the controversial legacy of Friedman and his associates has surely 
had an impact on the transition.   
In spite of the reluctance to make clear policy prescriptions, economists have undoubtedly 
been able to influence global affairs greatly. This point is underscored by Robert 
Chernomas and Ian Hudson in their book The Profit Doctrine: Economists of the 
Neoliberal Era. They argue, that after the neoliberal breakthrough, many of the leading 
economists that “rose to prominence…did so not because of their contributions to the 
standard list of economic goals, but primarily because of their contribution to corporate 
profit and the wealth of the business class”149. So, while a direct relationship linking 
academic economists and political policymakers has deliberately been downplayed, a 
tight union has nevertheless been forged between them, with the interests of big corporate 
business being the facilitator and a third party in the pact. The losers in this shift have 
been organised labour and the poorer tiers of society as the escalating income disparities, 
for example in the US, testify.150   
Tracing a shift in the ideological orientation within the IFIs staffs is a tricky task. In a 
multilateral and outwardly neutral institution, staff members are careful  about identifying 
themselves as followers of particular ideological doctrines. Due to the Bank’s emphasis 
on broader development issues, it has historically had workers with more diverse 
backgrounds. This fact, together with the availability of analytically richer sources, has 
tilted my analysis of the spread of neoliberalism in the IFIs once again towards the Bank. 
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The same holds true when I conclude this chapter by investigating the relationship 
between the IFIs and the influence of the Reagan government. As I stressed in the 
introduction, this bias is justified by the similarity of the institutions and the commonly 
held view that the Bank has been more sovereign with regard to the US. 
A former employee of the Bank recalls how staff members worked side-by-side in the 
1970s under Hollis Chenery (McNamara’s right-hand man in development economics) 
irrespective of their ideological beliefs: “we had Marxists, we had structuralists, we had 
Chicago types, we had Keynesians, we had supply-siders. There was a bubbling and a 
very lively intellectual atmosphere”151. The intellectual diversity did not last long, 
however, as neoliberal approaches became predominant in the policies of the institutions 
in the wake of the debt crisis. Ernest Stern, a very influential figure in the Bank during 
the 1980s, is careful in defining his own intellectual positioning. However, trained in 
neoclassical152 economics, he confesses that, in earlier years, the clear isolation of 
development economics did puzzle him somewhat:  
”It was never very clear to me why development economics completely ignored the 
neo-classical rules of pricing and markets. Why wouldn’t these concepts be relevant 
to the developing countries? That was always an issue floating in my mind. The 
current paradigm is, essentially, a rediscovery that some of the rules of normal 
economic theory apply to developing countries; that they are not exempt”153        
This extract is by no means controversial and most economists today would indeed agree 
with Stern’s statement. Nevertheless, I believe that some valuable insights can be drawn 
from it when the larger context is taken into account. Firstly, it has to be noted that the 
interview was conducted at the turn of the year in 1994–1995 when Stern was retiring 
after almost 25 years of service in the Bank. Even though his bafflement dates back to his 
early years in the institution, one gets a feeling that Stern is justifying to some extent a 
later change that occurred in the Bank’s intellectual orientation. Secondly, it is important 
to highlight the weight of Stern’s personal views. After McNamara left the Bank in 1981, 
the US government elected A.W. Clausen (1981–1986), the president of the Bank of 
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America, as the new man in charge. Under his management a great deal of operational 
power was centralised in the hands of Stern.154 The concentration of power overlapped 
with an expansion of structural adjustment lending in the adoption of which Stern had a 
crucial role.155  
The IFIs gradual implementation of neoliberal economic policies coincided with a similar 
transition in American politics as Ronald Reagan took office in 1981. The parallel timing 
is hardly surprising considering the strong American influence in the IFIs detected in this 
study so far. While unearthing a far-reaching American agenda behind this process is 
virtually impossible, some indicators of US influence can be observed, most notably in 
the appointment of top management personnel in the IFIs.  
Ngaire Woods maintains that when appointing senior staff members “the approval of 
United States is de facto necessary”156. Looking back at his time as the president of the 
Bank, Clausen recalls how “there was pressure from Treasury for key appointments”157. 
This was the case in 1982 when Anne Krueger was selected as the Bank’s chief 
economist, a position that carries probably the most ideological clout in the institution. 
Krueger was considered a conservative and had close ties to the American government, 
“very much hand-in-glove with the U.S. Treasury”158, as Shahid Husain – one of the vice-
presidents at the time – frankly puts it. It is clear that Husain was not on the same 
wavelength with Krueger:  
”Anne’s theory was that the market was supreme. In her view, the state should allow 
markets to work. It should not actively seek to eliminate poverty and income 
inequalities. More importantly, she also initiated a process of “ethnic cleansing” 
within the Bank. She got rid of anybody who had been associated with Hollis 
Chenery.159   
While Husain’s views seem somewhat exaggerated, Ylönen is another who likens the 
arrival of Krueger to a purge, since employees who did not adhere to the neoclassical 
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paradigms of economics either left or were forced out. In the three years that followed 
Krueger’s entry, 80 percent of the Development Research Group’s staff had gone.160 
While acknowledging that “a lot of people complained about her management style”161, 
Stern valued Krueger’s input: “she was a great asset to have around this period when we 
focused increasingly on adjustment programs, trade liberalization, macroeconomic 
conditionality, and relations with the Fund”162. Krueger herself highlights in a relatively 
recent interview that “almost everything I did was committed to development, which is 
committed, of course, to poverty reduction”163. However, she follows the claim by stating 
that “you cannot achieve very much in poverty reduction without getting reasonable 
economic growth”164. This is the most ideologically charged passage of a deliberately 
apolitical interview. 
The Bank’s focus on development issues had widened the organisation’s occupational 
base, but by the 1980s economists were taking over the institution. This was a concern to 
Chenery who left the Bank the same year Krueger arrived.165 Even Stern remarks that 
“structural adjustment lending boosted the role of the economists greatly – more than 
intended perhaps”166. One factor that facilitated the turn towards homogeneity in the 
institutions was the increasingly similar educational background of the workforce. David 
Knox, a regional vice-president of the Bank in the 1980s, describes the phenomenon:   
”There was this deliberate effort to widen the geographical spread. I think that was 
good, but it had one serious drawback: almost all of these people we recruited came 
out of the same university background. They were almost all graduates of the main 
graduate schools in the United States or the U.K. or Western Europe, and while they 
may have come from Asia, Africa, Latin America, or wherever, their intellectual 
equipment with which they arrived was the intellectual equipment they had acquired 
in this very comparatively small number of graduate schools. So we didn’t get a great 
deal of diversification.”167   
The numbers support Knox’s statement. By 1991, 80 percent of the Bank’s senior staff 
had graduated from Anglo-Saxon universities. Likewise, the staff of the Fund became 
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dominated by the alumni of North American graduate schools, as 90 percent of workers 
had graduated from American or Canadian universities in 1996.168 
In my opinion the two facts – a general increase in the number and importance of 
economists and the pattern of geographic concentration in educational backgrounds – 
have both likely contributed to the proliferation of neoliberal thought and policies in the 
IFIs. While detecting direct American influence in this process is hard, it is safe to assume 
that they did not oppose the doctrinal transition and most likely contributed to it 
significantly. The American guidance is noticeable when hiring senior managers, as the 
case of Krueger highlights. While Woods notes that “staffing may not reflect the 
sociological view that knowledge is controlled to ensure a particular orthodoxy is 
imposed worldwide”169, I agree with her assessment that “a change in the politically 
appointed senior management in either institution can quickly redirect and underline a 
particular political mind set and blueprint for conditionality within the institutions”170. 
 
2.5 From Cool Relations to Close Co-operation  
After a period of increased autonomy, US influence on the IFIs was strengthened as the 
1980s passed. The tightening grip on both institutions was facilitated by an external 
shock: the onset of the debt crisis in Mexico in the autumn of 1982. Under Paul Volcker 
the Fed followed monetarist principles in tackling high domestic inflation. The hikes in 
interest rates – commonly known as the Volcker shock171 – had damaging global effects 
in the developing countries which had borrowed excessively from private banks in the 
preceding decade, often in dollar-denominated loans. The debt crisis piled pressure on the 
Reagan administration because many of the banks that risked default were American and 
a global financial collapse loomed in the horizon.172  
The debt crisis prompted a change in the American policy towards the Fund which had 
been marginalised under previous governments. The Reagan administration had initially 
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considered the Fund (and the Bank for that matter) as a financial burden but being a 
multilateral financial institution it proved a handy tool in confronting the crisis.173 From 
the Fund’s point of view, the debt crisis was a big opportunity to boost its prestige after 
difficult years.174 With American support the Fund became a co-ordinator of sorts. Miles 
Kahler describes the change: “to ensure adequate financing for successful adjustment 
programs, the Fund became the linchpin in constructing financing packages for the major 
debtors”175. The new American line was supported by other major industrialised 
countries, namely Japan, Germany and the UK.176 The alliance was consolidated in 1983, 
when the US government was able to persuade a resilient Congress to pass a 50 percent 
increase in the Fund’s budget.177 Underlying this change was an “activist”178 executive 
manager of the Fund, Jacques De Larosiére (1978-1987). Under the Frenchman the Fund 
extended its involvement in the very poorest developing countries, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa after the second oil crisis of 1979.179  
The US government did not, however, simply offer an enhanced role to the Fund with no 
strings attached. The Reagan administration, with its novel emphasis on the might of 
market solutions, pushed for policies that promoted fast structural adjustment in the 
developing countries in order to minimise their dependence on international 
interventions.180 The American approach can be summarised to a “need for tightened 
conditionality in all Fund programs as well as an emphasis on the short-term nature of 
lending”181. Stress on the latter reveals that the Americans viewed the debt crisis 
essentially as a problem of liquidity. 
While an acute catastrophe in the international banking system was averted, the debt crisis 
spread rapidly into many developing countries, especially in Latin America and Africa. 
The Bank had ongoing lending operations in many of these countries and it was thus 
drawn into the fold. The Reagan government had an interest in getting the Bank involved, 
since it wanted to restrict the Fund’s operations to short term adjustment lending.182 The 
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Americans also wanted the Bank’s project lending to meet stricter standards in struggling 
developing countries. This meant tightening conditionality in project loans and an 
increased emphasis on the selection of suitable projects in the first place.183 These policies 
went hand in hand with stressing the importance of the private sector, as a lengthy but 
revealing paragraph from Attila Karaosmanoglu, a vice-president of the Bank in the 
1980s, demonstrates:   
”The prominence of the private sector, of course, raised also many policy issues. 
Now, all our lending operations have to be in conformity with the functioning of a 
market-based system and hence supportive of a healthy private sector. When we 
decided that the financial markets were not functioning properly, lending operations 
could only be supported in conjunction with a reorganization of the financial sectors 
relying on positive real interest rates. This meant that all those projects dried up. Yet, 
there may be instances where a power project or an oil project makes sense even if 
the markets are distorted. But we have ruled that out completely. I used to lose sleep 
over some of these issues.”184 
I believe that this extract illuminates the profound changes that were taking place in the 
IFIs in the 1980s. In a sense, the entire context of lending operations altered. Two 
different factors weighed in the process: an acute debt crisis and a change in the academic 
orthodoxy of economics which reflected itself in economic policies. This resulted in a 
fixation on the macroeconomic environment of the borrowing countries. In a sense, 
adjustment was seen as the only way out since the macroeconomic stability of the 
economy was the top priority. As a consequence, the IFI’s lending operations became 
more politicised. To be sure, political considerations had influenced operations in earlier 
years, but now a market-based system relying on the private sector was a prerequisite for 
receiving aid.   
While the Bank’s project lending was tied down by new restrictions, program lending, 
especially in the form of SALs, was expanding. As mentioned earlier, a 10 percent cap in 
the Bank’s overall lending volume had been imposed on the SALs when they were first 
adopted. However, a new way was quickly devised to circumvent the limit. This was done 
by issuing sectoral adjustment loans, focused on specific sectors of the economy, 
agriculture for example. A former employee of the Bank admits that “in a sense they were 
smuggled in”185. What is more, although project loans remained as the “bread and butter” 
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of Bank operations, structural adjustment was getting most of the attention. Warren C. 
Baum, who retired from the Bank in 1986, offers his assessment of the lending volumes 
and explains the shift:  
”And what I’m saying is that we continued to do 80 percent of our lending while we 
focused 75 percent of our attention on the 20 percent and allowed all of these other 
things to take place, and in this process we have done considerable damage to the 
institution.”186 
Due to his departure, Baum does not consider himself to be in a position to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the SALs.187 With damage he is referring here to the negligence of project 
lending. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Bank was heading towards uncharted waters with 
the increasing use of adjustment lending. While doing so, it was, in the view of many, 
also stepping on the toes of the Fund.  
The relationship between the “Bretton Woods siblings”188 has not always been rosy. From 
the very beginning, the institutions had distinct mandates but they often crossed paths 
when operating in the same countries. The interviews of the Bank’s former staff reveal 
that there has been a significant amount of contempt towards the Fund throughout the 
years.189 Many people at the Bank felt that Fund officials had a rather superior attitude. 
Gerald Alter was the director of the Bank’s Western Hemisphere Department and the 
vice-president of the Latin American and Caribbean region in the 1960s and 1970s. His 
reminiscing dates back to the McNamara years:  
”In some countries we had our differences, and the Fund was, of course, very, even 
at that stage, was very jealously guarding its jurisdiction. And when the chips were 
down, there were many people in the Fund that felt they could safely ignore what the 
Bank had to say.”190 
Moreover, there are differences in the organisational cultures of the IFIs. Moeen Qureshi 
worked in both institutions and believes that the Fund, where he spent twelve years first, 
is characterised by a homogeneous working culture. Qureshi attributes this to three 
different factors: the majority of staff being economists, the European nature of the 
organisation and to the fact that most people have a background in working in central 
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banks or other financial institutions. 191  This homogeneity coupled with the fact that the 
Fund has been “historically dealing with a relatively narrow problem which could be 
solved in more or less the same or similar fashion”192, makes working in the Fund less 
multifaceted. In fact, the later senior vice-president of the Bank admits leaving the Fund 
because he was “intellectually bored”193. The flip side of the coin, according to many 
interviewees, is the efficiency of the Fund in comparison to the Bank where a heavier 
bureaucratic machinery tends to decelerate the decision-making process.194 
In the 1980s it became apparent that the institutions’ operations were overlapping to a 
greater extent than before.195 The debt crisis was a watershed in the relationship of the 
IFIs. Stern maintains that before it there was contact between the institutions “but the 
relations weren’t all that intimate”196. According to Stanley Please, at the onset of the debt 
crisis, “the whole question of Fund-Bank collaboration became very central right from 
the beginning”197. In his view, the Bank was not trespassing on the Fund’s territory, but 
rather, the institutions were both moving closer together with the mid-term time frame 
being the common denominator in the harsh financial conditions of the 1980s:  
”The Bank had to relate its longer-term concerns to the medium-term horizon, the 
medium-term, liability in particular being the balance of payments. In effect, the 
Bank was altering its focus, not forgetting the longer-term focus, but also bringing 
its focus down to the medium-term. Whereas the Fund for its part was moving its 
focus to the medium-term not doing away with short-term stabilization but also 
looking to the medium-term. The introduction of the Extended Fund Facility, the 
EFF, was a reflection of that, a reflection of the fact that stabilization had to be seen 
not in a one-year horizon but as a medium-term problem.”198 
The Bank’s move towards the middle ground was more recent, epitomised by the 
adoption of SALs in 1979.199 The Fund had taken similar steps after the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system: the EFF was established in 1974. In effect, this meant that, in the 
1980s, both institutions were “providing balance of payments loans, tranched over one to 
                                                             
191 Interview with Moeen Qureshi, 5 April 1991, 5. World Bank Group, Oral History Program.  
192 Interview with Moeen Qureshi, 5 April 1991, 5. World Bank Group, Oral History Program. 
193 Interview with Moeen Qureshi, 5 April 1991, 5. World Bank Group, Oral History Program. 
194 Interview with A. W. Clausen, 8 June 1992, 15. World Bank Group, Oral History Program; Interview 
with Barber B. Conable, 8 May and 19 August 1991, 20-21. 
195 Interview with Moeen Qureshi, 5 April 1991, 3. World Bank Group, Oral History Program. 
196 Interview with Ernest Stern, 16 and 29 December 1994, and 5 January 1995: Second session, 33. World 
Bank Group, Oral History Program. 
197 Interview with Stanley Please, 26 August, 26. World Bank Group, Oral History Program.  
198 Interview with Stanley Please, 26 August, 26-27. World Bank Group, Oral History Program. 
199 Feinberg 1988, 549. 
 41 
 
three years, with medium-term amortization periods”200. Qureshi maintains that the “debt 
problem in a sense is the tip of the iceberg” 201. According to him, the IFI’s job is, 
essentially, to tackle the underlying structural problems of the economies from a holistic 
point of view, and this justifies the merger in the medium-term:   
”So in that sense merely going ahead and trying to eke out the short-term balance of 
payments equilibrium, even if it could be achieved, is not going to be sustainable.  
Similarly, if you were to merely think in terms of trying to resolve the longer-term 
issues of where is this economy going to be ten years from now, you’re not going to 
be able to do it because the inflationary environment that you're dealing with doesn't 
allow for any rational decisions to be made.”202    
Thus, in addition to a temporal merge, a great deal of integration happened at the level of 
substance as well. Richard Feinberg studied the program loans of both institutions back 
in 1988 and found a pattern of increasing coalescence.203 A comparison of economic 
variables in loan programs showed that both institutions were crossing some of the initial 
boundaries that had been erected between them. For example, the Bank’s programs 
included exchange rate adjustments, whereas the Fund was engaging in subjects such as 
energy pricing.204       
One sign of closer collaboration was the introduction of Policy Framework Papers (PFPs) 
in 1986. These were jointly prepared country-specific papers produced by the staffs of 
both institutions in co-operation with representatives from the governments of borrowing 
countries. The PFPs were designed especially to confront problems in Africa, because 
they were targeted at IDA countries.205 The Reagan administration regarded the PFPs as 
a means of formalising the association of the IFIs.206 The US government “had wanted a 
guarantee of formal cross-conditionality”207 between the institutions, which in effect 
meant that a borrowing country could not receive loans from one of the IFIs if it had not 
met the conditions of the other. While no such assurance was made, Babb notes that the 
PFPs “marked a significant harmonization of the two organizations’ policies”208.  
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While official cross-conditionality was never endorsed, Feinberg notes that “many 
decisions are taken by management and staff outside of the formal board framework”209. 
He distinguishes three mechanisms that facilitate cross-conditionality between the IFIs. 
In addition to the most important form, “consultative cross-conditionality”, described 
above, Feinberg identifies “interdependent cross-conditionality” and “indirect financial 
linkages”. Interdependent cross-conditionality is a mechanism where the IFIs select 
common conditions that they deem vital, an adjustment in the exchange rate for example, 
and make them “a priori” conditions before the borrowing countries have received any 
loans at all. An indirect financial linkage becomes visible when one of the IFIs withholds 
a loan, and as a consequence the borrowing state cannot meet its financial commitments 
to the other institution. This mechanism works through more extensive financial linkages 
as well, namely when third-party financiers, commercial banks for instance, are involved 
in the financial network.210 
After decades of gradual divergence, new formal and informal links were forged between 
the institutions. Krueger had recurring meetings with her counterparts from the Fund, and 
President Clausen of the Bank worked in close collaboration with the Fund’s executive 
manager De Larosiére and Fed’s chairman Volcker.211 Likewise, the later president of the 
Bank, Barber Conable (1986–1991), met the executive manager of the Fund, Michel 
Camdessus (1987–2000) regularly once a month.212 Conable provides a detailed account 
of the challenges in Fund-Bank relations and how the co-operation took place through the 
PFPs: 
“The problems are not of cross-conditionality. They're problems of disagreement 
about facts or something of that sort, and we are always running into different 
assumptions on oil prices or something, and then our Boards get upset.  But, you see, 
we also have more contact than we used to have.  For instance, the policy framework 
papers provide a point of contact.  I don't think they're terribly significant myself, 
but those are worked out on a tripartite basis; the government, the Fund, and the 
Bank work out the policy framework papers.  And we discuss them, and a Fund man 
comes and listens to the discussion.  And we send our conclusions over to them, and 
they act on them ultimately.”   
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Conable goes on to note that the PFPs “have more relevance to the Fund”213 because the 
Bank already has country-specific management strategies. In my opinion, hidden beneath 
his remarks is a rather obvious hierarchical order. It seems as if the Bank was consulted 
but the Fund always went first. Other sources verify the deduction. David Knox confirms 
that, despite the closer co-operation in designing SAPs, a pecking order remained: “Fund 
first, Bank next”214. It became customary for the Bank to “wait for borrowers to arrive at 
a lending agreement with the IMF before agreeing to its own loan program”215.  
Moreover, the Fund proved to be uncompromising in holding onto the preferred sequence 
of action. For instance, Camdessus was “furious”216 when the Bank moved ahead of the 
Fund and issued an adjustment loan for Argentina in 1987.217 However, in spite of the 
PFPs granting the Fund a position of precedence, the Bank’s role was not confined to a 
passive follower as it was able to contribute to the substance of the loan programs. In fact, 
after the introduction of the PFPs, the Fund moved a step further from quick 
disbursements towards Bank-style structural adjustment lending for longer time 
periods.218 This was facilitated by the establishment of the Fund’s Structural Adjustment 
Facility (SAF)219 in 1986.220  
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2.6 Building the Washington Consensus 
The Reagan administration’s policies towards the IFIs are characterised by a sense of 
ambiguity, even though a slow process of warming relations can be traced through the 
years. While the IFIs were initially seen as a waste of tax payer’s dollars, many in the 
Reagan administration started to gradually view them as useful tools in promoting the 
“magic of the market place”221. The American endorsement of structural adjustment 
should be viewed in light of this underpinning contradiction. Stern emphasises the 
importance of the US government input and the tripartite discussions in the increased 
issuing of SALs by the Bank:  
”It was in this period that Structural Adjustment Lending became an operational tool. 
The issues the Bank sought to address in those days – trade liberalization, price 
decontrol, the internal market, the foreign investment framework, energy pricing – 
became topics of discussion between the Bank and the IMF, and with the U.S. 
Government. The U.S. Government played a major role in the debt crisis from the 
outset because of the massive systemic risk to the banking system, particularly in the 
U.S. and Japan.”222 
However, largely due to the increased autonomy acquired under the previous president, 
the relationship between the Bank and the US government was much more strained 
compared to the Fund. Thus, because of the activist role which the US government 
assumed, the 1980s can be viewed as a struggle between an American push for control 
and the Bank’s thrust to oppose it. The Americans employed different methods in their 
pursuit for authority.  
The Bank’s management had customarily channelled its unofficial links with the 
American government via the State Department, but in the 1980s, American pressure was 
exerted mainly by the Treasury. Although the Americans had put great hopes in Clausen, 
the new president of the Bank did not simply comply under pressure. The relationship 
between Clausen and the Secretary of Treasury, Don Regan (1981–1985), was 
particularly uneasy.223 Clausen was trying to increase the Bank’s capital but the US 
administration and Congress were opposed to it. In response, Clausen resisted American 
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influence and this soured the relationship further. 224 The president of the Bank felt that 
the US administration was not working for the common good, quite the opposite: 
“But I felt the most political pressure from the United States and if I were the United 
States I wouldn’t be doing that. That was my test on political pressure. Everybody’s 
going to ask, on the theory that if they don’t ask enough, they’re not going to get 
more than what they ask for. And so I can understand that. But where some pressure 
is put, when it defied logic for what was best for the World Bank or what was best 
for the world, then that’s political pressure. That’s, pure, pure selfishness.”225 
A turning point in the tense dealings was seen when Reagan shuffled his administration 
after winning a second term in office. Clausen acknowledges the slow process of change 
but at the same time highlights the importance of personal relations: “I must say that as 
the administration progressed, it became more understanding. And oh what a difference 
a Secretary of the Treasury can make!”226 The new man in charge of the Treasury was 
James Baker III. In general, he had a more benign view of the IFIs, and more importantly, 
he was a pragmatist compared to his predecessor, and thus more willing to co-operate 
with the IFIs.227  
The new approach was materialised in the launch of the Baker Plan soon after the new 
Treasurer took office in October 1985. The US government sought for new ways to battle 
the debt crisis, which it increasingly viewed as a longer-term condition originating from 
underlying structural problems in the economies of the developing countries, not just as 
an acute liquidity crisis. Many had hoped for debt reduction for the struggling countries 
but it did not materialise in Baker’s new initiative.228 The Baker Plan was not designed 
for African countries. It was catered for 15 heavily indebted middle-income countries, 
most of them in South America.229 The reason for this is quite straightforward. Because 
of their size, the larger middle-income countries, Brazil and Mexico for example, posed 
the real threat to the international banking system. While smaller African economies were 
equally indebted, their default would not cause a catastrophic chain of events.230 
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However, analysing the Baker Plan is relevant for this study, because it reveals how the 
American government at the time viewed the debt crisis and the role of the IFIs in fighting 
it. Thus, it reflected the American stance more generally and had implications for all 
developing countries that were struggling with debts, many of them in Africa. Babb 
distinguishes the three main objectives of the Baker plan: 
”First, debtor countries needed to adopt “comprehensive macro-economic and 
structural policies supported by the international financial institutions, to promote 
growth and balance of payments adjustment, and to reduce inflation.” Second, Baker 
called for “a continued central role for the IMF, in conjunction with increased and 
more effective structural adjustment lending by the multilateral development banks, 
both in support of the adoption by principal debtors of market-oriented policies for 
growth.” And, third, he proposed “increased lending by private banks in support of 
comprehensive economic adjustment programs“.” 231 
The first and the third elements had been central for the US since the onset of the crisis. 
The novel thing about the Baker Plan was that it wanted to increase the involvement of 
the multilateral development banks (MDBs), of which the World Bank was the most 
important financier.232 Most notably, Baker wanted the development banks to issue 
quickly disbursing policy-loans to promote growth and exports, which in effect meant 
increased application of SAPs. In addition, the banks needed to tighten conditionality and 
increasingly focus on Fund-like policy prescriptions, exchange rate adjustments for 
example. 233 The PFPs were introduced after the launch of the Baker Plan as a tool for 
tightening the uniformity of the IFI’s policies.234  
Another new aspect of the Baker Plan was the added emphasis on “market-oriented 
solutions”. Trade and capital liberalisation had been on the table longer but promoting the 
privatisation of state-owned companies was a new approach from Reagan’s 
administration. Babb emphasises the importance of this change as the US government 
wanted now to “use program lending as an incentive to get governments to divest 
themselves of public enterprises and, thereby, to launch a major transformation of the 
economic governance of developing countries”235. Furthermore, Babb summarises 
cleverly the American rationale behind the entire Baker Plan: “if growth was the only 
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solution to the debt crisis and liberalizing reforms the only means toward growth, then it 
stood to reason that IFIs needed to be fully mobilised to promote liberalizing reforms”236. 
For the purpose of this study, the most important fact to draw from the Baker Plan is the 
significant change in American policy which it reflected. In essence, the IFIs were 
promised more funds by the American government, but the price was more extensive 
policy demands. 
The Baker Plan signalled a change in the deployment of the administration’s most 
important channel of influence. The donor leverage tactic was used extensively under 
Reagan’s first administration because in addition to a sceptical Congress, the government 
itself regarded the multilateral institutions as ineffectual organisations.237 The change of 
administration in 1985 did not usher the end of the tactic’s employment, but rather, after 
that, donor leverage was used more eagerly to push for preferred policies, not just for 
regulating the amount of capital allocated to the IFIs.238  
Clausen considered the Baker Plan to be “a good idea”239, though he was not very pleased 
with the way in which the Americans prepared it without thoroughly consulting the 
IFIs.240 Not everybody at the Bank, however, was convinced. David Knox recalls how a 
year after the launch of the initiative he was “already very concerned that we had just 
been overly optimistic, very, very optimistic”241. The private banks and the development 
banks failed to muster the proposed amount of capital and the rapid adjustment policies 
did not lift the economies out of the slump. In fact, the situation in most of the 15 countries 
deteriorated in the following years.242 
Knox had started to promote debt reduction already in 1986, but at the time it was not 
seen as a viable policy option in the IFIs, quite the opposite. According to Knox, “the 
reaction in the Bank was one of horror, and the reaction in the Fund was even more”243. 
Knox laments the fact that while management in the Bank warmed gradually to the idea, 
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shareholder pressure (mainly American in this case), slowed the process markedly.244 It 
was not until George H.W. Bush took office in 1988 that debt reduction was finally 
approved as a possible means for solving the crisis. In the next year, the new US 
administration introduced the Brady Plan245 which involved debt relief on a small scale.246  
While Knox was frustrated with the slow process of change, more profound criticism was 
also evident at the Bank. Shahid Husain replaced Warren Baum as the vice-president of 
the Operational Policy Staff in 1983 and from then on was involved in the handling of the 
debt crisis. Husain wrote a report where he identified the debt crisis as a structural 
problem rather than a liquidity issue, as Krueger, the Fund and Volcker all maintained.247 
According to him, Stern blocked the paper from reaching the executive board and 
Husain’s analysis was not taken into consideration.248 The official view of the Bank 
changed with the introduction of the Baker Plan as structural problems were recognised 
behind the debt crisis, but in Husain’s view a complete turnaround was not seen before a 
change in the US administration: 
”After George [H. W.] Bush came to power, everybody finally recognized that the 
debt crisis was a structural issue and then the Bank fell in line. The Bank, 
intellectually, failed the developing countries and its constituents. It didn't even 
provide a decent analysis of the debt issue. The lead was clearly in the hands of the 
U.S. Treasury. The Bank and the IMF saw their role as simply following the U.S. 
Treasury's lead. That was the fundamental change that took place between the 
McNamara times and the post-McNamara times. On key issues, like the debt issue, 
the Bank had basically ignored its role as an independent thinker and as an 
independent propounder of policy. Instead, Krueger and Stern chose to limit the 
Bank's role to one of implementing the policies of the U.S. Treasury.”249 
Husain’s views should be taken with a pinch of salt. First of all, he presents his story in a 
bitter tone, contempt towards some of his senior colleagues is obvious. Secondly, by the 
time of the interview it was clear that structural adjustment had not been a success story 
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History Program. 
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in most parts of the world. Nevertheless, Husain is right about the fact that the IFIs did 
lose a significant amount of their autonomy. I don’t believe that the IFIs simply fell in 
line and followed the American lead. However, it is evident that substantial compromises 
were made in the process of getting an intellectually heterogeneous organisation, like the 
Bank, to co-operate closely with the conservative and profoundly pro-market 
administration of Ronald Reagan. Critical voices were forced out or marginalised, as the 
case of Husain proves.  
The last years of the tumultuous 1980s were an especially difficult time for the Bank. 
After President Clausen was replaced by the Republican ex-congressman Conable in 
1986, the Bank went through a reorganisation process the next year. As a result, 10 
percent of the staff was laid off and many more were reshuffled inside the organisation.250 
In many ways the reorganisation had been coming for some time, because a lot of the 
power that was centralised under McNamara had moved to the hands of Stern and this 
was constraining the organisation.251 Many of the Bank’s former employees highlight the 
fact that an American initiative in bringing it about was significant.252 Baum represents a 
commonly held view of the episode:   
”Well in my mind a major purpose of the reorganization was to get Ernie out of the 
operation complex. I will give you my scenario, which you’ll match against a 
hundred others to find where the truth lies, but when Conable came on board, he was 
picked by the [Ronald] Reagan team with a certain number of conditions. He wanted, 
he knew he had to get IDA replenishment, he knew he had to get a Bank capital 
increase. He was held hostage to the administration which appointed him. The price 
was: “You’ve got to streamline the operations of the Bank. You’ve got to do work 
faster. You’ve got to get rid of this redundant staff. You’ve got to get rid of all of 
these excess vice-presidents. You’ve got to get rid of Ernie Stern”. And I think this 
was his brief when he came into the institution.”253  
Conable is vehemently opposed to the idea of the reorganisation being a plot machinated 
by the Americans.254 According to the former president, he was actually the one to 
propose the idea to Baker first and to this the Treasurer replied: “well, that's something 
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you should consider, but I'm not telling you you've got to have one”255. However, highly 
relevant incidents had taken place before this point of time. In a rather bizarre chain of 
events, Baker had initially asked Conable’s permission to use the former congressman’s 
name in private discussions regarding the vacant presidency, without seriously proposing 
that he take the job. The Treasurer wanted to add Conable to the shortlist in order to 
eliminate unwanted candidates from the race.256 Conable was in a state of shock when he 
found out that he was actually offered the presidency. Once again, he narrates the story 
by recounting his dialogue with the Treasurer: “My lord, Jim, this -- you can’t do this to 
me! I – this was not the understanding we had”257. 
After reluctantly accepting the position, another twist was seen just two days before the 
new president of the Bank took office. The executive board rejected a new budget 
(submitted by the departing President Clausen), with US, Japan and France voting against 
it. At this point Conable felt that his hands were tied, and in order to secure the funds he 
suggested the reorganisation to Baker.258 Unsurprisingly, once the reorganisation was 
under way the Executive Board approved the new budget. 
Therefore, irrespective of the initial ownership of the idea, the American input behind the 
reorganisation was crucial. It is no coincidence that the Americans chose a seasoned 
political veteran to head the Bank shortly before the reorganisation. Moreover, with the 
threat of not securing new funds, the new leader of the Bank had little option but to 
somehow streamline the operations of the organisation. Quite evidently the reorganisation 
had full American support, and a trap of sorts was set for Conable so that he would have 
to implement it. Whether the reorganisation was the ultimate aim of the American 
administration remains inconsequential. The bottom line is that the US government 
viewed the Bank as an oversized organisation and was able to once again influence its 
fate.  
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In this light, the events leading to the reorganisation should be seen as a striking piece of 
evidence of a strong US authority at the time. By 1987 the US government had come to 
regard the IFIs as useful allies, and thus, an increased willingness on the part of the 
administration to push for control had emerged. Conable speaks of American authority 
openly: “Their interest is in maintaining hegemony here. Looking ahead with their 
tremendous shortfall of foreign aid money and the probability that it's going to get even 
tighter, they think it's terribly important that they control this institution”259. 
After reading the rather cautious and vague interviews of the Bank’s earlier top 
management in relation to American influence, a strikingly different tone is portrayed in 
the frank and uncompromising passages in which the presidents of the 1980s, Clausen 
and Conable, speak of direct US meddling.260 I am inclined to ascribe this shift to an 
understandable aspiration on the behalf of the two presidents to hold on to a perceived 
autonomy of the Bank. US influence at the time was so obvious that denying it would be 
implausible and counterproductive. At that point in time, the US influence was in flux, 
moving from the strong, but relatively implicit, influence of earlier years to tighter, and 
crucially, more explicit influence as the 1980s progressed.       
The gradually ripened understanding and co-operation between the US government and 
the IFIs was conceptualised in 1989, when the term Washington Consensus was coined 
by the sociologist John Williamson. With the term, Williamson referred to a set of market-
liberalising policies negotiated between the IFIs and the US government. I will not go 
over the exact list of policies here, because a reasonably accurate picture of the economic 
prescriptions can be found in the two previous subchapters of this study. It is sufficient to 
quote Williamson:  
“A striking fact about the list of policies on which Washington does have a collective 
view is that they all stem from classical mainstream economic theory…None of the 
ideas spawned by the development literature…plays any essential role in motivating 
the Washington Consensus.”261   
Washington Consensus referred initially to policies directed at indebted Latin American 
countries, but its meaning rapidly broadened to include other developing countries of the 
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world as well.262 Its intellectual and ideological background stemmed from the rejection 
of Keynesian economics and “Third World statism”263. However, Ylönen highlights the 
fact that “the Consensus was not just a political program or an academic doctrine, but a 
tool, with which economic and societal ideas were mobilised into action”264. These policy 
prescriptions were applied extensively in developing countries around the world during 
the 1980s and the 1990s.265    
Back in 1989, Williamson was in his own words “oblivious to the thought that I might be 
coining either an oxymoron or a battle cry for ideological disputes for the next couple of 
decades”266. Certainly, in left-leaning circles, the Washington Consensus has become a 
swearword of sorts. It is often conflated together with ideas about neoliberalism and 
market fundamentalism, in such a way that Williamson, quite understandably, feels that 
the original meaning of the term is lost.267 Taking note of this fact does not, however, 
diminish the valuable insights that some critical commentators have constructed by 
drawing upon the Washington Consensus as a conceptualisation. Particularly renowned 
are the works of a few economists critical of globalisation, Dani Rodrik and Joseph 
Stiglitz, the latter of whom was chosen as the Bank’s chief economist in 1997.268 
Since the conception of the Washington Consensus, the IFIs have gradually distanced 
themselves from US government policies. While it is safe to assume that the need for 
change has stemmed mainly from the inadequacy of former policies, the ideological battle 
around the concept has surely contributed to the shift as well. Williamson argues that if 
the term is to be comprehended as an understanding between the US government and the 
IFIs, the “consensus has evaporated”269. From the 1990s onwards the IFIs have focused 
on matters like institution building and income distribution. The Bank has lifted good 
governance and fighting corruption to the centre of its agenda.270 The IFIs launched the 
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Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in 1996, which included debt relief to 
the very poorest countries of the world. 271  
Because of the limited range of this study, it is not possible or even necessary to examine 
thoroughly the various features of the concept. However, I feel that some important 
aspects of the Washington Consensus need to be emphasised. Although the term has its 
limits as a conceptualisation, and one often stumbles upon rather uncritical ways of 
applying it, I do find it useful for three reasons. First of all, the spatial connotations of the 
term should be highlighted. In addition to serving as the headquarters of the IFIs and the 
US government, Washington D.C. is also the home to many economic think tanks and 
development-oriented congressmen.272 Thus, the Washington Consensus should be seen 
as a broader understanding spanning across multiple levels of governance, not just as a 
one-way push on the behalf of the US executive.  
Secondly, it is important to view the Washington Consensus in the precise historical 
context of the time. I would argue that the world has grown more multipolar since and 
this has affected multilateral institutions profoundly. In contrast, thirty years ago 
globalisation was well under way, but the communist block was crumbling and China’s 
remarkable economic growth was only beginning to gather momentum. Although history 
did not come to an end, as the political scientist Francis Fukuyama famously declared, a 
sense of an inevitable triumph of free markets can be traced in and around the years of 
the Washington Consensus.273 I would argue that this led to overconfidence and backfired 
to some extent in many parts of the world that were introduced to the forces of free market 
capitalism. Aggressive SAPs were pushed through in many of the old Soviet states and 
communist countries, for example, with adverse outcomes.274    
Thirdly, and most importantly in my opinion, it needs to be emphasised that the 
Washington Consensus was not born overnight. It was forged slowly as the US 
administration’s stance on the IFIs changed from a hostile view to a pragmatic 
acceptance. Initially, the US government followed the line of the Heritage Foundation 
and other conservative think tanks in maintaining that the IFIs were unreliable 
organisations that funded socialist governments. This view was gradually pushed to the 
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background, and the selection of James Baker as the Secretary of Treasury was a pivotal 
moment in this process.  
The Fund was accepted as a credible collaborator faster, because it was better equipped 
to fight the debt crisis. In addition, it is safe to presume that the Fund’s relatively limited 
focus on balance of payments issues and a rather homogenous workforce made it an easier 
partner for US officials. In order for the Bank to get involved, it had to win the US 
government’s trust in its abilities to impose tough policy conditions.275 The IFIs would 
not have engaged in structural adjustment lending on the same scale without the US 
government’s influence and approval. Quite the contrary, the American contribution was 
vital. Babb encapsulates this well in noting that “the dramatic rise of structural adjustment 
among multilateral lenders was made possible by strong shareholder activism”276.  
From the IFI’s point of view, the 1980s were challenging but at the same time stimulating 
years. The Fund found a new sense of purpose after the marginalisation that had followed 
the end of the Bretton Woods system. The debt crisis legitimated its role as the “Band-
Aid” of acute liquidity crises. In addition, it was able to diversify its lending operations 
greatly with the advent of SAPs. For the Bank the decade was a more ambivalent period. 
From the sociologically inspired organisational view, the Bank’s increased policy-lending 
and co-operation with the US government made sense, although significant ideological 
opposition evidently grew within the institution. By forging close relations with the US 
Treasury, the Bank was able to secure funds and increase its budget, but the flip side of 
the coin was the American push for control. 
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3. The Case of Zambia  
 
3.1 The Curse of Copper 
In this chapter I will recount the economic history of postcolonial Zambia. To begin with, 
I will provide some essential basic information about the former British colony. I will 
also present a short summary of the fortunes of its mining industry, because the sector is 
vital in understanding the economic trajectory of Zambia. This section will be followed 
with a brief theoretical analysis that highlights the insecure position of Zambia as a small, 
open and undiversified economy. After the introduction, I will embark on a more detailed 
account of the Zambian economic path. 
In order to comprehend Zambia’s economic history, it is imperative to shed light on key 
political developments as well. Due to Zambia’s precarious geopolitical location, foreign 
affairs – questions related to national security in particular – have had an important role 
in explaining its postcolonial history. Other important political dynamics include the 
state’s relations with influential trade unions and the persistent opposition between the 
urban working class and rural people toiling in agriculture. However, for the purpose of 
this study, the main emphasis will lie on Zambia’s relations with the IFIs. The aim is to 
juxtapose the evolution of the IFIs with the Zambian experience. The primary question 
is: how were American influence and the tightening conditionality in the IFIs reflected in 
the case of Zambia?  
The Republic of Zambia was established on the 24 October in 1964 replacing the British 
protectorate of Northern Rhodesia. The struggle for independence was led by Kenneth 
Kaunda (1924–) and his socialist United National Independence Party (UNIP). Kaunda 
was inaugurated as the republic’s first president. He consolidated his power in 1972 with 
a constitutional change that made Zambia effectively a one-party state. Nearly twenty 
years later Zambia was one of the earliest African states that went through a (relatively) 
calm transition to democracy. Kaunda was defeated in the free elections of 1991 by the 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) that had strong support from trade unions. 
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The leader of the MMD, Frederick Chiluba (1943–2011), was chosen as president and 
under his rule Zambia went through sweeping economic liberalisations in the 1990s.277 
Zambia joined the IFIs in September 1965.278 The newly established central bank, the 
Bank of Zambia (BoZ), issued the republic’s first official currency, the Zambian pound, 
in 1964. A couple of years later the currency was switched to the Zambian kwacha, which 
was pegged to the British pound at a fixed rate of 1.7094 kwacha per pound. After the 
Nixon shock in August 1971, the kwacha was pegged to the American dollar.279 
Although Zambia has an abundant supply of natural resources, its geographic location is 
not optimal in terms of international trade. It is a land-locked country with eight 
neighbouring states: The Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Namibia, Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi and Tanzania (see Figure 1, page 57). Thus, good 
relations with bordering states and functioning infrastructure are crucial for maximising 
the potential of exports, as well as bringing in imports. Zambia has a tropical climate that 
is moderated by elevation as the country sits on the plateau of Central Africa (roughly 
1000-1600 meters above the sea level). The land in Zambia is very suitable for agriculture 
due to plentiful water reserves. Only one and a half million hectares is cultivated yearly 
of a land resource base of 42 million hectares280.  
Resembling the familiar pattern of African demographic development, Zambia’s 
postcolonial history has been characterised by fast population growth. When Zambia 
gained independence, the country had less than three and a half million inhabitants. 
During the next fifty years the population more than quadrupled to 16 million in 2015.281 
At its peak, the total fertility rate282 was almost 7.4 in the 1970s. The fertility rate has 
fallen somewhat since, but in a global perspective it has remained very high, with 
Zambian women giving birth to nearly five children on average in 2016.283 Unlike many 
other countries in the continent, Zambia has not suffered from civil wars. The AIDS-
epidemic of the 1990s and early 2000s has been the biggest factor affecting mortality 
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rates. The peak of the epidemic was seen back in 1996, when nearly 15 per cent of 
Zambian women aged 15–24 were infected by the HIV-virus. Today, AIDS is still an 
acute health issue, but prevalence has dropped to less than six per cent in the young female 
population.284 
 
Figure 1. Map of Zambia 
 
 
(Source: CIA, The World Factbook: Zambia.) 
Rapid population growth has unquestionably had a considerable impact on the economic 
performance of the country. Blaming underdevelopment solely on population growth is, 
however, unjustified. After taking a closer look at the data, a more detailed picture is 
revealed. The Zambian population doubled in the first 22 years of independence. During 
this time GDP per capita (measured in constant 2010 dollars)285 dropped from roughly 
1500 dollars to approximately 1090 dollars in 1986 (the average level of income remained 
fairly stable at first, but a steep fall started in 1976). In spite of plummeting to a low of 
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900 dollars in 1994, GDP per capita recovered back to 1500 dollars between 1986 and 
2011. In these 25 years the population doubled again from roughly seven million to 14 
million.286 If population growth is taken as a foundational cause of poor economic 
performance, surely the decline in GDP per capita should have been more constant, 
instead of having the shape of a u-curve.  
Moreover, fast but steadily declining population growth creates potential for future 
economic progress as the portion of young adults increases in relation to children and 
older people.287 As for many other Sub-Saharan countries, the utilisation of this 
“demographic dividend” is a key question for Zambia in the coming decades. Most 
importantly, investments in health care and education are paramount, because a large and 
young population may also be a source of unrest if jobs and opportunities are scarce.288   
Historically, Zambia’s urban population has been vast compared to other African 
countries. Moreover, urbanisation started very early in the region because of the 
expansion of the mining industry in the Copperbelt province during the 1930s and 
1940s.289 The Copperbelt is located 200 kilometres north of the capital Lusaka (see Figure 
1). The province still has many large mining towns and has remained the most urbanised 
region in Zambia. Lusaka is by far the biggest city in the country, however, with 
approximately two and a half million residents in 2018.290 The urban population of 
Zambia reached over one million in 1969 and at the time 750 000 Zambians worked in 
waged employment.291 Today, 43 per cent of the total population dwell in urban areas, 
but an almost equal level was reached back in 1980.292 The economic liberalisation of the 
1990s contributed significantly to the growth of the informal economy as the public sector 
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was slashed, and practises such as street vending increased. In 1999, only 11 per cent of 
Zambians worked in formal employment.293  
In some early Western studies the distinct cultures of Zambian urban classes were 
highlighted, but later research has proven that the experiences of rural and townspeople 
have not been so significantly different. Moreover, cyclical movement between towns 
and rural areas have distorted earlier data somewhat.294 However, Miles Larmer 
emphasises the fact that “the perception that Zambia was a highly urbanized (or 
overurbanized) country (whatever the material reality) was important in shaping urban 
Zambians’ sense of identity”295.  
Zambia’s postcolonial economic history is a tale of underdevelopment and unfulfilled 
potential. After five years of sovereign rule, Zambia was one of the richest countries in 
Africa. On a global scale, it was classified as a middle-income country, ranking ahead of 
the likes of Brazil, Malaysia, Turkey and South Korea when comparing GDP per 
capita.296 Today, the average Zambian income lingers around 1 500 dollars a year, which 
is slightly lower than the median level of Sub-Saharan Africa.297 On a global ranking it is 
in 154th place, behind Uzbekistan and ahead of Cameroon. For the sake of comparison, 
the average yearly incomes in Malaysia and Brazil are nearly 10 000 dollars, with Turkey 
slightly ahead of that mark. The rise of South Korea to become the biggest economy 
among the “Asian Tigers”298 is, of course, one of the most impressive feats in recent 
history.299 A comparison of GDPs does not, however, sufficiently capture the full impact 
of the decline in the living standards and widespread poverty that Zambia has faced. One 
striking piece of evidence is the dramatic fall in life expectancy, which was 50 at the time 
of independence, but dropped to 35 during the following forty years.300  
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The history of large-scale copper extraction in Zambia has its roots in the 1890s. After 
“discovering” vast copper deposits in the region, Cecil Rhodes301 and his British South 
Africa Company (BSAC) started securing mining rights from local rulers. The BSAC 
officially founded Northern Rhodesia in 1911 and thirteen years later it became a 
protectorate of the British Colonial Office.302 The BSAC reserved the mining rights and 
massive constructions were started in the Copperbelt region. Larmer describes how 
“many people, mainly Africans, suffered terribly in the process, but they built one of the 
greatest concentrations of industry and urban development in the African continent”303. 
The fortunes of the mining sector have defined Zambian economic development. Between 
1964 and 2012, the mining industry generated a third of the gross national income 
(GNI)304 on average.305 While the importance of the copper industry has been enormous, 
the deterioration of it has been equally remarkable. The debt crisis practically stifled all 
new investments and the falling revenues from the nationalised mines were hoarded by 
the state. No new mines were established after 1979.306 As investments plummeted the 
quality of the Zambian copper ore dropped 20 per cent throughout the 1970s.307  
The stagnation is best reflected in the volumes of production. At its peak, copper 
production reached 750 000 tons in 1974, but by 2000 the national mining conglomerate, 
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), was extracting only 257 000 tons of copper 
a year.308 Production picked up finally when rising copper demand in China and India 
kicked off a new boom in 2004. This was cut short by the global financial crisis of 2008, 
but copper prices recovered quickly after the crash. In 2017, a record of 850 000 tons of 
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copper was produced in Zambia.309 The reliance on copper is captured strikingly when 
comparing the price fluctuations of the commodity with the trajectory of the GDP per 
capita of postcolonial Zambia (See Figure 2, page 61). 
Why has a relatively peaceful and resource-rich country not been able to create wider 
prosperity for its people? This failure can be attributed to many factors. At first sight bad 
luck seems to be a crucial explanation, as Alistair Fraser shrewdly points out in the 
introductory chapter of the book Zambia, Mining, and Neoliberalism: Boom and Bust on 
the Globalized Copperbelt, which he has co-edited with Larmer. The first North 
Rhodesian copper mines started operating in 1929 just before the onset of the Great 
Depression, and the Zambian government’s decision to nationalise the mines was shortly 
followed by the crash of global commodity prices in 1974. The misfortune continued to 
the new millennia as the Zambian government was pressured to privatise the unprofitable 
mines in 1997–2000. A lion’s share of the revenues from the boom that started in 2004 
was then collected by multinational mining companies.310 
 
Figure 2. GDP Per Capita and Annual Copper Prices: Zambia 1964–2017  
 
(Sources: World Bank Commodity Price Data. The Pink Sheet; World Bank Open Data. GDP per capita 
(constant 2010 US$): Zambia.) 
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Although horrific timing in relation to international copper prices has certainly 
contributed to Zambia’s economic woes, it is not a sufficient explanation alone. While 
troubles in the Zambian mining industry have resulted in economic decline, the booms in 
the sector have not contributed significantly in disbursing national wealth to the larger 
population. Larmer sums this up in saying that “the historical evidence suggests that there 
has never been a direct or causal relationship between the fortunes of the mining industry 
on the one hand and the general prosperity of Zambia or Zambians on the other”311. 
Therefore, the volatile international copper markets are only part of the problem.  
While a strong mining industry undoubtedly creates great export potential, an 
overreliance in one sector of the economy can be problematic. In the economic literature 
concerning Zambia one commonly encounters the term “Dutch disease”. The term was 
coined by The Economist in 1977, when the newspaper analysed the economic situation 
of the Netherlands. At the time, the Dutch economy reaped great revenues by exporting 
natural gas, but this had adverse effects on other sectors of the national economy. The 
newspaper determined that the influx of foreign currency, caused by the booming exports, 
lead to an overvaluation of the Dutch guilder. This resulted in making other sectors of the 
economy less competitive and was followed by a plunge in investments and rising 
unemployment. In a fixed currency regime, as is the case with Zambia, the mechanism 
and results are only slightly different. The extra foreign currency is converted to the 
domestic equivalent causing an expansion in the supply of money. This in turn pushes 
prices up and is followed by the appreciation of the “real” exchange rate312. Once again, 
the end result is a drop in competitiveness and investments.313 
As with most economic models, reality tends to be more complicated. Indeed, the Dutch 
disease does not work in a uniform way in varying settings. Nevertheless, the Dutch 
disease is a handy tool for analysing the difficulties faced by undiversified economies that 
are relying on international commodity markets for export revenues. In recent years the 
Russian economy has encountered problems of this sort.314 While concentrating in the 
                                                             
311 Larmer 2010, 32. 
312 The real exchange rate measures the relative price levels of two countries with the help of consumption 
baskets and the nominal exchange rate. The nominal exchange rate indicates the relative price of two 
currencies.     
313 The Economist, 5 November 2014. 
314 Kalcheva & Oomes 2007. 
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production of one commodity is not inherently harmful, troubles will surely commence 
if commodity prices are volatile, as is the case with copper in Zambia and oil in Russia. 
Several studies have proven that the Dutch disease has plagued Zambian development 
ever since independence.315 Moreover, Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa’s calculations imply, that 
while the Zambian economy has been hurt by the Dutch disease during mining booms, 
busts on the other hand, don’t simply reverse the effects and make other sectors more 
competitive.316    
As an economic model the Dutch disease has its limitations. Most importantly, it does not 
take into account the varying socio-political contexts of the commodity-exporting 
countries. The Dutch society differs crucially from, say, the Russian, Venezuelan or 
Zambian counterpart. In this light, a further possible Zambian predicament can be what 
researchers have named the “resource curse”. The resource curse has been offered as an 
answer to the larger question of mineral-rich developing countries faring worse than states 
that have no natural resources. Zambia is often cited as the most clear-cut example of a 
state that has been plagued by it317.  
Graham Davis presents a comprehensive critique of the sectoral analysis tradition that has 
tried to identify reasons behind poor development in mineral exporting economies since 
the early 1990s.318 Numerous investigations have set out to specify possible factors that 
contribute to socio-political environments fostering development on one hand and 
impairing it on the other. Possible explanations vary greatly from cultural and religious 
traditions to different forms of structural determinism. Davis reckons that no general 
results behind the resource curse can be identified, and therefore a case-specific approach 
is more fruitful in studying the phenomenon.319  
Davis’ critique carries more profound assertions. As the often-cited example of South 
Korea proves, development economists tend to agree that a healthy portion of state control 
is needed for fostering sustainable growth. According to some explanations then, the 
curse is very real, as mineral extraction is believed to causally produce bureaucratic 
incapacity of the state.320 Instinctively thinking, however, this seems quite implausible. 
                                                             
315 Meijer 1990; Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1991; Boos & Holm-Müller 2016.  
316 Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1991, 860. 
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To take a contemporary case in point, it would be simplistic to blame oil for Venezuela’s 
recent hardships. Rather, the extraction of oil has helped a corrupted and dictatorial state 
to legitimate and maintain its power. The extraction of oil has enabled state corruption, 
but by no means has it necessitated it. Thus, it would be more reasonable to deduce that 
mineral extraction combined with a weak sate can result in a vicious circle that fosters 
corruption and hampers development.   
Classical development economics highlights the importance of import substitution and 
export promotion in diversifying the national economy. In the studies conducted in the 
1980s and 1990s, manufacturing was identified as the crucial sector to be promoted.321 
While this recipe certainly worked well in some Asian countries in the past, it sounds 
severely outdated in the rapidly changing global environment of today. Moreover, 
neoclassical economics suggests that diversification is not as all-powerful a solution as 
its proponents imply. According to one of the most famous paradigms, a country should 
focus on the production of commodities where it has a comparative advantage in relation 
to its trading partners.322 Thus, in theory, even a Dutch-disease situation should actually 
be welcomed, because it diverts resources from other uncompetitive sectors to the 
booming minerals production.323 
While the possibility of finding general and straightforward ways to deal with the resource 
curse is questionable, it is clear that developing countries relying on mineral exports do 
face problems of their own. Mineral extraction is not very labour intensive, so promoting 
other sectors of the economy is vital. Using Zambia as a case, R.M. Auty constructs a 
theoretical model, the corroding feedback loop, in which the effects of an external shock 
are compounded by a weak government that resorts to clientalistic rent-dispensing 
policies. Other parts of the loop include uncompetitive export sectors, an overvalued 
exchange rate, the accumulation of debt and widespread corruption.324 Although I 
disagree with the general conclusions that Auty draws from the case, he is right in that 
features of this kind have affected Zambian development since the oil crisis.  
                                                             
321 Davis 1998, 219. 
322 The theory of comparative advantage was formulated in 1817 by David Ricardo in his book On the 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.  
323 Davis 1998, 223–224. 
324 Auty 1991, 171. 
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More recently, Adrian Boos and Karin Holm-Müller have applied an econometric 
approach in studying the relationship of mineral dependence and Genuine Savings (GS), 
an indicator coined by the World Bank, which measures the reinvestment of rents from 
the depletion of natural resources in human and physical capital.325 Their findings indicate 
that Zambia has been affected by the resource curse, because “Zambian GS proved highly 
volatile and completely dependent on world copper prices and to a lesser extent on 
political developments”326. According to the study, in addition to external factors, two 
endogenous elements have contributed to the low reinvestment level in Zambia: a semi-
authoritarian political system and weak institutions that foster corruption.327 Widespread 
corruption at the very top level of government is a relatively recent phenomenon, 
however, because “only during the decade of Chiluba’s rule from 1991 onwards did 
corruption become entrenched and murkily intertwined with the political class”328. The 
most common form of corruption is often not financial but instead takes the form of 
patronage. Corruption has resulted in a bureaucratically large and wasteful public sector, 
which consumes a lot of the national budget and allocates mineral rents unproductively.329 
To conclude, I follow Davis in maintaining that the resource curse – as a dilemma 
hampering all resource-rich and export-oriented countries – is a myth. A comparison of 
Chile and Zambia, both economies heavily reliant on copper exports, is sufficient in 
establishing this conclusion.330 Moreover, Botswana, Zambia’s sparsely populated 
neighbour, has been very successful in managing to reinvest mineral rents in a sustainable 
way, with the state taking an active role in the process.331 In 1985, nearly 60 percent of 
the Botswanan population lived in poverty, but in the following 25 years the number 
decreased to a third of that.332 On the other hand, it is equally clear that a certain amount 
of diversification is needed because in a globalised economy an overreliance on one 
commodity is simply not sustainable. Mineral dependence is especially damaging when 
global prices are low or falling.333 Thus, the failure to diversify the economy before and 
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during the long mining bust that lasted approximately three decades, is a key element in 
an understanding of Zambian development. 
Both concepts – the Dutch disease, and the resource curse especially – have some serious 
shortcomings, but I believe that they nevertheless are useful tools in helping to understand 
why the Zambian economy has not been able to produce sustainable growth. The copper 
industry has damaged other sections of the economy and, even during the export booms, 
the spoils have not filtered down adequately to the poorest parts of society. This failure 
has been exacerbated by a weak and authoritarian state that has invested mineral rents 
inefficiently, in addition to being unable to take the decisive steps to diversify the 
economy. I have included the above discussion in the study, because I believe that it 
provides a useful theoretical framework which can be carried along with the historical 
analysis. The issue of diversification has been central to the Zambian economy and the 
question was recognised early in Zambian domestic politics and in the IFIs. 
   
3.2 The Boom and Nationalisations: 1964–1973 
Miles Larmer highlights the fact that the battle to control the Zambian mining revenues 
has always been a political contest.334 Due to the steadily increasing mining revenues in 
the 1950s, the question became acute as the struggle for independence intensified. After 
the formation of the short-lived Central African Federation (CAF)335 in 1953, revenues 
from the mines in the Northern part of the federation were largely pocketed by Southern 
Rhodesia’s white settlers.336 Thus, “nationalist opposition to the Central African 
Federation in Northern Rhodesia was framed in terms of resistance to white settler control 
of the territory’s mining resources”337. Furthermore, the process was guided by the 
understandable principle of directing mining revenues to the general development of the 
emerging state.  
The Zambian struggle to control the means of production was by no means unique. On 
the contrary, it was a common experience for the decolonising states of the world at the 
                                                             
334 Larmer 2010, 32. 
335 The CAF (1953–1963) was a semi-autonomous federation that tied together the British colony of South 
Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and two British protectorates, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (independent 
Malawi from 1964 onwards).    
336 Larmer 2010, 34. 
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time: “new rulers had secured political power at independence but remained dependent 
for resources on unequal relationships with the governments and companies of the former 
colonial powers”338. In Zambia, the transition was relatively smooth as a thoroughly 
negotiated and mutually respected partnership was forged between the UNIP government 
and the two major mining companies, which held the mining rights in the Copperbelt: 
Anglo American Corporation (AAC) and Rhodes Selection Trust (RST).339 
Although the so called First Republic (1964–1973) was ostensibly a multi-party 
democracy, the first years of Zambian independence were characterised by a steady 
decline of civil liberties and a waning tolerance of dissidents.340 In fact, Larmer criticises   
earlier historiography for its “unproblematic” stance in relation to the First Republic. In 
these accounts, the initial steps of development are often seen as sufficient in satisfying 
the expectations of Zambians.341 Indeed, authoritarianism was not born over-night in 
December 1972 when President Kaunda announced that Zambia was to become a “one-
party participatory democracy”.342 Giacomo Macola distinguishes the political 
undercurrents that planted the seeds of early authoritarianism.343 Kaunda’s rise to 
ascendancy had not been inevitable, as he had to defeat a rival party, the African National 
Congress of Northern Rhodesia (ANC)344, and its charismatic leader Harry Mwaanga 
Nkumbula in the first general elections of 1964. The relations between the two parties 
and their leaders had turned sour in the preceding years and a ferocious struggle for power 
paved the way to the elections. To this battle the UNIP “leadership reacted by elaborating 
an intellectual equivalence between party and national membership”345. In the process, a 
culture of political violence became gradually legitimated as both parties suppressed 
opposition movements in their stronghold areas.346 Macola concludes that: 
  “Ideological seeds of the one-party state and its natural corollaries, a much-heralded 
belief in the leader’s infallibility and a totalitarian ambition to quash and/or 
                                                             
338 Fraser 2010, 7. 
339 Larmer 2010, 35. 
340 Macola, 2008.  
341 Larmer 2008, 102. 
342 Larmer 2008, 98. 
343 Macola 2008, 17–44. 
344 After independence the party adopted the name Zambian African National Congress. Kaunda had 
initially been a member of the ANC, but he left in 1958 and splintered his own party out of it.  In comparison 
to UNIP’s socialist state driven economic planning, the ANC propagated itself as the defender of the 
interests of private businesses and free individuals. The ANC was popular among rural people in the South, 
while UNIP’s traditional stronghold was the Copperbelt province. (Macola 2008, 20, 29.) 
345 Macola 2008, 23.  
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encapsulate autonomous social movements, were already firmly embedded in the 
Zambian political soil well before the formal declaration of independence in October 
1964.”347 
Another significant reason for the state’s increasing willingness to oppress its own 
citizens stemmed from perceived threats to national security. In the early years of 
independence Zambia was very much a “frontier state”, in that it stood out as a sovereign 
indigenous nation in a very unstable part of the world.  Most of its neighbours were either 
engaged in emancipatory struggles against colonisers or experiencing civil unrest of some 
degree. Many of the conflicts were proxy wars with global superpowers taking sides in 
the familiar spirit of the Cold War. 
For Zambia, the situation across its Southern border was most disturbing. In November 
1965, Ian Smith, the leader of Rhodesia’s white settler minority, announced a Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI).348 The Zambian government urged the UK to quash 
what it viewed as a rebellion, but only a small number of British troops were sent to the 
region. Prime Minister Harold Wilson (1964–1970, 1974–1976) opted instead to use UN-
imposed economic sanctions to tie down Rhodesia.349 The persistent conflicts in 
neighbouring states, and the planned production of nuclear weapons by South Africa, the 
region’s biggest threat to Zambian existence, gave rise to precarious feelings in regard to 
national security.350 This undoubtedly amplified the UNIP government’s eagerness to 
tighten its grip domestically.    
The geopolitical tensions had significant impacts on economic considerations as well. In 
the first few years of independence, Zambia was wholly reliant on Rhodesia when it came 
to importing oil and exporting copper. The falling-out with Rhodesia and subsequent 
sanctions meant that the Zambian government had to look for other options in securing 
the supply of energy and in the continuation of trade. Fortunately, the US was dependent 
on Zambian copper at the time. For that reason, the government of Lyndon B. Johnson 
(1963–1969), together with the British government, organised a temporary air lift, which 
brought in the oil to run the mines in the Copperbelt. When the conflict with Rhodesia 
                                                             
347 Macola 2008, 24–25. 
348 None of the world’s independent states recognised the UDI. Despite this, Rhodesia’s minority 
government managed to hold on to power for nearly 15 years with the help of South Africa and Portugal. 
After a long guerrilla war, independent Zimbabwe emerged in 1980. The first elections were won by Robert 
Mugabe (1924–), who stayed in power for 37 years. 
349 DeRoche 2008, 79–81. 
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became prolonged, Zambia found an ally in Tanzania. An oil pipeline connecting the two 
states was built by an Italian company in 1968. Another vital piece of infrastructure was 
the planned new railway line that would connect the Zambian mines to the port of Dar es 
Salaam in Tanzania. Funds were secured from a rather surprising source – the People’s 
Republic of China – after the British, American and Soviet governments had refused to 
finance the scheme. The construction began in 1970 and the TAZARA-railroad, spanning 
1 860 kilometres, was completed five years later.351 
Although Zambia was led by a socialist party, it did not align itself to the communist bloc. 
The Zambian government found most international sympathy in the so-called Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM).352 Most of the countries in the non-aligned movement 
promoted a program of state planning and economic nationalism. This was also the core 
of UNIPs economic strategy. Thus, although the relationship with foreign mining 
companies remained relatively good, a nationalisation of the Copperbelt mines was on 
the agenda soon after independence.  
The urge to nationalise originated to a large extent from domestic politics although 
Rhodesia’s UDI and other international issues had a part to play as well.353 According to 
Larmer, “in much of the country, local party officials were besieged by angry 
complainants bemoaning the lack of real development in their villages”354. On the other 
                                                             
351 DeRoche 2008, 82–89. 
352 NAM was established in 1961 by the leaders of Yugoslavia, India, Egypt, Indonesia and Ghana. The 
purpose of the movement was to resist the bloc-politics of the Cold War environment. NAM quickly gained 
widespread support, especially among newly independent ex-colonies. While a plethora of different 
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imperialism and a commitment to work for world peace. In 1970, Zambia hosted the third NAM summit in 
Lusaka. 
353 The nationalisations should be viewed against the backdrop of growing frustrations in the international 
context. The countries of the global South had promoted for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
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system. Moreover, President Kaunda worked actively through the NAM in order to organise a cartel of 
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hand, most of the mineworkers in the Copperbelt were Bemba-speaking355 UNIP 
supporters who had played a major role in the nationalist struggle. This constituency, led 
by Kaunda’s increasingly radical party comrade, Simon Kapwepwe (1922–1980), 
demanded more returns from its representatives as well. Under piling pressure from many 
fronts, Kaunda decided to nationalise the mines.356 Thus, it can be reasoned that ethnic 
tensions and a culture of patronage shaped Zambian postcolonial politics from the very 
beginning.   
The nationalisations were a key component of the Mulungushi Economic Reforms of 
1968. In the next year, the state claimed a 51 per cent stake in the two big mining 
corporation’s operations in Zambia and formed two parastatal companies, Nchanga 
Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM).357 The 
nationalisations were wide-ranging, as an equally large share was acquired in other major 
foreign-owned industrial and financial firms. The process of nationalisation progressed 
gradually, so that by 1975, the Zambian state had taken full control of the mines and other 
vital assets.358  
Besides taking control over foreign firms, economic nationalism was displayed in the 
reform package more generally. Hugh Macmillan has investigated the impact of a set of 
laws that were introduced in order to encourage indigenous trading and retailing.359 At 
the time, Zambian trade and retail was dominated by a few big foreign companies and, 
especially in the countryside, by entrepreneurs of Indian origin. The novel laws pressured 
bigger firms to “voluntarily” offer majority stakes of their companies to the state, and 
restricted “resident expatriate businesses” (mainly Indians in this case)  to running their 
enterprises in the centres of ten large towns.360 While a Fund-report in 1973 cited Zambian 
representatives saying “that the transition has caused very little, if any, disruption”361, the 
truth was quite the opposite. Macmillan emphasises the long-term consequences of the 
                                                             
355 The Bemba people are the largest ethnical group in Zambia comprising approximately 20 per cent of the 
population. In addition to being spoken by the Bemba people, the Bemba language is the lingua franca of 
18 different ethnic groups, some of which live in neighbouring Congo, Botswana and Tanzania.  
356 Larmer 2010, 36. 
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reforms. The long depression that kicked in after the copper price shock of 1975 was more 
severe in the countryside, because traditional trading networks had been broken up and 
new businesses failed to replace them. This – coupled with newly introduced price 
controls – hampered agricultural output particularly, as farmers lost the incentive to 
produce for local markets.362 Macmillan reckons that the Mulungushi economic reforms 
did not cause the later depression, but they certainly made it longer and more damaging.363 
Agriculture was singled out as a vital sector for the development of the Zambian economy 
already in the first national economic program in 1966. The rhetoric did not, however, 
materialise in reality. While government spending rose significantly in the years from 
1966 to 1970, the same cannot be said of inputs to agriculture.364 Malcom F. McPherson 
determines the main reasons behind the persistent lack of development that continued in 
the following decades. They include state-influenced low producer prices (the low cost 
of food was directed to please urban workers), an overvalued exchange rate plus a lack 
of investment in production boosting activities and infrastructure.365 The UNIP 
government encouraged the formation of farming cooperatives but they proved to be 
unproductive.366  
Life in the booming Copperbelt during the 1960s was an exciting time. Mining revenues 
and generous subsidies created wealth and a buzzing urban atmosphere with “an 
unusually high concentration of motor cars, fashionable hairstyles, and European-style 
nightclubs”367. Strong trade unions were formed in the Copperbelt already in the 1950s 
and they had played an important part in the nationalist struggle.368 After independence, 
the alliance with UNIP became strained, because the state recognised that wage growth 
had to be controlled. The unions responded with strikes and the question was tied to the 
differences of income between African and expatriate workers.369 As a result, the UNIP-
government and the foreign mining companies had to submit to pay rises. The Fund 
estimated that Zambian wages grew 22 per cent annually between 1965 and 1968, before 
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a wage freeze was implemented by the government in 1969.370 The strong leverage of the 
mine workers was one reason that made the nationalisations more appealing to Kaunda 
as they “aimed to increase both the effective control of strategic mineral resources and 
the human resources vital to their exploitation”371. 
The years after independence witnessed an expansion of the public sector. Worryingly, 
the civil service proved useful for the government in rewarding loyalty as sinecures 
became common.372 Contrary to the recommendations of the first economic plan, the 
UNIP leadership pushed for growth in both wages and employment. As a result the 
government wage bill reached quickly to a sizable ten per cent share of the GDP.373 
According to Boos and Holm-Müller, the creation of a “large and inefficient bureaucratic 
apparatus” is a customary feature in resource-rich countries that are shaped by 
patronage.374 The heavy public sector aggravated the failed efforts to promote agriculture 
and diversify the economy. To conclude, the economic policies during the First Republic 
did not encourage diversification and, in fact, they strengthened the bias towards the urban 
working class at the expense of the rural poor. Auty sums up the consequences: “the over-
all effect of post-independence policies was to deploy high rents from copper primarily 
to expand and reinforce a powerful urban rent seeking constituency whose income from 
mines, factories and offices outstripped productivity”375.  
The Bank had funded a few projects already under the British rule in Northern Rhodesia. 
By far the biggest project before independence was the Kariba power dam, built on the 
Zambezi-river bordering Northern and Southern Rhodesia. The Bank loaned 80 million 
dollars to the project, and the bill was split in half between the two territories.376 After 
independence the rate of new projects grew significantly, as altogether 14 new projects 
were undertaken between 1966 and 1974.377 Financially the weightiest projects were still 
in infrastructure. Two highway projects were initiated in 1966 and 1968 respectively.378 
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In the next decade, the Bank agreed to provide a total of 82.1 million dollars to build 
another power station at the Kariba-site. In 1973, a similar power project at the Kafue-
river was funded with a substantial loan amounting to 115 million dollars.379  
Following the Bank’s intellectual reorientation, a gradual shift in the emphasis of the 
projects can be detected through the early years of Zambian independence. In 1968, the 
Bank’s first ever forestry project was initiated in Zambia. The scheme was considered a 
success in a later project performance report.380 On the other hand, a loan for a livestock 
development project was cancelled by the Zambian government after the parastatal 
company in charge of implementation got into financial trouble.381 By 1973, the Bank 
had also made a commitment to invest significantly into Zambian education. In the 
following years the Bank disbursed over 50 million dollars to three projects that were 
directed to improve secondary education, teacher training, vocational schooling and the 
standard of universities. The projects yielded somewhat positive, but overall mixed 
results.382 The clearest sign of the Bank’s new agenda can be seen in a 20 million project 
in 1974, which was designed to improve the living standards of urban squatters in 
Lusaka.383    
The Zambian authorities interacted quite frequently with Fund-officials through the 
1960s, but since the macroeconomic situation of the country remained largely good, the 
relationship was more or less consultative. Overall, people at the Fund seemed pleased 
with developments in Zambia. In a meeting held in February 1968, the executive directors 
noted the fine performance of the Zambian economy despite the complications brought 
about by Rhodesia’s UDI, although increasing government expenditures were seen as 
slightly alarming.384 A staff report next year was mainly optimistic, but it did raise 
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concerns of stagnating agricultural production and the broadening gap between urban and 
rural incomes.385 
Already in 1969, the Fund’s staff appraisal had acknowledged that “the Zambian 
authorities are keenly aware and concerned over the vulnerability of the economy to a 
possible future fall in world copper prices”386. A report conducted a year later was more 
anxious. The Fund’s staff were worried about a sharp fall in the global copper prices in 
1970, as the commodity was accounting for 45 per cent of the Zambian GDP and 93 per 
cent of export earnings despite the efforts to diversify the economy. The volume of copper 
production tumbled as well, principally due to a severe flooding accident at the Mufulira 
mine, which had produced 25 percent of the total Zambian copper output.387  
Although the report noted that agriculture was to take a centre stage in the government’s 
next five-year economic plan, the sector was clearly in trouble according to it. Many 
expatriate commercial farmers had left the country and the government-organised 
cooperatives had largely failed.388 Interestingly, the report concluded that the 
“Zambianisation” of the economy “has caused considerable dislocations, which the 
authorities believe to be of a transient nature”389. While implying the harmfulness of these 
policies and recommending some repairing actions, the Fund was not yet in a position to 
dictate Zambian economic policy and the critique was confined to the level of rhetoric. 
The economic downturn forced Zambia to seek financial help from the Fund for the first 
time in December 1971. The Fund agreed to the Zambian authorities’ acquisition of 19 
million dollars from the Compensatory Fund Facility (CFF), which was designed to assist 
in acute troubles following a decline in exports. The staff at the Fund believed that the 
shortfall in the export earnings was “largely attributed to circumstances beyond the 
control of the member”390. In August 1972, Zambia borrowed another 19 million form 
the CFF. The Fund deemed the Zambian export shortfalls to fall into the category of being 
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caused by “disasters or major emergencies”, so that a rule limiting a member to 25 per 
cent of its quota in a 12-month period could be circumvented.391 
Due to the difficulties in the copper industry, Zambian GDP contracted by four and eight 
per cent in 1970 and 1971, respectively. As the mechanism of the Dutch disease would 
indicate, other sectors of the economy grew in comparison, but not significantly enough 
to balance the loss in exports.392 The border between Zambia and Rhodesia was closed 
permanently in January 1973. This damaged trade, because the TAZARA-railway was 
still under construction and about half of Zambian exports and imports still travelled 
through Rhodesia.393 The good macroeconomic balance that Zambia had maintained 
since independence was in danger, as domestic credit expanded and foreign reserves 
decreased. The UNIP government responded by taking a more interventionist role in 
issuing price controls and restrictions on imports and capital transactions. The 
government continued its efforts to cut spending and to balance the budget. The budget 
deficits were financed mainly through credit from domestic banks. 394 
By March 1973 it was clear that additional external assistance was required. The Zambian 
government applied for a one-year stand-by arrangement (SBA) from the Fund, in which 
it would have the right to take out 19 million in Special Drawing Right (SDR)395, a quarter 
of the Zambian quota. The Fund staff approved the request as they assessed that “the 
Zambian authorities are making a reasonable effort to cope with the adverse impact of the 
border closure, and to improve the country’s financial position”396. While no specific 
policy conditions were outlined in the Fund’s decision, Zambian authorities were ordered 
to remain in close consultation with the Fund and a three-year deadline to repayment was 
set.397 
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In December 1972, the era of one-party rule began in Zambia. A fierce internal battle in 
the UNIP had resulted in Kaunda’s main rival, Simon Kapwepwe, forming his own party 
– the United Progressive Party (UPP) – in August 1971. Although ethnic tensions played 
a part in the birth of the party, the UPP was a heterogeneous political group that was 
unified by a feeling of injustice. Kapwepwe could claim a broad backing, as he enjoyed 
support among radical students and businesspeople in Lusaka alike. The president’s 
response was swift and decisive. Kaunda banned all political parties (except his own) in 
February 1972 and sent 123 leading UPP members to jail. The constitution was amended 
to facilitate the one-party state and was adopted the next year. In his writings, Kaunda 
justified the one-party system by its compatibility with what he saw as authentic African 
tribal culture, which emphasises the importance of chiefly authority on the one hand, but 
communitarian decision making on the other.398  
As he was consolidating his power, Kaunda unveiled the ambitious second national 
development plan (1972–1976). Agricultural self-sufficiency was a key element of the 
plan, with the government taking an active role in pricing, as well as subsidising seeds 
and fertilizers. Other major targets were a 36 per cent GDP growth and 100 000 new jobs 
in the five-year time frame. The plan consisted of massive investments, financed mainly 
by projected copper revenues and foreign and domestic debt. In total, the sum of capital 
expenditures in the plan reached two billion kwachas (approximately 3.12 billion dollars 
at the time).399  
Owing to the hardships of the past couple of years, the government had to scale down the 
plan’s investments substantially. In light of this, the Zambian government requested a 30-
million-dollar program loan from the Bank to help finance the plan. After reviewing the 
plan, President McNamara gave the loan his full support.400 The program loan was 
directed to finance vital imports in the short term, and the only condition was a provision 
that changes in the investment plan that affected the loan program would trigger a 
suspension. McNamara highlighted the need to implement some economic policies that 
the government representatives had proposed to a Bank mission in regard to achieving 
development over a longer time frame. The policy suggestions included a freeze of public 
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wages, cutting government subsidies, changes in pricing policies and a long-term view in 
planning external borrowing. 401 However, the loan was cancelled already in May 1974, 
because of the fast recovery in copper prices in 1973–1974. The remaining disbursements 
of the loan were diverted to the Kafue power station project instead. 
The most intriguing Bank-document from this period dates back to May 1973, when a 
meeting of the executive directors was held to discuss the third education loan to Zambia. 
One of the directors raised concern over the growing indebtedness of Zambia and the 
significant amounts the Bank was investing in the country considering its small size.402 
McNamara acknowledged the apprehensions, and Senior Vice-President J. Bruce Knapp 
admitted that lending at the current level was not sustainable for a longer period.403 
Nevertheless, the Bank decided to go ahead with the loan. The captivating discussion 
exposes a few fundamental aspects of the Bank’s position in relation to Zambia at the 
time. First and foremost, it reveals the Bank’s conviction in that Zambia’s predicaments 
were of a temporary character. While the volatility of copper prices was recognised, 
nobody – quite understandably – was anticipating the prolonged slump in commodity 
prices that was about to begin. Secondly, at this point in time, the Bank’s senior staff 
clearly had trust in the UNIP government’s ability to plan and implement sound economic 
policies. 
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3.3 The Bust and Accumulation of Debt: 1974–1979 
In hindsight, the short-lived rise in copper prices starting from January 1973 and 
subsequent momentary economic recovery was an adverse occurrence for Zambia. It 
reinforced the belief that copper price movements are cyclical. Thus, the response after 
the price shock in May 1974 was erroneous. When it would have been an appropriate 
time to start adjusting the economy, the UNIP government decided to finance its way out 
of troubles instead.404  
If one wants to locate a turning point in Zambian postcolonial history, it can be pinpointed 
to April 1974. At the time, the price of copper reached 1.37 dollars per pound, a record 
figure. This was followed by a sharp plunge in May, and by December, the average price 
had fallen to 0.59 dollars per pound.405 In the space of just a couple of months the copper 
price fell by more than 60 per cent.406 Although the copper price shock was undoubtedly 
the biggest blow to the Zambian economy, it was compounded by the persistent problems 
in establishing secure trade routes, which in turn hiked up the costs of exports and imports. 
The TAZARA-railroad was completed in 1975, but its positive effects were largely 
outdone by a civil war erupting in neighbouring Angola. Due to the conflict, exporting 
copper through the port of Lobito on the Atlantic coast was no longer an option.407  
The price shock had an immediate effect on the macroeconomic situation in Zambia. In 
just one year from 1974 to 1975, a swing worth 55 per cent of the entire GDP was 
recorded in the combined budget and balance of payments deficits.408 The UNIP 
government did not blame external forces only. The Zambian authorities acknowledged 
that the projected rises in copper production in the second national development plan had 
been overestimated, and that the deep-seated problems constraining the agricultural sector 
had been underrated.409 However, this frankness did not significantly alter the policies 
and priorities of the government. While the rate of investments and savings fell, public 
and private consumption continued at a high level.410 The government levied higher costs 
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to foreign currency transactions ending a fairly liberal regime adopted since 
independence. The tougher controls, combined with an increasingly interventionist 
government, hindered economic activity, fuelled uncertainty and resulted in capital 
fleeing the country.411  
The latter part of the 1970s was a time of stagnation in Zambia. A long recession hit the 
country hard and was accompanied with rapid accumulation of debt as the government 
opted to use external funds to finance large budget deficits. Credit was also used to sustain 
an outsized public sector and to finance food imports. As the viscous circle of increasing 
indebtedness gathered pace, new loans were increasingly used to repay earlier debt as 
well.412 Initially, getting cheap credit was easy. According to Fernando R. Fernholz, 
“international financial agencies, flush with bank deposits from oil exporters, were eager 
to lend. They viewed the Zambian economy as basically sound with export earnings 
expected to recover”413.  
During the last years of the decade, obtaining capital from the international markets 
became harder for Zambia. The response from the UNIP government was to draw credit 
from the Bank of Zambia, which in practise meant printing more money. This policy – 
common at the time in many parts of Africa and Latin America – has damaging effects 
for an economy in recession, not least by the inflationary pressure it creates.414 In the five 
years from 1975 to 1980, the total sum of debt more than doubled from 1.6 billion dollars 
to 3.3 billion. At the turn of the decade the level of debt was already unsustainable, two 
years prior to the global debt crisis.415 
Although the copper price shock received most of the attention, other problems in the 
Zambian economy were discussed in the Fund as well. In a document from November 
1975, the staff at the Fund highlighted some of the UNIP government’s policies that they 
believed to have contributed to the financial distress. The policies included state subsidies 
on basic consumer goods that kept consumption at a high level and low producer prices 
that hampered growth in the agricultural sector.416 The Fund approved Zambia’s request 
for new resources, but emphasised the need to diversify the economy and correct the 
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subsidies and pricing policies.417 The only conditions in the loans denied the Zambian 
authorities the right to impose new levies or other restrictions on international capital 
transactions without consulting the Fund first.418     
In July 1976, the Zambian authorities requested for a SBA equivalent of 62 million SDR. 
This time around the Fund-staff was considerably more straightforward about the UNIP 
government’s mistakes. A report stated that “inappropriate demand management and 
pricing policies have caused a steady deterioration in the balance of payments 
position”419. The poor performance of the agricultural sector was once again highlighted 
as the report noted, that “since the independence of Zambia agricultural exports have 
virtually disappeared and food imports have increased”420. The Zambian authorities had 
drawn up a financial program to tackle the problems. In addition to fixing the above-
mentioned deficiencies, the plan contained an exchange rate adjustment. Fund-officials 
recognised the overvaluation of the kwacha and agreed on the proposed 20 per cent 
devaluation of the currency.421 Some conditions were attached to the SBA: 
”The proposed stand by-agreement includes the following performance criteria: (a) 
a phased ceiling on the net domestic assets of the banking system, with a subceiling 
on net credit to government; (b) a phased reduction of payments arrears; and (c) the 
clause relating to exchange and import restrictions.”  
The criteria were outlined quantitatively in a table attached to the report. They aimed at 
restricting government borrowing from the banking system, curbing the escalating 
amount of debt and liberalising capital transactions. The SBA of 1976 was a prototype of 
later SAPs. It had a few conditions, but for the Fund staff at the time, it was sufficient that 
the Zambian authorities drew up a program consistent with Fund-recommended austerity 
measures. However, the SBA was cancelled shortly after adopting it, because Zambia 
failed to meet the conditions set by the Fund. Fresh monetary data revealed that the sub-
ceiling on net credit to government had been surpassed, and in addition, the payments 
arrears continued to accumulate instead of gradually being phased out. Only 8.5 million 
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SDR of the projected 62 million had been disbursed to Zambia at the point of 
cancellation.422  
A staff report in January 1977 concluded that “the key policy choice to be made by the 
authorities now relates to the speed at which the existing internal and external imbalances 
should be corrected”423. The speed proved to be non-existent as economic woes deepened. 
In 1977, the real GDP of Zambia contracted and inflation climbed to 20 per cent. After a 
short-lived improvement, the balance of payments position deteriorated again in 1977 
depleting Zambia’s foreign exchange reserves and accumulating external payments 
arrears alarmingly.424 The mining companies were in increasing distress as copper prices 
did not recover and production lagged. In March 1978, a further 10 per cent devaluation 
of the kwacha was agreed with the Fund in order to boost the competitiveness of the 
sector.425  
The exchange rate adjustment was once again tied to a larger stabilisation program which 
the Zambian authorities submitted to the Fund. The proposal consisted of familiar 
elements: a reduction in state subsidies, a wage freeze to cut expenditures and a push to 
diversify the economy by boosting agricultural production. The novel addition was the 
emphasis on the mining companies and their profitability.426 A significant two-year SBA 
– totalling 250 million SDR – was negotiated in April 1978 to support the Zambian 
authorities’ effort to steady the ship. In addition to the SBA, Zambia purchased 48.75 
million SDR from the CFF and 16 million SDR from the recently established Trust 
Fund.427  
While backing the stabilisation program, the Fund was evidently increasingly critical of 
the UNIP government’s handling of the crisis. A report criticised the governments’ 
policies and failures to diversify the economy, stating that “virtually none of the 
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objectives of the SNDP [second national development plan] was achieved”428. The 
tougher stance was reflected in the tightened conditions of the new SBA. The expansion 
of domestic credit and sum of arrears were now scrutinised on a quarterly basis. In 
addition, external borrowing was restricted as well. 429 The substantial loans meant that 
Zambia had greatly surpassed its quota for loans from the Fund. However, the Fund staff 
felt that the exemption was justified, because of the “exceptional circumstances 
applicable in the case of Zambia”430. 
A Fund mission visited Lusaka in the end of 1978 to evaluate the stabilisation effort under 
the SBA. The report was optimistic, noting that the Zambian authorities had largely 
followed proposed policies and respected the conditions set out by the Fund.431 Most of 
the internal targets of the plan were achieved, but on the external side difficulties 
persisted, as only a small improvement in the balance of payments position was 
recorded.432 The report concluded that “in 1978 Zambia’s performance under the current 
stand-by arrangement clearly demonstrates the Government’s commitment to the 
program and its resolution to solve the serious economic problems facing the country”433.   
The first half of 1979 witnessed substantial progress in the external situation, because of 
a rise in the copper price and the reopening of the Southern transport route through 
Rhodesia.434 Domestically, however, serious problems were surfacing and the initial 
optimism within the Fund was starting to wane. The implementation of the Fund-
promoted liberal pricing policies proved hard in the state-led economic model of Zambia 
and its emphasis on parastatal companies. A prime example of this were the massive 
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losses incurred by the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD), a 
parastatal body in charge of buying, storing and selling agricultural products.435  
The government had to cover the losses, which meant breaching the first performance 
criterion of the SBA. In response to a far-reaching pricing plan presented by the Zambian 
authorities, the Fund approved some modifications to the ceilings of the first condition.436 
Despite the setbacks, the Fund seemed comparatively happy with the Zambian 
performance during the two years of adjustment under the SBA. A later evaluation did, 
however, state that “inadequate progress was made in major areas, such as in the reduction 
of consumer subsidies and the implementation of economic pricing in the important 
parastatal sector”437. 
The Bank’s eagerness to lend to Zambia seems to have declined somewhat in the latter 
part of the 1970s and even more so in the early 1980s. While nine new projects were 
introduced between 1975 and 1979, the financial weight of the schemes was moderate. 
Even without taking inflation into account, the loan sums were smaller in absolute terms 
than before. While some financially substantial infrastructure projects were initiated – 
most notably a telecommunications project in 1975 (32 million dollars), a highway 
project in 1978 (22.5 million) and a railway project in 1979 (40 million) – the vast scale 
of the earlier hydroelectric projects, for example, was not replicated.438   
In September 1976, when the rapidly deteriorating economic situation of Zambia was 
fully realised, the Bank issued a 30-million-dollar program loan for the UNIP 
government. The loan was approved soon after the short-lived SBA was negotiated with 
the Fund. At the time, the Bank seemed very committed to Zambian development and 
sensitive to its economic distress, as three special missions had visited the country 
between September 1975 and April 1976. The program loan had two goals. Firstly, it was 
directed at helping the government to finance acutely needed imports. Secondly, the Bank 
hoped that it would help the government to channel investment to the agricultural sector 
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in order to diversify the economy.439 Following the shifting intellectual orientation of the 
institution, the president’s report highlighted that “the Bank's future lending program will 
emphasise agricultural and rural development to help diversify the economy and improve 
the living conditions of the rural poor”440. 
The evaluation report of the loan is rather ambiguous in character. While noting that the 
program loan was vital in the first objective of financing acute imports, the long-term 
goal of investing in rural development had largely not materialised. A part of the problem 
was that the loan had been designed on the assumption that the Zambian government 
would go through with the SBA and thus secure full credit from the Fund.441 However, 
the report stated that “it is difficult, even in retrospect, to argue that the Bank's loan should 
have been directly linked to drawings under the IMF stand-by”442. This was explained by 
the different goals of the institutions as the Fund was striving for short-term stabilisation 
and the Bank had its eyes on longer-term structural diversification. Interestingly, the 
Bank-report seems to imply that this created a conflict of interests between the IFIs in the 
case of Zambia:  
“On the other hand, it is apparent that the strengthening of agricultural services 
desired by the Bank was not fully compatible with short-term budgetary constraints 
and the related austerity measures imposed by the IMF, unless the Government was 
willing to make matching cutbacks elsewhere. While the Fund was trying to impose 
"across the board" budgetary cuts, the Bank clearly attempted to foster a reallocation 
of resources among the different budget categories.”443 
The paragraph exposes a lack of co-ordination between the IFIs at the time. Although the 
Bank waited for the Fund to reach an agreement first, it is clear that the IFIs had different 
emphases in Zambia. The Bank’s concern was in sustaining the path to development, not 
just in correcting balance of payments imbalances. This is in stark contrast to later years, 
when the IFIs co-operated closely with the American government playing a crucial part 
as the facilitator of this liaison.  
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While the IFIs clearly had conflicting views, a co-ordinated international effort was 
nevertheless desired by the Bank. It sponsored the Zambia Consultative Group (ZCG)444, 
which met in Paris in the summer of 1978. After extensive negotiations, international aid 
pledges were made and an additional 57-million-dollar loan was secured from the 
Eurodollar markets. The loan disbursements were linked to Zambia’s performance under 
the 1978 SBA, which surely enhanced the Zambian determination to see through the 
stabilisation program. In addition, the Bank established a committee in charge of 
managing the external debts of Zambia.445 
In late 1979, the UNIP government had announced the third national development 
program for the years 1979–1983. The second national development plan had failed, and 
because of its over-optimistic goals the UNIP government was losing credibility in the 
IFIs. While the Bank had wanted to support the second plan, it was brutally frank about 
the third plan in its evaluation:  
”The TNDP is weak first, because it has not adequately accounted for the effects of 
the prolonged economic and financial crisis, second, because its assumptions 
regarding resource availability are too optimistic, especially for the Government 
sector, and finally because it does not set out the strategies and procedures which 
planners and plan implementers should follow in the event that assumed resources 
do not materialize.”446 
This extract is telling as it displays the change in the Bank’s standpoint in relation to 
Zambia. At the time of the commodity price shock in 1974, the Bank was dedicated to 
the development agenda in Zambia. It was willing to keep lending to the country, because 
it believed in Zambia’s progress and ability to endure the acute crisis. In the following 
few years this commitment seems to have evaporated as the economic situation in Zambia 
worsened. Moreover, as the citation above testifies, the Bank lost its faith in the UNIP 
government’s capability to formulate economic policies. The Bank staff toned down their 
rather unconditional pledges to support Zambian development and did not question the 
Fund’s austerity measures like they had back in 1976. Instead, in the midst of the debt 
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crisis, the long-term goal of diversifying the Zambian economy became the focal point of 
the Bank’s policies. Program and sector-specific loans were increasingly applied to 
achieve this target.   
Compared to the Bank, the Fund approached the problems in Zambia strictly from an 
economic perspective. The institution’s operations were largely guided by the 
neoclassical paradigm of sustaining internal and external macroeconomic balances. 
Although it was not until the strong American push for control started in the 1980s that 
the Fund became a fully-fledged herald of the neoliberal dogma, a gradual change in the 
emphasis of its policies can be traced already during the 1970s. In the first years of the 
crisis, the focus was on traditional austerity measures, as slashing government 
expenditures and controlling the expansion of credit were common policies. While the 
targets of achieving financial equilibrium and curbing indebtedness remained the same, 
the set of policies designed to obtain these goals widened. The liberalisation of prices and 
capital transactions and the removal of subsidies gained steadily more importance in the 
Fund’s programs. Overall, however, conditionality was still quite weak in these years.   
In many ways, the five years or so after the copper price crash, are crucial in explaining 
the economic woes of Zambia. The years had far-reaching consequences, because of the 
rapid accumulation of debt. Furthermore, the economic catastrophe of later years could 
have been averted by taking rigorous corrective actions following the copper price crash. 
The main culprit here was the Zambian government, which did not cut domestic 
consumption, but rather, sustained it by borrowing more. In hindsight, the failure to adjust 
the economy looks inexcusable, but it has to be remembered, that the fall in copper prices 
was expected to be a temporary difficulty. 
In my opinion, the reasonableness of the IFI’s policies in Zambia during the late 1970s 
should be questioned somewhat. Both institutions kept providing funds to a country that 
was clearly in a spiral of escalating indebtedness. Zambia had trouble in repaying its loans 
already in 1975 and just three years later its debt amounted to a half of the GDP, a very 
high figure at the time.447 Once again, the lavish lending was based, at least partially, on 
the assumption that copper prices would recover quickly. Nevertheless, especially when 
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taking into account the IFI’s later strictness, the continued lending seems problematic in 
retrospect.     
Paradoxically, the limited scope of US influence and the relatively low conditionality 
probably contributed to the exacerbation of the troubles of Zambia. At a time when the 
Bank and the Fund were enjoying relative autonomy, the IFIs were unable to decisively 
help the Zambian economy out of the slump. On the contrary, the IFIs kept providing new 
resources, with few conditions attached, to an incompetent Zambian government, which 
failed in the implementation of most of the programs. In this process, the Zambian 
government became accustomed to turning to the IFIs for aid, despite routinely providing 
disappointing results in the execution of the jointly negotiated programs.  
In the latter part of the 1970s the IFIs were in a state of transformation. The Fund was 
marginalised by the US government but increasingly engaged in struggling developing 
countries. In contrast, the Bank had established itself as a credible promoter of 
development issues, but looking after the macroeconomic balance of indebted developing 
countries was not yet a central part of its function. Speculatively thinking, stronger IFIs 
at the time could have imposed tougher conditions on the Zambian government and thus 
helped it in guiding the economy towards the needed adjustments. The economic 
liberalisation and loss of autonomy that this would have entailed can be debated, but, in 
the absence of such determination, the IFIs contributed mainly to a sustaining of the status 
quo while external debts kept accumulating. The absence of committed external political 
guidance is also visible in the evident lack of co-ordination between the IFIs at the time, 
demonstrated by the conflicting priorities in adjusting the Zambian economy. 
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3.4 The Collapse and Insolvency: 1980–1985 
After the establishment of the one-party state in 1972, political opposition in Zambia 
disappeared largely underground. The internal conflict in the UNIP party, which had led 
to the banning of Simon Kapwepwe’s offshoot UPP-party, shaped the political 
environment for years to come. Many of the UPP-supporters re-joined UNIP. The 
rationale behind this was the belief that working the system from the inside would bring 
better results than direct confrontation with the state. The ones who sought to topple 
Kaunda and his party from the grass root level had to gather in secret and under an 
increasing threat of repression. The dissidents organised meetings in imaginative settings, 
like family gatherings, church ceremonies and cultural events. The split in the ruling party 
carried long-lasting effects, as the UNIP leadership’s legitimacy started to crumble in the 
eyes of the broader public. The party lost support among voters in its core areas: the 
Copperbelt and Northern Province. In an act of reconciliation Kaunda accepted 
Kapwepwe back into UNIP in 1977, only to imprison him on dubious charges soon after, 
because the rival had declared his intentions to challenge the sitting president.448    
In the late 1970s, the future president of the country, Frederick Chiluba, started to gain 
more political clout. His vehicle for organising support were trade unions, in which the 
UNIP government’s economic policies were viewed increasingly with dismay.449 The 
political climax of these years was seen in October 1980 when a coup attempt was pre-
empted. A group of wealthy businessmen were behind the plot, and they had support from 
Zairean rebels. Dozens of influential Zambian figures were sent to jail and seven of the 
conspirators were sentenced to death, but Kaunda pardoned them later in 1990.450 The 
internal uprising raised concern for the UNIP party in a comprehensive way, because it 
coincided with Zimbabwe gaining independence. The end of the Rhodesian white settler 
rule meant that the biggest external threat to Zambian security vanished, which in turn 
provoked criticism towards the ruling party as calls for a democratic transition were 
made.451 Moreover, Kaunda was convinced that the plotters enjoyed the tacit support of 
South Africa and its intelligence services. Later research has confirmed that no evidence 
supporting South African meddling exists. However, they did help in a failed attempt to 
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free the prisoners next year.452 As a result of the tensions, Zambia’s defence expenditures 
were pushed up at a time when the state really could not afford it.453  
To compound the political pressures, the economic situation was getting rapidly worse 
again. After the relatively successful stabilisation process in 1978–1979, the new decade 
started in a desperate atmosphere. Large parts of Zambia suffered from droughts in 1979, 
1981 and 1983, which meant that a significant portion of the yearly consumption of maize 
(the staple food product in Zambia) had to be imported.454 The droughts proved to be a 
turning point for the agricultural sector as per capita production declined through the 
1980s and the 1990s.455 
During these years debt repayment became increasingly difficult. One reason behind this 
was the Volcker shock, after which interest rates climbed up around the world with severe 
consequences for indebted countries. In fact, Fernholz lists the interest rate hikes as the 
fourth and final external shock that hit Zambia after independence.456 The UNIP 
government reacted by levying even tighter controls on capital transactions. Creditors 
demanded guarantees on their loans and this prompted the Zambian government to switch 
a big share of the unsettled loans to public sector debt. The Zambian foreign exchange 
reserves diminished until the country was practically default by 1987.457  
In April 1981, the Zambian authorities requested an 800 million SDR loan from the 
Extended Fund Facility (EFF) that would be phased over three years.458 The Zambian 
authorities drew up a financial program for the years 1981–1983. Here, it is important to 
note, that while the staff of the IFIs (in Fund documents especially) portray these 
programs as products of the Zambian authorities, they clearly influenced them a lot. The 
staff of both IFIs had regular discussions with the Zambian government. In my opinion, 
it is evident that it was in the interest of the IFIs to highlight the Zambian ownership of 
                                                             
452 Larmer 2008, 120– 121.  
453 ZAMBIA – REQUEST FOR EXTENDED ARRANGEMENT, 7. EBS/81/91, 4/20/1981. IMF Archives; 
World Bank 1981a, 21. Zambia – Country economic memorandum (English). World Bank Archives. 
454 McPherson 2004b, 300; ZAMBIA – REVIEW AND CONSULTATION UNDER STAND-BY 
ARRANGEMENT, 5. EBS/80/53, 3/17/1980. IMF Archives. 
455 McPherson 2004a, 33. 
456 Fernholz 2004, 264–265. The first shock was the UDI of Southern Rhodesia and subsequent tensions in 
Zambia’s neighbouring countries, which caused transportation issues and hampered trade. The second was 
the oil crisis, which increased the cost of oil imports significantly. The third shock was the copper price 
crash and its devastating effects on Zambia’s balance of payments position.  
457 Fernholz 2004, 265. 
458 ZAMBIA – REQUEST FOR EXTENDED ARRANGEMENT. EBS/81/91, 4/20/1981. IMF Archives. 
 90 
 
the programs so that their own influence and pressure would not stand out. The bottom 
line is that, in order to secure funds from the IFIs, the Zambian government had to present 
programs that were approved by them. Thus, the policies that are presented as creations 
of the Zambian government represent to a large extent the aspirations of the IFIs.  
The aim of the adjustment program in 1981–1983 was to halt the contraction of the 
economy by diversifying productive capacities and achieving a healthy annual growth 
rate of five per cent. On the fiscal side austerity was endorsed, as the goals of the program 
were to achieve equilibrium domestically and a sustainable position externally. 
Investment was to be channelled to productive sectors of the economy, agriculture in 
particular. Special attention was given to pricing policies. Government subsidies were to 
be reduced significantly or eliminated entirely.459 The Fund report noted the political 
sensitiveness of these policies:  
“While it is recognized that price increases affecting particularly the urban 
population are not easy to carry out from a political point of view, it will be necessary 
to make further progress during the program period”460. 
Although just four conditions were outlined in the EFF loan and, moreover, they were 
almost identical to the performance criteria of the previous SBA, the 1981 adjustment 
program differed crucially from its predecessor.461 In their suggested program the 
Zambian authorities emphasised the need to implement policies targeted at fixing 
medium-term issues, and these policies were discussed in the lengthy memorandum in 
detail.  Moreover, the EFF was designed to help in lengthier adjustments compared to the 
stabilisation efforts of the SBAs. Thus, the 1981 adjustment program truly earned the 
prefix, “structural”, as it was increasingly aimed at correcting underlying problems of the 
economy, not just acute liquidity issues. Fund staff noted this with approval: “for the first 
time the Government's medium-term priorities are set out in an operationally relevant 
document”462.  
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The 1981 EFF loan introduced a first real co-ordinated effort on the behalf of the IFIs in 
the context of Zambia. The UNIP government’s investment plan was reviewed by staff 
members of both institutions and discussed together with all three parties463 Just two 
weeks after the Zambian authorities had reached an agreement with the Fund officials, 
the Bank provided two sectoral loans (11 and 18 million dollars), targeted at boosting 
agricultural production in the Eastern and Southern provinces respectively.464 Compared 
to the late 1970s, the division of work between the IFIs was more clearly outlined and the 
goals of the SAP more broadly shared. The Fund supplied the bulk of the resources for 
the immediate adjustment and the Bank assisted by providing additional loans that were 
targeted on the longer-term goal of diversifying the economy.  
Implementation of the SAP proved difficult from the very beginning. Early warning signs 
were seen in November 1981, when Zambia had to request for a waiver, as its external 
arrears exceeded the limit set by the Fund.465 At the end of the year, it was clear that it 
could not meet the conditions, and in July 1982, the Zambian authorities cancelled the 
program. 300 million SDR had been disbursed prior to the dissolution of the SAP.466 A 
major reason for the poor performance was that the projected trends of copper prices 
proved to be too optimistic. After gradually picking up again in the last years of the 1970s, 
a steady decline from February 1980 to the summer of 1982 wiped 55 per cent of the 
value of the commodity.467 As export revenues tumbled, the Zambian request for 59.3 
million SDR from the CFF was approved by the Fund in 1981. Although the EFF-loan 
was cancelled in July 1982, the Fund approved another CFF-loan later that year, worth 
34 million.468 
Despite the cancellation, the parties remained in close contact as discussions for a new 
adjustment program were initiated almost instantly. The state of the Zambian economy 
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was deteriorating alarmingly on many different fronts. The most acute problem was the 
shortage of foreign exchange, which threatened the Zambian government’s solvency  and 
stifled investments in the newly established giant mining company, the Zambia 
Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), and other vital sectors of the economy. In addition, 
inflation was gathering pace: A Fund report estimated that consumer prices for low-
income groups rose nearly 20 per cent in 1983.469 The unsustainable situation required 
radical measures. In January, the Zambian authorities announced a 20 per cent 
devaluation of the kwacha and a temporary suspension of payments of arrears, as well as 
of principals of external loans.470 In May 1983, an agreement was reached on substantial 
rescheduling of existing Zambian debt in a Paris Club meeting with the country’s main 
creditors.471  
The negotiations for a new SAP were concluded in April 1983 before the Paris Club 
meeting. Reflecting a change in the Fund’s approach, the new program was a SBA (211.5 
million SDR) for one year. It was supplemented with a significant loan (97.2 million 
SDR) from the CFF.472 The binding conditions of the SBA were similar to previous loans, 
mainly aimed at curbing debt and stabilising the government budget and balance of 
payments.473 However, the failures of the earlier arrangements seem to have affected the 
Fund’s tactics, because they requested an evaluation for June, just three months into the 
program. Moreover, in addition to reviewing the performance criteria, other policies 
included in the program were to be evaluated as well: 
“In particular, this review will require understandings to be reached with the Fund 
on performance criteria for the remaining period of the program, as well as on 
exchange rate and interest rate policies. Other topics of the review will include 
progress on debt rescheduling, budgetary performance, credit policies, and prices 
and incomes policies.”474   
A comparison of the SAPs of 1981 and 1983 is informative. Firstly, it indicates the 
graveness of the troubles facing Zambia. By 1983, the country was in a position were at 
                                                             
469 ZAMBIA – RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS, 5, 21. SM/84/125, 6/1/1984. IMF Archives. 
470 ZAMBIA – EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS, 1. EBS/83/10, 1/11/1983. IMF Archives. 
471 REPORT ON ZAMBIA’S EXTERNAL DEBT RENEGOTIATION. SM/83/106, 5/26/1983. IMF 
Archives.  
472 ZAMBIA – USE OF FUND RESOURCES – COMPENSATORY FINANCING FACILITY. 
EBS/83/70, 3/31/1983. IMF Archives. 
473 ZAMBIA – STAFF REPORT FOR THE 1982 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION AND REQUEST FOR 
STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT, 29. EBS/83/67, 3/30/1983. IMF Archives. 
474 ZAMBIA – STAFF REPORT FOR THE 1982 ARTICLE IV CONSULTATION AND REQUEST FOR 
STAND-BY ARRANGEMENT, 29. EBS/83/67, 3/30/1983. IMF Archives. 
 93 
 
the same time it desperately needed both external resources and comprehensive structural 
reforms. While the ambitious EFF loan in 1981 had targeted economic growth and the 
diversification of the economy, the financial program475 of 1983 was clearly aimed at 
fixing the former problem. The second observation is the change in the Fund’s approach. 
The SAP in 1983 spanned over just one year, and instead of boldly targeting the 
diversification of the economy, its aim was rather to build the basis for this objective.476 
Diversification was still seen as an essential goal, but the problems facing Zambia were 
now to be tackled in a chronological order, as the minutes of an executive board meeting 
reveal: 
“The staff could agree that there was such a need, but in the present circumstances, 
given the foreign exchange crisis, the highest priority surely had to be setting the 
country’s financial house in order. Once the authorities had done that, they would 
find it far easier to concentrate on diversification efforts.”477  
A few different factors are likely to have influenced the SBA. The succession of failed 
programs of the Zambian government made a shorter adjustment program a more 
attractive option. It is probable that the debt crisis, which had spread globally in the 
autumn of 1982, also had an effect. The US started propagating for a more influential role 
for the Fund and the institution got a new injection of funds the next year. During the 
acute phase of the crisis, the Fund’s focus was on short-term liquidity issues. The rationale 
was to give indebted countries more resources to endure the immediate crisis, but full 
repayment of the loans was nevertheless expected. 
Interesting minutes of an executive board meeting discussing Zambia’s situation in April 
1983 can be found in the Fund’s archives. Two officials –  the executive director of the 
US, Charles Dallara, and his colleague from the UK, Christopher Taylor –  stand out with 
their lengthy assertions. Both directors emphasised in their statements the importance of 
austerity and price liberalisation in the Zambian case. Taylor stressed that “it would also 
be necessary for producer prices to continue to convey significant market-related 
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incentives”478, while Dallara noted that “it was particularly important to keep expenditure 
within agreed limits”479.  
One point of major conflict can be found in the discussion. Taylor and Dallara supported 
the Fund management’s proposal to wait for the Paris Club negotiations – scheduled later 
in May – before approving the substantial CFF-loan. The rationale behind this sequence 
of actions was that, for Zambia, securing additional external funds was seen as vital for 
carrying out the SAP.480 Many of the other directors expressed their apprehensions of the 
proposed extra conditionality, because the disbursement of CFF-funds was supposed to 
be guided by the simple principle of supporting countries suffering temporary falls in 
export earnings.481 While Taylor was maintaining that the procedure was an exception 
due to the unique predicaments of Zambia, Dallara declared that ”there were some 
questions as to whether the Fund could have reasonable assurances that its resources 
would be repaid on schedule”482. Dallara justified his view by emphasising that, in the 
Zambian case, drops in export revenues had not proven to be temporary in nature, and by 
implying that the Fund had provided resources with inadequate precautions to Zambia in 
previous years.483   
Unsurprisingly, the executive board decided to follow the management’s 
recommendation and the CFF-loan was not approved before additional funds and the 
rescheduling of debt were secured at the Paris Club meeting.484 The minutes reveal the 
tightening conditionality and liberalising policies that the Americans pushed for in the 
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Fund at the time. Moreover, while it was recognised that Zambia urgently needed 
temporary debt relief, the rescheduling of some of the payment arrears was the absolute 
limit for the Americans. According to the minutes, “Mr Dallara stated, the need to 
safeguard the revolving nature of the Fund’s resources was paramount”485. The minutes 
are informative in other aspects as well. Taylor and Dallara both supported the Bank’s 
involvement in longer term structural adjustment by drafting an investment program in 
collaboration with the Zambian authorities.486 This was in line with the US government’s 
position at the time, as the aim was to assign distinct roles for the IFIs in handling the 
debt crisis.   
In its mid-term evaluation of the SAP, the Fund listed with satisfaction the adjustment 
measures that the Zambian government had undertaken: 
“Under the present stand-by arrangement, the Zambia" authorities have made 
substantial progress in implementing adjustment measures. These have included 
importantly a significant depreciation of the kwacha and the adoption of a rare 
flexible exchange rate policy, an upward adjustment in interest rates, a wide range 
of tax increases, sizable increases in the retail prices of maize and fertiliser and 
agricultural producer prices, and a general decontrol of wholesale and retail prices. 
There has also been a vigorous and successful effort to reduce costs in the important 
mining sector.”487 
Despite the laborious efforts and meeting all the conditions of the program, the Zambian 
financial position did not recover as expected. The Zambian representative in the Fund’s 
executive board, N’Faly Sangare, assigned the disappointing results to severe shortages 
of foreign reserves, caused by transport problems in shipping exports. Domestically, a 
fall in imports and a decline in overall economic activity meant that raising projected 
amounts of revenue proved impossible.488 In July 1983, the Zambian authorities made 
further attempts to fix the situation. A flexible exchange rate was adopted, and the kwacha 
quickly depreciated over ten per cent against the dollar. In addition, the mineral exports 
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tax was doubled.489 The expected competitiveness boost after the depreciation of the 
currency never materialised, as global demand of copper remained low.490 
Yet again, the SAP was not carried through. The last disbursement of 67.5 million SDR 
was cancelled, because “the shortage of foreign exchange led to the criteria on arrears 
under debt rescheduling agreements and on commercial payments being exceeded”491. 
The Fund report did, however, highlight the rigorous efforts of the Zambian authorities, 
which justified a new SBA loan, approved in July 1984.492 The new SAP stretched to 
April 1986 and was worth 225 million SDR. For the first time, the official list of 
conditions exceeded ten items. While most of the performance criteria touched the 
familiar issues of credit control and management of payment arrears, more emphasis was 
placed on the Fund staff’s reviews of the program.493 The first review of the program was 
scheduled as early as September and was catered to “deal in particular with external debt 
rescheduling, exchange rate policy, and budgetary developments”494.  
Moreover, the financial program that was devised with the Zambian authorities was rich 
in detail. For example, it contained a 0.08 kwacha rise in the price of a bottle of beer.495 
This reflects the change towards “micro-conditionality” that was taking place in the Fund. 
While the previous programs, especially in the 1970s, had highlighted the importance of 
price liberalisation, for example, the SAP of 1984 had very specific policy measures 
outlined in it. In my opinion, it reflects the fact that Zambia was gradually losing its 
economic self-governance. The country was in a position, where Fund officials could 
compel the  Zambian authorities to undertake very explicit measures. 
At a quick glance, the Bank seems to have concentrated on active and miscellaneous 
project lending in Zambia during these years, with as many as sixteen different projects 
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introduced in 1980–1985. However, this hides the fact that structural adjustment lending 
was steadily gaining more importance in the Zambian loan portfolio. First of all, most of 
the new projects were significantly smaller in size than before, probably reflecting the 
grave economic situation in Zambia. The notable exceptions were a fifth education project 
in 1982 (25 million dollars), a rural water supply project in 1983 (16 million), a third 
industrial forestry project in 1984 (22.5 million) and a railway project in 1985 (20 
million).496 
While the two sectoral loans to agriculture in 1981 had been rather modest in size, 
especially in comparison to the Fund’s concurrent EFF loan, the Bank gradually gained a 
bigger role in the adjustment process of Zambia. At the onset of the global debt crisis, the 
immediate focus of the international financial community was on acute stabilisation, 
following the co-ordinated lead of the US Treasury and the Fund. Pretty soon the need 
for longer-term structural adjustment gained more prominence, presumably because in 
many countries (Zambia included) the quick fix had not led to results to speak of.  
If the Fund was a co-ordinator for financiers in arranging debt repayment and additional 
funds for stabilisation, the Bank took on a similar role in Zambia as the organiser of 
funding for longer-term adjustment. In May 1984, the Bank chaired the Zambia 
Consultative Group (ZCG) meeting in Paris. The main objective of the meeting was to 
draw up an investment plan for Zambia and negotiate multi-donor loans to support the 
diversification of the economy. The first multi-donor loan – for an export rehabilitation 
and diversification project – had already been approved before the ZCG-meeting in 
March 1984. The loan’s aim was the rehabilitation of the ailing mining sector and the 
national mining company, ZCCM. In total, the investment amounted to 300 million 
dollars, with the Bank providing 75 million and the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the African Development Bank (AfDB) supplying 46 million and  27 million 
respectively. The other half of the sum was to be raised through ZCCMs internal cash 
generation.497 Similar rehabilitation loans on a smaller scale were issued to the 
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agricultural sector (72,3 million dollars, of which the Bank provided 25 million) and to 
the industrial sector (62 million, with the Bank’s share being 20 million).498  
Although the Bank highlighted the need to diversify the productive capacities of the 
Zambian economy, regaining the lost productivity of the mines was seen as an essential 
first step. Therefore, it can be deduced that the Bank had adopted the same approach as 
the Fund after the global debt crisis. A Bank report of the export rehabilitation loan 
spelled out the conviction: 
”Paradoxically, policies to lessen Zambia's dependence on copper, and to bring about 
diversification, have little chance of succeeding without investing first in the 
rehabilitation of the copper industry. For any long-term growth strategy to succeed, 
it is of the utmost importance that financial balance in the economy and 
creditworthiness be restored first.”499 
This extract is in stark contrast to the Bank’s proclamations of the 1970s, which had 
shown confidence in the progress that could be made under a more developmentalist 
approach in economic policy. The huge problems that most of the developing countries 
were facing at the time of the debt crisis undoubtedly influenced the change of outlook, 
but one cannot overlook the spread of neoliberalism, which can be seen in other aspects 
of the three rehabilitation loans. Prior to the issuing of the rehabilitation loans, the Bank 
had held extensive consultations with the Zambian authorities for nearly two years. In 
these discussions, the parties had outlined some medium-term targets for the Zambian 
economy, which the Bank report summarised as follows:  
“Providing a system of incentives to producers and exporters of agricultural and 
industrial products in which prices are responsive to market forces; Allowing greater 
competition in the procurement and selling of food crops. Ultimately, 
NAMBOARD, the Government's agricultural marketing agency, will act only as the 
buyer and seller of last resort to ensure the effectiveness of incentive pricing;  
Improving planning, and budgetary and other procedures to shift resources to 
productive sectors; Using wages and interest rate policies to reverse past trends of 
increasing consumption and declining investment; Improving the management of 
foreign debt; Strengthening the technical and managerial capacity of ZIMCO, which 
is the holding company of most state-controlled enterprises; Restructuring the energy 
sector to bring about lesser dependence on imported oil; and Ensuring the 
competitiveness of exports through an active exchange rate policy.”500  
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In comparison to the Fund’s increasingly detailed SAPs, these measures were more like 
strategic goals for reforming the economy in the longer time frame. Liberalisation of 
prices, boosting competition and promoting more flexibility in interest and exchange rate 
policies were standard principles of the neoliberal thought collective. Thus, although the 
Bank’s operations in Zambia consisted seemingly of issuing sector-oriented loans, it was 
simultaneously leading an effort to restructure the economy in a more holistic way. In 
essence, the aim was to dismantle the model of economic nationalisation and state 
planning, which the Zambian government had adopted since independence. The Fund had 
vociferously disapproved of many of the “statist” policies already 1970s, but for the Bank 
this was a more recent undertaking. 
The export rehabilitation project was divided to two phases: the first one spanning through 
1984–1985, and the second one covering the year 1986. In order to receive the 
disbursements for the second phase the Zambian government had to meet three 
conditions.501 The first two conditions concerned ZCCMs operations, but the third one 
was more general as it required that “the Borrower has made adequate progress in the 
carrying out of the actions referred to in the letter from the Minister of Finance”502. 
Interestingly, the annexed letter specified the broad policy targets for the medium term 
that had been negotiated between the Bank staff and the UNIP government, summarised 
in the lengthy quotation above.503 Thus it can be determined, that whereas the Fund’s 
conditionality had been evolving towards the micromanagement of policies, the Bank 
seems to have adopted a different line. The rehabilitation loans had fewer conditions, but 
more room for interpretation when evaluating the performance under them.    
The export rehabilitation loan had three main elements: recuperation of equipment, 
training of personnel and rationalisation of mining operations.504 While the first two 
objectives raise no further questions, the third component is intriguing in its vagueness. 
Larmer maintains that the loan was conditioned on cutting the ZCCM-workforce 
significantly and introducing better discipline at the workplace.505 The same broad 
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objective of increasing efficiency was spelled out in the other two rehabilitation loans as 
well. One of the targets of the agricultural rehabilitation project was to “adopt a policy of 
economic pricing for parastatal enterprises, and streamline their operations”506. Similarly, 
the industrial reorientation project stated that the Zambian government was committed 
“to rely increasingly on market forces to allocate resources, and to reduce the share and 
increase the efficiency of the public sector in manufacturing”507.   
Indeed, the rehabilitation loans were designed to thoroughly overhaul the parastatal sector 
of the economy. According to Jonathan Kydd, the Bank and the ZCG believed that 
because diversification and growth “could only be achieved by policies which rolled back 
economic controls, it was desired to liberalise as many sectors as possible, and to break-
up the monolithic structure of state-owned enterprises”508. The full privatisation of state-
owned companies was not yet on the Bank’s agenda. However, the Bank did evidently 
view the parastatal sector as a wasteful and unproductive segment of the economy. Thus, 
streamlining the parastatal companies was a pivotal component in the effort to diversify 
the Zambian economy. 
If one of the Bank’s central aims was to reform the parastatal sector, the results proved to 
be disappointing to say the least. According to Larmer, the effort to integrate mining 
operations under ZCCM actually enabled the Zambian state to hoard more mining 
revenues as the centralisation fostered corruption.509 The same message is echoed in the 
Bank’s evaluation of the loan from 1992:   
“ZCCM's managerial autonomy and accountability were not even considered as a 
potential issue, given the dominant role of the Party (UNIP) in the management of 
the economy, the way the appointments of the top executives were made, and the 
strong sense of party loyalties within the corporate structure. In terms of 
accountability, ZCCM has been "a state within a state."”510 
In the summer of 1985 the Zambian economy was on the verge of default. The Fund 
calculated that Zambian mid- and long-term external debt amounted to over 3.5 billion 
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dollars.511 Moreover, it could not pay back its scheduled obligations to the Fund. The 
Fund decreed that Zambia could not make use of Fund resources before it started paying 
back its obligations on schedule.512 Incidentally, the decision was taken in an executive 
board meeting in Seoul in October 1985, when the Baker Plan was unveiled by the US 
Treasury. In the face of the deteriorating economic conditions, members of the Fund staff 
had visited Lusaka back in April 1985, but an agreement with the Zambian authorities for 
further adjustment measures could not be reached. As a result, the SAP of 1984 was 
declared inoperative.513 
Hence, after a stint of comparative prudence in obeying the Fund programs, a change 
happened in the Zambian government’s approach in 1985. One major factor that 
contributed to the sudden shift was the influence of the domestic political situation. In the 
1980s, the trade unions, led by Chiluba, became the main opposition to the UNIP 
government and one-party politics. The main reason for this was a lack of investments, 
as the government and ruling elite were amassing a larger portion of the shrinking mining 
revenues. Widespread strikes became common in the urban sectors of the economy.514 
The IMF-led austerity measures and wage freezes further exacerbated the grievances of 
the urban dwellers. The Zambian representative at the Fund’s executive board, E. I. M. 
Mtei, implied that the failure of the SAP can be explained at least partially through this 
political dynamic: 
“As a consequence, the stand-by arrangement had become inoperative earlier in the 
year, despite the Government's determined efforts to press ahead with major policy 
initiatives in the face of great opposition to further austerity from the strong and 
politically vocal workers’ union.”515 
To be sure, implementing the first real wave of liberalisation of the Zambian economy in 
1983–1985 was a politically tough task for the UNIP government. The depreciation of 
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the currency and high inflation were harshly felt in the pockets of ordinary Zambian 
people. In December 1982, five kwachas equalled approximately four dollars, but three 
years later six kwachas could buy only one dollar.516 In November 1984, an on-off 
liberalisation of prices sent the cost of bread and wheat flour up by 80–90 per cent.517  
In analysing the economic decline of Zambia in this period, bad timing seems to be a 
major factor once again. The global debt crisis prompted a change in the IFI’s policies, 
but Zambia’s debt problem had already matured long before that. The main target of the 
massive EFF loan in 1981 was the diversification of the Zambian economy, a reform that 
was already late and which the economy desperately needed. However, because of 
another copper price downturn, the EFF loan failed, and the emphasis in the Fund’s 
policies switched markedly in 1982. Thus, in the aftermath of the eruption of the global 
debt crisis, the acute need to diversify the Zambian economy was postponed further. 
Instead, the focus was pinned on short-term liquidity and the repayment of existing debt. 
Because the copper prices remained low, the Zambian government could not achieve 
growth and fix the dire situation, despite its rather valiant efforts to implement the Fund’s 
adjustment measures in 1983–1985.  
This trajectory reflects neatly the narrative of growing US influence in the IFIs – 
especially in the Fund – during Reagan’s first administration, outlined in the second 
chapter. Many of the Bank’s former employees stressed that a major mistake in the IFI’s 
policies was to follow the US lead in treating the debt crisis initially as a liquidity issue. 
In hindsight, this is exactly what happened in Zambia. Thus, it can be concluded that the 
1983 SAP was the first one in Zambia, where the US influence seems to have played a 
significant part.  
The performance criteria did not change much compared to earlier programs. 
Nevertheless, a significant change was witnessed in the content of the programs, again 
mirroring the American push for more comprehensive SAPs. During the previous decade, 
the programs had generally indicated policy areas that needed reforming, but specific 
measures were rarely included. While it is impossible to attribute the substance of every 
single small policy measure to the IFI staffs, in my opinion, the mere existence of very 
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exact price and subsidy targets implies the Fund’s push for detailed SAPs. Moreover, the 
micro-conditionality was accompanied by more extensive screening of the Zambian 
government’s performance under the programs. 
Moreover, earlier IFI documents portray the discussions with the Zambian officials as 
sincerely consultative processes. Although the IFIs still presented the SAPs of the 1980s 
as plans designed by the Zambian officials, the relationship had visibly transformed. As 
the Zambian government was verging on insolvency, the IFIs could more or less dictate 
the policy measures that had to be taken. In addition, the Zambian government was no 
longer responsible for formulating comprehensive long-term economic plans, as had been 
the case with the first and second national development plans. Instead, the Bank took a 
leading role in creating an investment program that spanned over several years. 
In the Bank’s case, tracing American influence behind its operations in Zambia is harder. 
As the second chapter of this study charted, the first half of the 1980s witnessed a struggle 
within the institution as the American influence was increasing. The US government 
wanted to assign distinct roles to the two institutions, but compared to the Bank, the Fund 
was enjoying the full American support at the time. The Bank had more trouble in 
securing additional funds, but on the other hand, is was leading the diversification efforts 
in Zambia more independently through the ZCG, because the Reagan administration’s 
focus was on financial stabilisation.  
The major change in the Bank during this period can be seen in the proliferation of 
neoliberal economic policies and the growing emphasis on structural adjustment. As a 
former employee of the Bank admitted in his interview, the 10 per cent cap on structural 
lending was circumvented by sectoral loans. This was exactly the case in Zambia, where 
the push for comprehensive structural adjustment was embedded in sector-specific loans. 
However, even if the diversification of the Zambian economy was recognised as the most 
important objective, the biggest loan of the period was nevertheless directed to the mining 
sector, because achieving short-term macroeconomic balance was seen as a prerequisite 
for economic growth. This was in line with the reasoning of the Fund and the US 
Treasury. In terms of results, the Bank’s effort to diversify the Zambian economy was 
feeble.  
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The neoliberal influence is present in the Bank’s operations of the time. The Bank and 
the Zambian officials had drawn up a plan that involved the gradual liberalisation of the 
state-planned economic model. In addition, the Bank was trying to promote private 
enterprises by reducing and streamlining the parastatal sector. To conclude, direct 
American influence is hard to detect in the Zambian case, but it is clear that at the same 
time the Bank was adopting a position that was similar to the Fund’s and the US 
Treasury’s stance. Drawing from the Zambian case it is evident that by the mid-1980s the 
neoliberal “purge” was complete at the Bank as managers like Anne Krueger had made 
their imprint on the institution.  
     
3.5 The Pain of Adjustment: 1986–1991 
President Kaunda was a typical authoritarian leader at least in one manner: namely in that 
he persistently assigned the blame for Zambian hardships on external forces. 
Unfortunately, for a long time, the president had reasonable success in conveying his 
message to the people.518 The most common explanations for the poor performance of the 
economy were the low copper prices and recurrent droughts.519 This tactic diverted 
attention from the underlying problem, which was that the UNIP regime had allowed 
Zambian institutions to deteriorate and corruption to corrode economic management.520 
McPherson sums up the consequences by noting that “reform was postponed due to the 
general absence of accountability”521.      
The last years of Kaunda’s rule should be viewed against the backdrop of this failure. 
Eventually, the UNIP government’s rule had to come to an end, because the prolonged 
economic disaster could not be solved by it. Richard Sandbrook has studied the role of 
states in implementing SAPs, and I find his conclusions to be illuminating in the Zambian 
context.522 According to him, the thorough implementation of SAPs produces a paradox, 
because a strong state is needed to instigate reforms that are largely designed to diminish 
its own role in the economy: 
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”Structural adjustment assumes an institutional capacity to design and implement 
complex policies concerning prices, trade, banking, finance and foreign investment, 
to reform parastatals, and to manage complicated negotiations with donors and the 
subsequent assistance programmes. The state, originally conceived as part of the 
problem of economic decline, is to contribute to the solution.”523   
From this perspective, it is easy to see how the Zambian government was approaching a 
dead-end. In the last years of its existence, the UNIP government was facing a trade-off 
between the austerity and adjustment promoted by the IFIs, and the political 
considerations of the ruling elite. The Zambian people were increasingly opposed to the 
UNIP government, but simultaneously also against the austerity policies. This 
confrontation shaped the Zambian experience in the last years of the 1980s. A recent 
analogous example can be found in the struggles faced by Greece during the European 
debt crisis.524  
Because of the decisiveness of this political dynamic, I intend to focus more on the 
political narrative in the last pages of this study. Analysing the Zambian economic 
situation in detail is not so relevant, because it is rather sufficient to point out that it was 
desperate. Moreover, tracing the American influence behind the last SAP after the 1991 
elections is equally fruitless in my opinion, because it is evident that the program was 
largely shaped by the Washington Consensus. However, before recounting the path to the 
first free elections in more detail, it is essential to analyse the SAP from February 1986. 
As the hopeless economic situation of Zambia unfolded in the summer of 1985, the Fund 
took on more extreme methods. At this point, it is safe to say that Zambia had lost its 
sovereignty in economic matters as the IFIs could more or less dictate the policies to be 
implemented. To begin with, the Fund introduced an auction-system to manage foreign 
exchange transactions. Due to its complicated nature, I will not specify the technical 
aspects of the system. It is adequate to note, that it was mainly designed to adjust the 
exchange rate towards the perceived market-value, which in reality meant a further 
depreciation of the kwacha. A Fund report concluded that the auction system “should be 
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allowed to reflect to the maximum extent possible the influence of market forces”525. The 
auction system had immediate effects, as the value of the currency plummeted in April 
1987 to 21 kwachas against one dollar.526   
After the unsuccessful adjustment efforts of 1983–1985, new measures were introduced 
in order to insert a swift injection of liberalisation into the economy and unleash the forces 
of the private market. A host of supporting measures were introduced with the auction-
system for achieving these targets: prices and interest rates were liberalised further, 
subsidies eliminated by most parts or completely, and trade regulation loosened.527 The 
auction system and the supporting measures were meant to alleviate the acute liquidity 
and insolvency problems. In order to fix the economy in the longer term, a new SBA for 
two years (229.8 million SDR, plus an accompanying CFF-request worth 68.7 million) 
was agreed upon in February 1986.528 The SAP followed the path of the previous ones, 
as the Fund staff still highlighted the acute need of financial stabilisation for achieving 
the longer term goals of growth and diversification.529  
The novel element of the SAP was stressing the power of free markets more forcefully. 
In evaluating the auction system and other liberalising measures, the Fund report noted 
that they “represented a fundamental shift away from a relatively regulated economic 
system and toward an outward-looking, market-oriented policy environment”530. Besides 
its central aim of further liberalising the economy, the SAP included harsh austerity and 
heavy cuts on public spending. In addition to wage freezes and limits to personal 
emoluments, the public sector was slashed by cutting workforce, fast-tracking retirement 
and prohibiting new recruitment.531 
Overall, the 1986 SAP was very comprehensive and rich in detail. Altogether 51 different 
policy measures and conditions can be found in a summary of the program’s elements, 
attached to the Appendix of the Fund report. The different elements of the program were 
extremely wide-ranging, as they included for example the elimination of the import 
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prohibition covering over 50 items; cutting maize and fertilizer subsidies by two thirds; 
organising an independent evaluation of the Zambia Airways’ operations in order to 
streamline it; and permitting free collective bargaining.532 The performance of the 
Zambian government was to be reviewed three times during the first year, and the last 
condition simply stated that “the completion of these reviews will constitute performance 
criteria”533. 
The imprint of US authority – and the Baker Plan more specifically – is clearly visible in 
the SAP of 1986. A stress on market-oriented solutions had already surfaced in the 
introduction of the auction system, and this was followed enthusiastically in the SAP. The 
privatisation of the parastatal companies was not yet on the Fund’s short-term agenda, 
although one target of the program was “to ensure that the enterprises are self-reliant”534. 
Considerable debt relief in the form of rescheduling was seen as imperative for the 
success of the program, but writing off any debt was not yet an option.535 
Another key element of the Baker Plan was to enhance the role of the multilateral 
development banks (MDBs) and this is reflected in Zambia’s adjustment process as well. 
In May 1986, the Bank drafted a medium-term recovery plan, which was tied to the earlier 
SAP so that the Fund program’s “quantitative framework forms the initial phase of the 
Bank-Fund joint medium-term scenario for Zambia”536. To support the plan, the Bank 
issued a 50-million-dollar recovery credit to the Zambian government.537 Regarding the 
importance of market forces, the Bank had clearly adopted an approach similar to that of 
the Fund. The main rationale for the credit was to ensure that necessary imports could be 
secured in order to carry through the Fund’s stabilisation measures: “through its support 
of ongoing and additional policy and institutional reforms in Zambia, particularly the 
foreign exchange auction, it would help ensure greater efficiency of the economy”538 
Following in the path of the earlier rehabilitation loans, reforming the parastatal sector 
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was a pivotal component in the joint medium-term plan. Moreover, privatisation was 
emerging as a viable policy option: 
”The Industrial Development Corporation has engaged consultants under the 
Industrial Reorientation Project (Cr. 1630-ZA) to help improve the efficiency of 
enterprises under its control through the restructuring of phasing out of all or some 
of their activities. This would include privatization where possible.”539 
The Baker Plan was a watershed in the collaboration of the IFIs in Zambia. The 
institutions had increased their co-operation in the previous few years, but from 1985 
onwards the Zambian policy outline was prepared jointly with all three parties 
involved.540 The co-operation was fully institutionalised with the adoption of the Policy 
Framework Papers (PFPs), of which the first one was drafted by the staffs of both 
institutions during the year 1986.    
The first PFP sketched out the IFI’s common medium-term strategy for the Zambian 
economy. One area that the paper singled out for reform was the public sector, which was 
deemed to absorb too much from the state’s coffers: “the ultimate goal is to reduce 
employment in the civil service to an efficient level, which is expected to require 
reduction by about one third the number of temporary daily workers over a three-year 
period”541. Interestingly, the PCP acknowledged that the medium-term strategy could 
have adverse effects on welfare in the short-term, but highlighted that “since a large 
proportion of the poor live in rural areas, the reduction in discrimination against 
agriculture and the rural sector inherent in the program should have definite distributional 
benefits”542. 
To conclude, from late 1985 to early 1987 the IFIs were in charge of managing the 
economic situation of Zambia. The institutions worked closely together with the shared 
aim of thoroughly reforming the economy. Following the neoliberal approach to 
economic policy making, this was to be done by a host of measures, of which the most 
important were further liberalisation of prices and subsidies; streamlining or privatising 
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parastatal enterprises; and enforcing strict austerity in public finances, especially by 
cutting the size of the public sector.     
The Baker Plan was later held as a turning point in the US government’s stance towards 
the debt crisis, as it started to recognise the underlying structural problems holding back 
the developing countries. This does not, however, reflect itself in the 1986 SAP of 
Zambia, where the focus was still very much on financial stabilisation with an increased 
emphasis on the market-oriented neoliberal approach. The Fund created the Structural 
Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986, which had a medium-term outlook, but in many ways 
it came too late for Zambia. The economy was already in an acute state, and even more 
crucial were the political tensions that followed in 1987–1991, which would have made 
a comprehensive structural adjustment under the SAF (ESAF since 1987) impossible.  
The political drama commenced in May 1987, when President Kaunda suddenly cut ties 
with the IFIs and terminated the SAP. Moreover, in a fiery speech, he accused the ”neo-
colonial” IFIs for bringing about Zambia’s economic woes. Margaret Hanson and James 
Hentz have studied the ownership and spread of neoliberal policies in Africa. According 
to them, Kaunda’s allegations were aimed at listeners both home and abroad.543 Hanson 
and Hentz argue that the “financial coercion” exerted by the IFIs does not explain 
satisfactorily the probability of a state embracing neoliberal policies. Instead, the key 
variable in adopting them has been domestic political situations and more specifically 
electoral cycles.544 Therefore, accounts that portray the spread of neoliberalism as 
influenced only by a one-sided push on the behalf of the IFIs should be viewed critically. 
Although ideological opposition to the IFIs (often framed as a critique of their neo-
colonial meddling) has been common in Africa, it is often used in arguments spelled out 
in domestic political tussles for power. 545   
Indeed, the domestic political situation largely explains the UNIP government’s actions. 
The harsh austerity of the effectual SAP had sparked unrest in the Copperbelt and Lusaka. 
In December 1986, 15 people died in food riots, which followed the decontrol of maize 
prices.546 It has to be remembered that, despite Kaunda’s authoritarian conduct, violent 
outbreaks were uncommon in Zambia, a rarity on the African continent as a whole. 
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However, considering the austerity measures, growing unemployment and rocketing 
inflation, it is not surprising that people took their protests to the streets. As the political 
situation was spiralling out of control, Kaunda decided to discard the IFIs in a move that 
was surely motivated more by his own chances of survival as the head of the state. Lise 
Rakner points out perceptively that the reasonable effort to stabilise the economy in 1983–
1985 was preceded by elections (not the competitive sort), after which Kaunda was 
nevertheless able to consolidate his power.547 
Following the break-up, President Kaunda introduced the New Economic Recovery 
Program (NERP), which was in essence a step back towards a model of state planning.548 
The kwacha was revalued significantly and debt repayment reduced.549 The NERP should 
be viewed as a last desperate attempt of the Zambian government to hold on to what 
remained of its economic self-governance. Predictably, the experiment did not last very 
long, although Zambia did actually record some decent growth under the NERP in 1987–
1988, mainly because of an excellent harvest.550 However, breaking off the ties with the 
IFIs had drastic consequences, as no other donors were willing to lend to Zambia anymore 
and aid that had been negotiated earlier stopped rolling in. Kaunda had to retreat and talks 
about a new SAP were quietly started in the spring of 1989.551 
At the time of the 1986 food riots, Chiluba – speaking as the leader of the trade unions – 
condemned the Fund for imposing monetarist policies on the “socialist” state of Zambia. 
The turmoil and Kaunda’s decision to cut ties with the IFIs exposed the UNIP 
government’s weakness and encouraged the opposition to get organised. The summer of 
1990 was even more turbulent as more rioting and a failed coup shook the country. The 
unrest and mass protests emboldened the opposition further and Chiluba started to 
demand for more profound changes. Under the piling political pressure, Kaunda conceded 
and scheduled multi-party elections for October the next year.552  
By the time of the elections, Chiluba had made a complete turnaround and MMD “was 
elected on a platform built on neoliberal policies”553. Hanson and Hentz maintain that this 
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change of mind was chiefly a political move, as the MMD framed its opposition now fully 
against Kaunda. The tactic worked, as MMD recorded a crushing victory in the 
parliamentary and presidential elections: the party took 125 seats in the parliament from 
a total of 150, and Chiluba won the presidency by taking 75 per cent of the popular vote.554 
Judging by the election result, Zambian people had increasingly turned against Kaunda 
and the political system, not just the austerity policies of the IFIs. Thus, Chiluba’s’ 
political success was crucial in the adoption of neoliberal policies, and in my opinion, 
reaffirms Hanson’s and Hentz’ argument on the importance of domestic political currents.  
The free and fair elections drew a lot of international attention as they were, unfortunately, 
quite exceptional at the time in Africa. This was reflected in the significant amounts of 
aid that started pouring in after the ballot.555 Chiluba had campaigned by promising to 
liberalise the economy with policies that were later portrayed as “too aggressive for even 
the IMF’s tastes”556. For the IFIs, however, this was welcome news, as the election result 
and MMDs commitment to reform finally offered a clean slate to start reorganising the 
whole economy. Thus, the liberalisation that started after the elections was reminiscent 
of what Naomi Klein has labelled the “shock treatment” of an economy, where old 
structures are overhauled swiftly in a wave of neoliberal policies.557 To be sure, the spirit 
of the Washington Consensus was embodied in the very first paragraphs of the third PFP, 
which covered the essentials of the liberalisation process:  
”The economic strategy recognizes the importance of market forces and reflects the 
conviction that Government should not undertake what the private sector can do at 
least as well. It is grounded in the view that individual initiative and freedom in the 
market place and in the political arena are essential for a thriving economy and a 
responsive political system. These beliefs are fortified by the conviction that free 
markets reinforce political freedoms, and vice versa.”558 
The Bank had initiated some new projects in the years 1986–1987, but after the rift with 
the Zambian government the lending ceased completely.559 Through the 1980s, the 
Bank’s inputs to Zambia had been smaller than the Fund’s, but in the new decade the 
parts changed over as the Bank took a principal role in guiding the MDD government 
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through the adjustment process. The Bank issued nearly 1.4 billion dollars to Zambia in 
1991–1996. The loans were aimed to assist Zambia through the transformation in a 
comprehensive way: in achieving a macroeconomic balance in the economy; in investing 
in the diversification of the productive base; in assisting in the privatisation of state-
owned companies; and more traditionally, in providing inputs to agriculture, health care 
and education.560 With the Fund, the newly-elected Zambian government negotiated a 
three-year rights of accumulation program (RAP) in July 1992. The RAP was a novel 
type of agreement, where, by adhering to the SAP, the Zambian authorities acquired back 
the rights to draw capital again from the Fund in the future.561  
The social consequences of the structural adjustment were devastating. Real GDP per 
capita fell to an all-time low of just over 900 dollars in 1994.562 By 1993, the price of 
maize had risen 500 per cent and 20 000 public sector workers had lost their jobs.563 The 
heavy burden of adjustment was distributed unevenly, as women and children suffered 
more because of cuts in health care and education. In addition, many of the subsistence 
farmers who lost rights to their land due to privatisation were women. Malnutrition 
increased child mortality and abandonment.564 To compound the hardships, bad timing 
played a significant part again, as has been the case throughout the postcolonial history 
of Zambia. The country was hit by a devastating drought in 1991–1992.  
An important aspect in the critique of the SAPs has been the questioning of some of the 
research on which the policies were based. Deborah Potts has studied the movement of 
people between urban and rural areas in Africa, and according to her, the IFIs did not 
fathom migration processes correctly in the 1980s. Potts argues that, after the debt crisis 
hit Africa, migration flows reversed from urban to rural in many countries. Moreover, 
cyclical migration became common as living standards worsened and opportunities were 
scarce both in urban and rural areas.565  
The IFI’s policies in Africa in the 1980s were influenced by two important studies, both 
dating to 1981. A Bank-report by Alan Berg highlights the persistent urban-rural income 
gap and rapid rate of urbanisation in the developing world. In his book Markets and States 
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in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies, Robert H. Bates in turn 
is critical of the prevalent agricultural marketing policies in developing countries at the 
time. Both studies emphasise the detrimental effects of subsidising basic commodities as 
they are seen to sustain urban middle-class consumption at the expense of rural 
subsistence farmers.566 
Indeed, the fast rate of urbanisation and rural-urban wage gap are perpetual themes in the 
IFI documents treating Zambia in the 1970s and 1980s. A Bank report from 1981 asserted 
that, despite the growth rate of urban areas slowing down a bit since independence, “the 
absolute numbers involved are staggering”567. The Bank’s contemporary data reveal that 
rapid population growth facilitated a steady urban expansion through the 1980s, but the 
pace proved to be significantly slower than initially was projected. In fact, while 40 per 
cent of the population lived in urban areas in 1980, the percentage declined 0.5 points 
during the decade.568 Potts has calculated that the Bank’s estimation of the rate of 
urbanisation was nearly 81 per cent too high back in 1980.569 In this light, the 
misjudgement of the IFIs looks serious.  
Potts claims that profound changes – missed largely by the IFIs – had already taken place 
in Zambia during the 1970s. The urban growth rate was extremely high from 1963 to 
1969, and this trend was expected to continue. Bates had studied the post-independence 
urbanisation in Zambia and the government’s policies that he judged to contribute to 
sustaining an “urban bias”. His influential work in 1981 drew upon these earlier studies 
and thus continued to project fast urban growth. Potts argues, however, that migration 
flows adjusted to the long recession already in the 1970s.570 Moreover, by the 1980s, the 
privileged position of the urban classes could be questioned. While an urban elite had 
been a common feature of African societies in the 1960s, the rural-urban income gap 
declined steadily during the next decade and trade unions lost their earlier strength. In the 
1980s, there was no more a distinct urban class to speak of. The informal sector had grown 
and an influx of unskilled workers created several class layers in the urban population.571 
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A common feature of the SAPs of the 1980s in Africa was targeting urban consumption, 
especially through pricing policies and the elimination of subsidies. These adjustment 
policies hit the urban poor hard as the prices of basic foodstuffs and other vital 
commodities, such as petrol, rocketed. In Zambia, it resulted in increased poverty and 
child mortality.572 In addition, the adjustments always included austerity in the public 
sector, which in effect meant slashing education, health care and transport.573 Moreover, 
while the urban-rural wage gap may well have been still a significant issue back in 1981, 
the IFIs did not revise their view during the decade at all. Potts sums up the mistake: “yet 
the structural adjustment policies implemented since 1989 have taken no cognizance of 
this fact, and have been exceedingly harsh in trying to “correct” an imbalance which no 
longer existed”574.  
Other studies have verified the “urban bias” miscalculation. An investigation by Allast 
M. Mwanza, Nkonga Mwamba and Eniwet Kakuwa shows that it was already well known 
by the time of their review in the early 1990s:  
”By 1986, some 35 to 40% of urban households were living below the Poverty 
Datum Line. Evidence further indicated that the rural income gap had narrowed 
down whereas in urban areas, the rich-poor gap had widened. Moreover, the decline 
in urban incomes was accompanied by a massive contraction of formal sector 
employment.”575   
The liberalisation of prices and elimination of subsidies were universal elements in the 
SAPs around the world. In many parts of the globe, the policies were directed at a 
perceived “labour aristocracy”576, as the actual make-up of urban classes was not 
thoroughly enough investigated. As a result, poor and unskilled workers of the informal 
sector were hit hardest by the adjustment policies. This process was exacerbated in Africa, 
due to a lack (and misreading) of data by the IFIs. Because of its early and rapid 
urbanisation, Zambia is one of the clearest examples of an African state, whose 
development has been affected by this largely illusive “urban bias”. 
The years after the free elections were the toughest period in the postcolonial history of 
Zambia. The speedy recovery never arrived and the liberalisation of the economy proved 
to be a more protracted and socially arduous process than expected. The MMD 
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government was partly at fault, as in many cases the implementation of the reforms was 
not done satisfactorily. Especially in his second stint in power from 1996 to 2001, 
Chiluba’s eagerness to reform the economy diminished because staying in power became 
a more pressing priority.577 After a promising start, the newly born Zambian democracy 
took steps backwards as the ruling class manipulated institutions and fostered corruption 
in governance.578 
Zambia’s prospects look better in the new millennia as the rising global demand for 
copper sparked an economic boom in the early 2000s. However, despite the robust 
economic growth of the past years, 54 per cent of Zambians are still poor at present 
times.579 Crucially, the Zambian economy has become more diversified, making it less 
dependent on the mining sector, which still contributed 15.4 per cent of GDP in 2017.580 
On the troubling side, Zambian external debt has been mounting again after being largely 
written off under the HIPC program in 2005. The debt has climbed to 59 per cent of the 
GDP in the past ten years, with China holding a quarter of it. Even more worrying is the 
widespread corruption and movement towards authoritarianism that has accompanied the 
escalating indebtedness.581 
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4. Conclusions 
 
The United States (US) played a pivotal role in creating the Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) of the 1980s and 1990s. The development of conditionality in the 
lending policies of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) was a crucial part of this 
process, and this development was strongly influenced by the US from the very 
beginning. The Americans insisted on formulating certain open-ended paragraphs in the 
Fund’s Articles of Agreement, and these enabled the later expansion of conditionality. 
After the Bretton Woods system broke down, a transitory period followed as the Fund 
had to reinvent its purpose to some extent. The US government contributed significantly 
to the Fund’s metamorphosis as it pushed for increased conditionality in the organisation, 
which, in turn, enabled the institution to take on novel ventures. After the eruption of the 
debt crisis in 1982, an initially reluctant American government began to enhance the role 
of the Fund. Under US guidance, the Fund moved towards an increasing extent of 
microconditionality and issued constantly tightening and more wide-ranging SAPs 
throughout the 1980s.  
Tracing neoliberal aspirations in the Fund’s lending policies is not as straightforward a 
task. This is mainly due to the institution’s primary concern in fixing balance of payments 
problems and other macroeconomic issues. To be sure, neoclassical economics guided 
the Fund’s operations already in the 1970s. However, at that time, the Fund did not 
thoroughly and openly embrace the neoliberal agenda, which was centred around the 
mission of retasking the state in a comprehensive way in order to turn the “statist” 
developing countries into liberal market economies. Despite this, it must be concluded 
that the Fund did endorse the neoliberal policy program in the 1980s. After all, it did forge 
a close alliance with the US Treasury. 
Conditionality developed at a later stage in the lending policies of the Bank, and the US 
did not have a central role in the process, as had been the case with the Fund. When 
decolonisation gained pace, the US was able to promote the Bank as the major global 
creditor for the developing world, in place of the more egalitarian and ideologically 
diverse United Nations (UN). After this, however, the US stepped back and the Bank 
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gained more autonomy under the leadership of Robert S. McNamara, who guided the 
institution toward a broader developmentalist agenda.  
The US stance altered in the 1980s, mainly because of a change in administration with 
the Republican Ronald Reagan taking office. An ideological clash ensued in the Bank. In 
this battle, the neoliberal line of thought prevailed and critical voices were ousted or 
marginalised. The Americans played a part in this by influencing the recruitment of top 
management. After the introduction of the Baker Plan, the Bank was accepted as an equal 
member in the alliance that was already in place between the Fund and the US 
government. The closer cooperation between the IFIs was institutionalised with the 
adoption of the Policy Framework Papers (PFPs). By the last years of the decade, the 
Bank had adopted the neoliberal program completely, as the push to privatise state-owned 
companies, for example, testifies. Thus, the Bank became the third pillar of support for 
the Washington Consensus.    
In my opinion, a sociological view in studying the IFIs is paramount for achieving a 
fruitful analysis. Too often, the institutions are presented as passive agents, easily led by 
outside pressure. It is true that, in most cases, it made sense for the IFIs to follow the lead 
of the US and other Western industrial countries. This is fairly understandable, because, 
unlike in the UN, power is linked to  financial weight in the IFIs. In this respect the world 
has changed since the 1980s. The past years have seen the rise of China and other big 
emerging economies. In addition, a handful of the old industrial nations have formed a 
powerful economic and political block in the European Union (EU). Although the head 
of the Bank is still selected by the US president, the Bank has distanced itself from the 
US government and focused on issues like poverty reduction, sustainable development 
and gender equality. Likewise, the Fund has highlighted its impartial status since the days 
of the Washington Consensus. 
The US influence and the neoliberal breakthrough in the IFIs are evident in the case of 
Zambia. In the first half of the 1970s, the Bank was very committed to Zambian 
development. The Bank assessed that the UNIP government was able to implement sound 
economic policies, and it did not oppose the nationalisations in the key sectors of the 
economy. Gradually, as the economic situation worsened in Zambia, the Bank’s trust in 
the UNIP government waned. The Fund was marginalised by the US government in the 
1970s. This meant that it had a freedom to operate, but, on the other hand, its stature in 
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the international financial markets was modest, and conditionality was still at a 
comparatively low level. The relative autonomy of the IFIs with regard to US influence 
did not benefit Zambia, quite the contrary. The cooperation between the institutions was 
inadequate as they had different, and somewhat conflicting, goals in the Zambian context. 
Moreover, both institutions kept issuing new loans to Zambia, although the country’s debt 
was piling up and the UNIP government’s performance in implementing the 
accompanying policy programs was questionable. 
In the first years of the 1980s, the considerable changes that were taking place within the 
IFIs were reflected as rather inconsistent policies in Zambia. The Fund had a bigger role 
in the Zambian adjustment process in these years. The substantial Extended Fund Facility 
(EFF) loan was targeted at diversifying the Zambian economy, but it was doomed to fail 
because the copper price projections proved overly optimistic. After the debt crisis, the 
Fund’s approach in Zambia changed as the institution’s focus shifted to acute liquidity 
issues, following the general line of the US Treasury in handling the global emergency. 
The Bank was only beginning to adopt structural adjustment loans (SALs) in this period. 
In Zambia, the Bank experimented with sectoral program loans, which yielded 
disappointing results in terms of diversifying the economy. Although the cooperation of 
the IFIs was not yet formalised, the institutions started to work more closely together in 
these years. In addition, the IFIs had a major role in organising new funds and debt 
rescheduling for Zambia with other donors and financiers. 
In the second half of the 1980s, US influence became very apparent in the case of Zambia. 
After the introduction of the Baker Plan, the IFIs started formulating policies for Zambia 
in complete collaboration. The emphasis was on fostering the free markets and achieving 
a comprehensive liberalisation of the “statist” economy. The IFIs had considerable 
leverage in decreeing policies, because Zambia was on the verge of default. The climax 
of US influence was witnessed in the 1991 SAP, two years after the Washington 
Consensus was forged. The adjustment was sorely needed due to the hopeless state of 
affairs in Zambia, and it laid the ground for later growth and diversification. In hindsight, 
however, the shock treatment of 1991 seems rather harsh since the IFI’s approach 
changed soon after. Zambia was approved into the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) program in 1996 and its debt was completely wiped out ten years later.  
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The truly disheartening conclusion, which can be drawn from this study, is that the 
Zambian economic collapse was not unavoidable. First and foremost, the blame should 
be assigned to Zambia’s government, which made several cumulative errors that were 
crucial in bringing about the disaster. The first mistake of the UNIP government was to 
postpone the diversification of the economy during the copper boom. The Zambian 
government adopted a strategy of appeasing urban laborers and public-sector workers, 
who constituted the core support of the UNIP party. As a result, the economy remained 
vulnerable to external shocks, and a culture of patronage was rooted in the important 
parastatal sector of the economy.   
The second erroneous move was made in the aftermath of the copper price shock. Instead 
of adjusting the economy when it could have been done with relatively small sacrifices, 
the UNIP government borrowed from the deregulated international capital markets in 
order to sustain domestic consumption and finance budget deficits. The decision was 
motivated, at least partly, by the belief that the copper price slump would be brief. By the 
1980s, the economic situation was beyond a quick fix. However, President Kenneth 
Kaunda and his party comrades did no favours to the Zambian people by clinging onto 
power and thus protracting the crisis. Corruption intensified in the process as larger 
portions of the shrinking export revenues were hoarded by the ruling elite. During these 
turbulent years, Zambia lost its position as a middle-income country and large parts of 
the rapidly growing population were dragged into poverty. Informal employment became 
common and new classes of urban poor emerged.   
While it would be extremely unfair to blame the IFIs for the Zambian hardships, it can be 
concluded, that the institutions were not very successful in helping the country. One could 
argue, that the task was impossible due to the mismanagement of the Zambian 
government. In my opinion, however, this claim is not a sufficient explanation alone. It 
is important to note that the Zambian economy was dragged into trouble because of 
external shocks. From this perspective, it would be reasonable to expect better assistance 
from the institutions that were designed to provide support precisely in these 
circumstances. 
Moreover, the troubles in Zambia should be viewed against the larger context of a 
changing external economic environment. “The rules of the game” in the global economy 
were rewritten after the Bretton Woods system collapsed, but countries like Zambia had 
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no part in this process. It can be argued that the profound changes were mostly beyond 
control, but at least the Western powers – due to their hegemony in the system and their 
influence in the IFIs – were able to manage the transition better. In contrast, Zambia’s 
position, as an open and undiversified economy on the periphery, was a very exposed 
one. Zambia is dependent on the production of a single raw material and a “price taker” 
in the global economy, as the value of copper is dictated in the London Metal Exchange. 
The extremely vulnerable economic position is made even more precarious by Zambia’s 
location as a land-locked country. Ten years after gaining independence, the country 
found itself in a very unstable part of the world. Zambia’s economic troubles were 
aggravated because the state was slow to adapt to the external changes. Under the 
leadership of President Kaunda, the country tried to hold onto the model of state control, 
which was rapidly becoming outdated. However, this investigation has shown that the 
IFIs were also sluggish in adapting to the changing external environment.  
Therefore, an important aspect to be learned from this study is the significant role of 
timing in the process of adapting to neoliberal policies. Too often, the SAPs around the 
world are treated as fairly identical processes, when in fact complete narratives about the 
impacts of the programs require a thorough understanding of the gradual transformation 
of the IFIs (affected largely by US influence) on the one hand, and domestic political 
dynamics on the other. In the Zambian case, the adjustment process stretched over a long 
period. It was one of the first countries to accumulate significant amounts of debt after 
the oil crisis. In spite of the protracted process of adjustment, the decisive blow was 
nevertheless sharp. Because of the continually failed efforts to adjust the economy and 
the political deadlock of the 1980s, the final phase of adjustment took the form of a shock 
blow to the economy. 
Irrespective of the precise time of adjustment, the SAPs did have common characteristics 
around the world. The most obvious shared feature was the hard social consequences of 
adjustment. SAPs in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe all increased income 
differences and hurt segments of society that were already disadvantaged. These 
outcomes can be largely attributed to the neoliberal content of the policies, but in the 
Zambian case the situation was aggravated by the IFI’s misjudgement of the rural-urban 
migration patterns. The positive aspect in the Zambian case was the relatively peaceful 
democratic transition that accompanied the liberalisation process. The free elections gave 
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a credible mandate for Frederick Chiluba to reform the economy, although unfortunately, 
the reign of the former trade union boss proved to be disappointing and characterised by 
wide-spread corruption. 
The Zambian experience highlights the importance of sound domestic institutions. The 
successful implementation of SAPs requires an active state, but I would argue that 
democratic and transparent institutions constitute a second precondition. Substantial 
economic reforms are hard to execute without an active civil society and functioning 
economic and political institutions. However, it is equally important to maintain 
transparency within the global multilateral institutions. In fact, this study has exposed 
some of the dangers associated with multilateral institutions that are operating under 
external pressure. Moreover, developments in the past years have highlighted the need 
for strong independent multilateral institutions, as bilateral lenders like China have 
emerged as sources of cheap credit in Africa.  
It has been clear to me from the very beginning that this study will not produce a 
straightforward set of conclusions. The goal of the study was to offer a nuanced analysis, 
and in this respect, I believe it has served its purpose. At least I have been able to clarify 
my own thoughts in relation to a topic that initially seemed incredibly complicated and 
disputed. The relational approach has been essential to this process. By pinpointing the 
focus on two distinct questions and their interaction, I have gained insights into the wider 
dynamics of the complex set of relations that have shaped the debt crisis in Africa. I 
believe that this study can pave the way for additional research. It would be interesting to 
apply the same approach in a comparative analysis of the implementation of SAPs in 
different parts of the world. 
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